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ABSTRACT 
   
 This thesis investigates the cooperation and competition between a global 
power (the United States) and a regional power (China) in Southeast Asia from 1991 
to 2015. The research explores the interests of the US and China, focusing on how 
collective benefits can be maximised so as to meet the national interests of Vietnam. 
By means of an empirical analysis of American, Chinese and Vietnamese foreign 
policy through extensive interviews with ASEAN politicians and diplomats, this 
thesis argues that, contrary to some accounts, Vietnam is not forging closer ties to the 
US to counter-balance the rise of China. Rather, the thesis argues that Vietnam has 
adopted a steady policy of power balancing. This is in accordance with recent 
Vietnamese foreign policy, which is based on diversity and multilateralism. 
 While there are numerous and wide-ranging discussions within the Vietnamese 
government about the impact of the Sino-American relationship on the country, they 
are largely based on internal sources of information. This thesis brings new 
perspectives from Southeast Asian politicians, diplomats and scholars in the region. 
The dissertation presents, for the first time in English, an analysis of regional voices 
from Southeast Asia and Vietnam that consider the impact of Sino-American 
interactions in the post-Cold War period to 2015, as well as giving recommendations 
for the region and Vietnam into the future. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis explores Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia from 1991 
to 2015 and its implications for Vietnam. This 24-year time frame begins with the 
significant starting point of 1991 when Vietnam ended its international isolation 
imposed by the international community after Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia 
(late 1978 - September 1989). In that year Vietnam normalised relations with China 
in 1991, and in 1995 with the United States of America (US). The year 2015 is 
selected as the end point, due to its importance in Vietnam’s relations with the US 
and China. The year 2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the normalisation of 
Vietnam-US diplomatic ties (11/7/1995 - 11/7/2015) and the 65th anniversary of the 
establishment of Vietnam-China diplomatic ties (18/1/1950 - 18/1/2015). Thus, the 
year 2015 brings the thesis up to the present day, making it a contemporary study in 
the research field of international relations. 
Since the mid-20th Century, the study of the developing relations between 
China and the US in international relations has been of great interest to scholars 
because of their important roles in world politics. While the US is the current global 
superpower with its comprehensive economic, military and political strength, China 
has increasingly been considered as a new giant in Asia with different strategic 
interests in various parts of the world. Within this period of transformation in global 
politics from the “new world order,” the Sino-American relationship has been of 
enormous importance to the national interests of many states. One particular area that 
has attracted both American and Chinese interest is Southeast Asia, due to its 
significant geographic, economic and political position. The US, the largest 
developed country, is trying to maintain the status of a current superpower while 
China, the biggest developing state, is drawing global attention for its potential 
power. Some scholars argue it is inevitable that there will be a strategic competition 
between Washington and Beijing.1 The implications of Sino-American interests in a 
                                                 
1Chen, O., ‘The US’ Political Challenges on China’s National Security in the 21st Century’s First 
Decade’, Asian Social Science, 7(6), 2011, pp.103-109 at 108. 
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particular region like Southeast Asia for the last two decades have become a matter 
of concern for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
In an era when the centre of gravity of the world is shifting from the west to 
the east, Southeast Asia is located in an area that will be of strategic significance for 
China and the US in the next twenty to fifty years. Geographically, Southeast Asia 
possesses a huge wealth of natural resources, including oil and other energy, which 
are vital substances for the economic development of China and the US.2 China 
needs oil from a diversity of sources, including Southeast Asia, due to its economic 
ascension. According to Karen Ward, a senior global economist from HSBC Bank, 
the world may have no more than half a century of oil left at the present consumption 
rates. One tremendous pressure is from China, where growth trends may see as many 
as one billion more cars on the road by mid-century.3 According to Womack, China’s 
energy needs are estimated to grow by more than 50% by 2020. As a result, China 
will have to import a large portion of its oil needs, and it is diversifying the oil 
supply source. Vietnam is now China’s sixth largest oil supplier, with 5.6% of the 
total in 2002.4 Meanwhile, as the world’s naval power, the US has benefited from the 
free and safe navigation of Southeast Asian sea-lanes, through which passes one-
third of the global trade and 66% of the world’s oil and natural gas.5 
Southeast Asia is situated on an important sea transportation route, with 
international sea-lanes including the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits and the South 
China Sea. A high-ranking Indonesian political official6 claimed that approximately 
50,000 vessels per year pass through the Malacca Straits connecting the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans. Every day, vessels carrying around 11 million barrels of oil from the 
Middle East to East Asia sail through these sea-lanes. Moreover, Southeast Asia has 
a population of approximately 600 million people, with a growing middle class in a 
                                                 
2 Interview Dr Rizal Sukma, Director of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, 
Indonesia, 12 June 2012. 
3 Rudolf, J.C., ‘Less than 50 Years of Oil Left, HSBC Warns’, 30 March 2011. Available at 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/less-than-50-years-of-oil-left-hsbc-warns/? (Date of visit 7 
July 2015) 
4 Womack, B., ‘China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry’, Cambridge University Press, p. 49 
5 Koh, T., ‘The United States and Southeast Asia’, pp. 35-54 at 40. 
6 H.E. Dr.MarzukiAlie, SE, MM, the 14th Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Republic of 
Indonesia 
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dynamic commercial area. It is a potential market for products from both the US and 
China. In terms of security, the Malacca Straits makes Southeast Asia an important 
region, as controlling this strait means taking control of a shipping route of the global 
economy.7 
In terms of politics, Southeast Asian states, and to a lesser extent ASEAN 
itself, play important roles in debates and practices of regional security, democracy 
and human rights. There are also a number of potential flashpoints from border 
disputes, both maritime and land, particularly in the South China Sea with disputes 
over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. For these reasons, the Asia-Pacific is 
considered to be one of the most dynamic regions in the world.8 Consequently, 
Southeast Asia is an important factor in the strategic foreign policy of China and the 
US.  
China borders Central Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia, 
but Southeast Asia is historically linked to China and shares favourable 
characteristics with China in culture, history and religion. Chinese communities are 
also a typical presence in this region, especially in the business and commercial 
classes of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The 
overseas Chinese occupy a place of significance in Southeast Asian economies and 
they play a crucial bridging role between Mainland China and the region. According 
to the Director General of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, 
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the S.R Vietnam, Dr. Hoang 
Anh Tuan, China regards Southeast Asia as a significant area within which it can 
develop its influence. Within Southeast Asia it is thought that if China can control its 
relations with countries in the region, it can create the conditions to broaden its 
influence at a global level. The way China aims to use Southeast Asia is even 
compared with the Monroe Doctrine, under which the US sees its neighbouring Latin 
American and Caribbean states as coming under an American “sphere of influence.” 
Similarly, Southeast Asia may be regarded as an area under China’s “sphere of 
                                                 
7 Information in this paragraph is taken from the interview with H.E. Dr.MarzukiAlie, Jakarta, 
Indonesia, 12 June 2012. 
8 Feng, H., ‘ASEAN’s relations with Big Powers’, in Samuel C.Y. Ku (eds), Southeast Asia in the new 
century: An Asian Perspectives, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, National Sun Yat-Sen University, 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, p.214. 
 
16 
 
influence.” China has aimed to enhance bilateral relations with Southeast Asia to 
portray itself as a peace-loving great power in order to enhance its prestige in the 
international arena. It was a much-needed boost after the Tiananmen Square 
massacre of 1989. 9  It is therefore important for China to cultivate favourable 
perceptions in its relationship with Southeast Asia. 
For the US, Southeast Asia is a significant region because of its location at the 
intersection of two of the world’s most heavily travelled sea-lanes—the east-west 
route links the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while the north-south route connects 
Australia and New Zealand to Northeast Asia. These sea-lanes are vital for US forces 
stationed from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. 
Maintaining freedom of navigation of these waterways is regarded as a top US 
strategic objective.10 As a result, the US returned to the region in the first decade of 
the 21st century when Southeast Asia was considered a “second front” in the US-led 
global war on terror. During the George W. Bush Administration, the US had 
planned for increased engagement with Southeast Asia. However, it was only under 
President Barack Obama that a comprehensive “return to Southeast Asia” policy was 
realised.11 
Among the countries in the region, Vietnam is of particular interest to both 
China and the US, due to its special strategic location and its relations with these two 
powers over different periods in history. This thesis explores the dynamics of this 
developing regional complexity for Vietnam, concentrating on the opportunities and 
challenges posed. Geographically, Vietnam lies on the Indochina peninsula by the 
Pacific Ocean: to its north is the border with China, to the east is the “East Sea” 
(“South China Sea”), to the west is Laos and to the southwest is Cambodia. With a 
long coastline of 3,260 km, and occupying half of the islands in the Spratly group, 
                                                 
9 Interview Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan, Director General of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic 
Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the S.R Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam, 13 
February 2012. 
10Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A. and Neu, C.R.,The Role of Southeast Asia in US Strategy towards China, 
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2001. 
11 Hung, M.T & Liu, T.T.T., ‘US Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia Under the Obama Administration: 
Explaining US Return to Asia an Its Strategic Implications’, USAK Yearbook, 5, 2012, pp. 195-225 at 
195. 
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Vietnam is the closest state to the centre of maritime routes through the South China 
Sea.12 
With its location at the centre of the region, Vietnam is in the most 
geographically advantageous position as the gateway to China and Southeast Asia. 
After Indonesia and the Philippines, Vietnam has the third largest population in 
ASEAN with 90.388 million people in 2013. 13  After joining ASEAN in 1995, 
Vietnam has become an active member, holding significant prestige and an 
influential position in this association. Economically, Vietnam has experienced 
impressive growth and development. It has a very stable political system and a 
foreign policy defined by the motto: “Vietnam is a trustworthy partner and a 
responsible member of the world community.” 14   This foreign policy reflects 
Vietnam’s shift from international economic integration into overall international 
integration.  
Moreover, Vietnam borders the South China Sea and has the potential to 
benefit from the pace of development in a significant part of the Asia-Pacific, the 
most dynamic economically developed region of the world. This is an advantage for 
Vietnam in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. As a result of its 
stability, growth and position, Vietnam has become the darling of foreign investors. 
Thus, Vietnam forms part of the strategic policy framework towards Southeast Asia 
of both the US and China. These states’ competitiveness against each other drives 
their policies toward Vietnam. With its crucial geographical, economic and political 
location, Vietnam is caught in the relationship of the global and regional powers.15 
Consequently, Vietnam has been a victim of geo-political interests and suffered 
successive wars during its drive towards reunification in 1975. It was in the front line 
between the former USSR and the US during the Cold War, and it is now positioned 
between the current superpower (the US) and a potential emerging power (China). 
                                                 
12Those territories are disputed so they are known by different names. For example, what is called 
“South China Sea” is called “East Sea” in Vietnam and “West Philippines Sea” in the Philippines. 
13http://www.worldpopulationstatistics.com/vietnam-population-2013 (Date of visit 23 December 
2014). 
14Interview 3, Southeast Asian official, 14 February 2012. 
15Nguyen Hong Thach,, VN between China & the United States (1950-1995), PhD Thesis, UNSW, 
2001, p. 1. 
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Vietnam’s national interest and self-interest must operate alongside practical 
approaches to both powers; this is a pragmatic step in its foreign policy. This thesis 
investigates how Vietnam has sought to secure national benefits for its national 
stability, which will contribute to peace, stability, prosperity and development of 
Southeast Asia as the region moves towards a single community. Since 1991, 
Vietnam has been able to engage with the two powers. The ties between the 
communist parties of China and Vietnam seem cordial with the finalization of the 
land border arrangement at the end of 1999, and the ratification of a Tonkin Gulf 
Demarcation in December 2000.16 The author aims to explore beneath that surface of 
Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relationship. 
However, more recent negotiations demonstrate a relatively complicated 
approach to the territorial disputes of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as the 
discussions over other continental shelf claims in the South China Sea and the Gulf 
of Tonkin. With the US, the year 1995 opened a new page in bilateral relations with 
the normalization of diplomatic ties. Increased US-Vietnam military cooperation and 
a considerably warm US-Vietnam bilateral relationship in the past decade has caught 
China’s attention as Washington aims to remind Southeast Asia, and Beijing, of its 
useful power balancing role in the region.17 Therefore, competition between two 
leading powers in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period has made this a period 
of importance for diplomatic analysis. 
1.2 Thesis Question 
The thesis will explore the relations between Vietnam, China and the US and 
attempts to answer a specific question: Does Vietnam move closer to the US more 
than China in the course of its development after normalizing bilateral ties with both 
powers? So as to address the central question, the author aims to analyse the 
following issues: 
1. What is Vietnam’s position in China’s foreign policy? 
2. What is Vietnam’s position in US foreign policy? 
                                                 
16 For details see Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations (2006), p. 33. 
17 Grinter, L.E., ‘China, the United States, and Mainland Southeast Asia: Opportunities and the Limits 
of Power’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28(3), 2006, pp. 447-465 at pp. 452-453.  
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3. How do China and the US interact with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold war 
era? 
4. How do China and the US interact with Vietnam, and what is the 
Vietnamese response? 
5. What are the implications for Vietnam from the interests of US and China in 
Southeast Asia? 
6. How can Vietnam benefit from sitting between a global power and a 
regional power? 
These questions are raised in the context that the US has signalled a return to 
the Asia Pacific as its new diplomatic strategy. This policy was stated by US 
President Barack Obama in a speech to Australia’s Parliament on 17 November 2011 
that “Let there be no doubt: in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States 
of America is all in” and it is a “deliberate and strategic decision” that is “here to 
stay.”18 This commitment has both positive and negative impacts for Vietnam, as a 
strategic country located next to China. 
In this context, the central argument of this thesis is that Vietnam is not 
moving closer to the US than to China since its diplomatic normalization with the 
two great powers. There is more harm for Vietnam if it chooses to ally itself with the 
US to counter the rise of China. This is because China is eternally close in proximity 
as Vietnam’s large northern neighbour, while the US is forever geographically 
distant. The Vietnamese are those who understand China more than any other 
country in the world, due to their traditional connection during the one thousand 
years of Chinese domination in the past. The Vietnamese have a traditional saying 
that “distant water will not quench a fire nearby” (Nước xa không cứu được lửa gần) 
which means the same in Chinese (远水救不了近火, literally “water from far away 
could not put out a close-by fire”). The Vietnamese also have another saying that 
“better a neighbour nearby than a brother far away” (Bán anh em xa mua láng giềng 
gần). Vietnam balances its foreign policy direction with both major powers, China 
and the US.  
                                                 
18 Barack Obama, Remarks to the Australian Parliament, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, 17 
November 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-
australian-parliament (Date of visit 7 July 2015)  
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One scholar, Frederick Z. Brown, is of the view that Vietnam is shifting 
towards the US to gain more leverage with China. 19  According to Brown, the 
rapprochement between Vietnam and the US has been “step-by-step” and 
“reciprocal.”20 According to Brown, the rapprochement was developed gradually 
from the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1995 to the signing of a Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (BTA) in 2001, and further enhanced by Vietnam’s entrance into 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007. Most notably, the landmark of 
rapprochement was noted at the 2008 visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung to Washington, when President Bush spoke about the positive 
development of the growing US-Vietnam friendship with more bilateral trust and 
commitment to support the national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of 
Vietnam.21 The message from Bush reassured Dung that the US did not support anti-
communist Vietnamese exiles in the US in their effort to overthrow Vietnam’s 
current socialist government.  
Another advocate who has claimed Vietnam is attempting to be closer to the 
US to restrain the aggressiveness of China is William Choong, a noted contributor to 
the Straits Times and currently the Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-
Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia) in 
Singapore. Choong has argued that Vietnam sought to “repair and build relations 
with the US as a strategic insurance against China” by granting permission for 
American naval ships to visit its ports, and by hosting the official visit of the US 
Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta.22 
However, this thesis argues that the claim that Vietnam is getting closer to the 
US is a one-sided and superficial view. Such a viewpoint is subjective and looks only 
at the outside appearance without analysing the matter with any great depth. 
Adopting an insider’s perspective, this thesis argues that the rapprochement between 
                                                 
19 Brown, F.Z., ‘Rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States’, Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, 32(3), 2010, pp. 317-342 
20 Ibid, p. 318. 
21 Brown, F.Z., ‘Rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States’, p. 333. 
22Choong, W., ‘Vietnam’s Sino-US Dilemma’, The Straits Times, 31 August 2012, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Vietnams-Sino-US-dilemma-30189403.html (Date of visit 
7 January 2015). 
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Vietnam and the US does not come at the expense of China. The current 
rapprochement in bilateral relations between Vietnam and the US has been a 
dynamic development in the geopolitical atmosphere of Southeast Asia. The 
Vietnamese officials’ visit to USS George Washington, a nuclear super-carrier, in 
May 2014 is a symbolic example of an improving Vietnam-US security cooperation. 
However, the closer cooperation in various sectors between Vietnam and the US 
does not mean an overt enthusiasm to be an ally of the US.  Vietnam still pursues the 
“three nos” defence policy 23 , which prevents Vietnam from forming a defence 
alliance with a third party. Moreover, there are negotiations between the US and 
Vietnam on the former providing nuclear fuel and technology, without the usual 
constraints on enriching uranium to prevent proliferation. Vietnamese officials, 
however, insisted that US-Vietnam cooperation would not have an adverse effect on 
neighbouring states.24 
Yet, according to Carl Thayer and Evelyn Goh, Vietnam has to be cautious 
about its military cooperation with the US in a way not to provoke China. Beijing’s 
hostile reaction to Hanoi’s granting of naval basing rights to the Soviet Union in the 
1970s, and the general history of conflict with China, means that Hanoi has to be 
cautious: 
In 2010, even while it sought US authority to pressure China over the South China 
Sea disputes, Hanoi maintained close strategic ties and even deference to Beijing. 
The Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister assured China that Vietnam would not 
form an alliance with another country, allow foreign bases in its territory, or develop 
relations with another country targeted at a third party.25 
                                                 
23 No military alliances, no allowing any country to set up military bases on Vietnamese territory and 
no relying on one country to oppose a third party. 
24Tran, M., ‘Vietnam, Unlikely US Ally’, The Guardian, 1 September 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/aug/31/vietnam-us-military-china (Date 
of visit 6 August 2014) 
25 C. Thayer and E. Goh, cited in Graham, E., ‘Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from 
a Divided Region’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 
35(3), 2013, pp. 305-332 at 316. 
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Ha Hoang Hop examined whether Vietnam’s bilateral relationship with the 
US would affect its ties with China.26  Ha claimed that “while some leaders in 
Vietnam may want to use relations with the US as a counterbalance to China, it is 
most unlikely that Vietnam’s comprehensive partnership with the US will negatively 
affect Vietnam-China relations.” 
The DirectorGeneral of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, 
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the S.R Vietnam, Hoang Anh 
Tuan, confirms the argument of this thesis that Vietnam is not moving closer to the 
US than China. This is because the US has the strategy of deepening relations with 
Southeast Asia due to its own interests in the region. Vietnamese military 
enhancement with the US is seen as a natural requirement for national defence and a 
method of enhancing leverage for Vietnam in its interactions with world powers. 
Thus, Vietnam’s military cooperation with the US does not mean that it favours 
Washington more than Beijing. Rather, Vietnam follows a foreign policy of 
multilateralism and diversification as an active member of ASEAN.27 
Hoang also believed that Vietnam should not get closer to the US at China’s 
expense, or vice versa, since Vietnam benefits from both relationships. Vietnam 
should seek to advance its own national interests so as to boost its bilateral ties with 
both China and America.28 In his response to the “Vietnam-US Rapprochement” 
viewpoint from Frederick Z. Brown, Hoang also argued that the new friendship 
between Hanoi and Washington should neither be seen as countering the influence of 
third parties nor internationalising the South China Sea territorial disputes.29  By 
examining the relations with both the US and China, this research will make policy 
recommendations for Vietnam on how to make full use of the relationships between 
the global and regional power to maximize benefits. 
                                                 
26 The following discussion is drawn from Ha Hoang Hop, More Changes Awaits Vietnam’s Political 
Economy, Trends in Southeast Asia No. 4, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2013, pp. 
1-31 at 27 
27 Interview Hoang Anh Tuan, 13 February 2012 
28Ibid 
29 Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘Rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States: A Response’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32(3), 2010, pp. 343-349 at 348. 
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Similarly, with the close connection in politics, economics and security 
between Southeast Asia and the US, the region treats the US as a principal power for 
regional stability. Many countries in ASEAN believe that US troops should be 
maintained in the Asia-Pacific region for regional security and prosperity and, more 
importantly, to counterbalance China. Looking from an objective perspective, the 
relationship between the US and Southeast Asian countries has been considered 
“rapprochement,” “re-engagement” or “revitalization” because of the commitment to 
enhance bilateral relations with countries in the region by the Obama 
Administration.30 According to Simon31, despite a severe US economic downturn 
since 2007 and the prospect of considerable cuts in national defence budget spending 
to 2020, the Obama Administration is still enhancing its security presence and 
commitment in Asia and especially towards Southeast Asia. This policy was stated 
clearly during President Obama’s official visit to Australia in November 2011 when 
he noted, “Reduction in US defense spending will not, I repeat, will not come at the 
expense of the Asia-Pacific.”32 
However, it is not in ASEAN’s interest to see heavy American involvement 
in Southeast Asia again. ASEAN fears the US may take a leading role in ASEAN’s 
internal affairs, and Southeast Asian states do not desire foreign interference in what 
they see as their domestic politics. Southeast Asia and China have also improved 
their relationship after the Cold War, although this relationship still has some 
limitations. The main barrier is the “China Threat” because Southeast Asia fears the 
traditional geopolitical influence from Chinese dominance in the region. This threat 
can be seen through some territorial and maritime disputes between China and some 
members of ASEAN such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. 
From the relationship of ASEAN with the US and China, it can be seen that 
Southeast Asia understands China’s ambition for influence in the region, but it also 
                                                 
30 Limaye, S.P., ‘Introduction: America’s Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asia-Constraints and 
Promise’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32(3), 2010, pp. 309-316 309. 
31 Simon, S., ‘US-Southeast Asia Relations: Rebalancing’, Comparative Connections:  A Tri-Annual  
E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 13(3), 2012, pp. 53-62 at 53. 
32 Barack Obama, Remarks to the Australian Parliament, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, 17 
November 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-
australian-parliament (Date of visit 7 July 2015) 
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wants to take advantage of the American desire to prevent or limit any possible 
Chinese expansion. ASEAN also wants China and the US to function as a system of 
checks and balances to maintain regional peace and stability. 33  Above all, by 
analysing American and Chinese ties with Southeast Asia, this study helps to propose 
outcomes for the region through a strategy of balancing both powers. From historical 
experience, it is not to the benefit of Southeast Asia to be allied with one power 
exclusively. In the context of ASEAN engaging with the US and China, ASEAN is 
very well aware of the fact that there are two major powers: one is on the rise and the 
other one is being challenged. Since the formation of ASEAN in 1967, it has always 
been careful not to be seen as favouring one power over another.34Consequently, the 
Southeast Asian nations should have equidistant relationships or equally close 
relationships with great powers that share the same interest in this region.  
From a practical viewpoint, stability and security were not achievable for 
Southeast Asian countries by allying with some big powers or in a group to oppose 
some others. Thus, Southeast Asian has been a “Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality” (ZOPFAN) in its relations with the big powers. This principle of 
balancing big powers will be the region’s aim until 2020.35 This thesis argues that 
within the strategic competition occurring between two large powers, an appropriate 
foreign policy for Southeast Asian states is to work towards permanent security, 
stability and development through harmonization and soft power diplomacy. 
Accordingly, this thesis is significant generally as it addresses the question of 
how to balance both the US with China, the latter being a major issue for Vietnam 
since the end of the nineteenth century. In the past, Vietnam came under the strong 
influence of China, the largest and most powerful of its neighbours. While regionally 
powerful, China experienced political and military pressure from western countries 
during the 19th and 20th centuries and was forced to open itself to Western influences. 
                                                 
33Feng, H., ‘ASEAN’s Relations with Big Powers’, in S.C.Y. Ku (ed.), Southeast Asia in the New 
Century: An Asian Perspectives, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, National Sun Yat-Sen University, 
Kaohsiung, 2002, pp. 214-225. 
34 Interview Ms. MelyCaballen Anthony, Director of External Relations, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 
Indonesia, 12 April 2012. 
35Feng, ‘ASEAN’s relations with Big Powers’, in Samuel C.Y. Ku (eds), Southeast Asia in the New 
Century: An Asian Perspectives, pp. 198-201. 
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Since China’s greater openness and transparency from the 1980s, the question of 
following China or heading towards the US has perplexed countries in the region, 
especially after the Cold War, when the US became the global superpower and China 
emerged as the rising Asian power. This is an objective fact that Southeast Asia and 
Vietnam are faced with, as the US has special interests in the region by its “Asia-
Pacific Strategy” and China is a close neighbouring regional power. Consequently, 
this research is significant as it studies the impacts of Chinese and American interests 
in Southeast Asia and Vietnam.  
Specifically, this thesis is important for two main reasons: Firstly, for 
academic institutions, the research provides essential updated references about the 
nature of the relationship of cooperation and competition between the US and China 
in Southeast Asia over the past 20 years. This study also provides a means for 
assessing the impact of Sino-US relations on Southeast Asia and Vietnam in the past, 
and it aims to identify the approaches adopted by the region and by Vietnam both at 
present and prescribes an approach for the near future. Secondly, for Vietnamese 
policymakers, the research will provide useful knowledge about international politics 
and relations after the Cold War. This work will help policymakers to propose 
suitable external policies and foreign diplomacy based on diversity and 
multilateralism. On the basis of this research information, domestic politicians in 
Vietnam can discover the political acumen and flexibility to avoid being drawn into 
the rivalries of big powers. Strategically, it assumes that the leadership of Vietnam 
can seek to balance the rising power of China and avoid military invasion with 
efforts to create favourable conditions for internal economic modernization.  
In the meantime, according to Thayer36 , the eighth plenum in mid-2003 
resolved to provide the policy rationale for Vietnam to enhance bilateral cooperation 
with the US. According to this resolution, two ideological concepts are defined: đối 
tác (partners of cooperation) and đối tượng (objects of struggle). As a result, on the 
basis of sound comprehension of each partner or object, the implementation of each 
specific policy will be carried out. The enhanced bilateral ties with the US can create 
                                                 
36 Thayer, C.A., ‘Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1975-2015: From Member of the Socialist Camp to 
Proactive International Integration’, paper presented at the ‘International Conference on Vietnam: 40 
years of Reunification, Development and Integration (1975-2015)’ at Thu Dau Mot University, Binh 
Duong province, Vietnam, April 25, 2015, pp. 1-27 at pp. 9-10. 
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more leverage for Vietnam in the relationship with China, but it should be kept at a 
safe distance. The optimum policy for Vietnam should be to maintain equidistant 
relations or equally close relations with China and the United States. 
Above all, the implications for Vietnam from this thesis has to focus on the 
advantages of its relationship with the US and China in Southeast Asia that is 
consistent with preserving national independence, state sovereignty and Vietnam’s 
socialist orientation in line with a policy of multilateralism and diversification as 
guided by the 11th congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.37 
1.3 Literature Review     
Academic research has largely focussed on the Sino-American, Sino-
Vietnamese, or American-Vietnamese relationships. There is a 1995 study on “China 
and South China Sea Disputes” by Valencia. In 1997, “China Rising: Nationalism 
and Interdependence” by Goodman and Segal was published. In 2004, the Asia 
Foundation had a study about “America’s Role in Asia: American View.” In 2007, 
William W Keller and Thomas G Rawski wrote about “China’s Rise and the Balance 
of Influence in Asia.” In 2009, there was a study on “Southeast Asia in the Sino-US 
Strategic Balance” in the journal Contemporary Southeast Asia. 38 These are valuable 
documents from the available collection of literature discussing major powers and 
their influence in Asia.  
However, the triangular relationship between Vietnam, the US and China has 
been rarely addressed. There exists only a single study so far – “Vietnam between 
China & the United States (1950-1995)” by Nguyen Hong Thach.39 This study is an 
empirical analysis about the way for Vietnam to move forward between a regional 
power and a global superpower. Thus, there is a gap in research about the new 
                                                 
37 Interview 3, Southeast Asian official, 14 February 2012 
38Nguyen Hoang Giap, Canh tranh  chien luoc giua cac nuoc lon o khu vuc Dong Nam A trong hai 
thap nien dau the ky 21 va  tac dong doi voi Vietnam[Trans: Strategic Rivalry Among Great Powers 
in Southeast Asia in the First Two Decades of the 21 Century and its Implications for Vietnam], Bao 
cao Tong hop Ket qua nghien cuu De tai khoa hoc cap Bo nam 2011 [Trans: The General Report of 
Ministerial Science Research Report, 2011], ma so B11-03 [Trans: Volume B11-03], Hoc vien Chinh 
tri-Hanh chinhQuoc giaHo Chi Minh [Trans: Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public 
Administration], Hanoi, 2011, pp. 5-6. 
39Nguyen Hong Thach, Vietnam between China & the United States (1950-1995), PhD Thesis, 
UNSW, 2000 
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characteristics of Sino-American interactions for Southeast Asia, which has a direct 
impact on Vietnam.  
As the world enters the post-Cold War era from 1991, Sino-American relations 
also experienced competition and cooperation. When the US and China compete 
with each other, Vietnam will have increased negative impacts. Adversely, the two 
powers’ bilateral cooperation can help to bring about positive impacts in Vietnam. 
Also, there is a need for an updated assessment and a dynamic development of 
applied international relations theory using newer material. As a corollary, the need 
for a more informative study with a new approach to the current triangular 
relationship is becoming essential for international and regional studies.  
The aims of this study are twofold. The first contribution is providing an 
updated reference about the nature of the relationship of cooperation and competition 
between the US and China in Southeast Asia since 1991. The second purpose is to 
analyse the impact of Sino-American relations in the region on Vietnam by 
implicating proper approaches for Vietnamese policymakers. These academic 
suggested external policies are expected to supply Vietnamese strategists with 
political acumen and flexibility to make Vietnam advance and avoid being drawn 
into rivalries of big powers based on diversity and multilateralism.  
1.3.1. Vietnamese Foreign Policy   
While remaining socialist politically, Vietnam has opened itself to capitalist 
regional and global markets. Vietnam now also plays a more important role in 
regional affairs and achieves a more active position in the international arena due to 
its practical foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Through the seventh (1991), 
eighth (1996), ninth (2001), tenth (2006) and eleventh (2011) national congresses of 
the CPV, Vietnam has shown an active foreign policy through regional and 
international integration in the cause of its national development.  
The year 1991 marked an important turning point in Vietnam’s foreign policy 
history with the new foreign strategy launched at the Seventh National Congress, 
from 24-27 June 1991. Recently, Thayer noted that Vietnam pledged to “diversify 
and multi-lateralise economic relations with all countries and economic 
organizations” as “Vietnam wishes to be a friend of all countries in the world 
 
28 
 
community, and struggle for peace, independence and development.” 40  In an 
interview with a political official41, Vietnam’s foreign policy is one of diversification 
and multilateralism. “Diversification” means this policy is carried out in every sector 
from economic, political, security and military spheres, including cooperation 
between the Communist Party of Vietnam and other Parties in the world. 
‘Multilateralism’ means Vietnam wants to broaden external relations with all foreign 
countries. 
This diversified and multi-lateralised strategy has brought about positive 
results for Vietnam’s foreign policy at this period. In October 1991, the Agreements 
on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed by 
Cambodia and 18 other signatories, including Vietnam, paved the way for Vietnam 
to improve bilateral relations with regional countries.42 The Paris Agreements on the 
Cambodian peace process was welcomed as a rationale for ending the Cold War that 
existed since China’s incursion in February 1979. The break-through result of the 
Cambodia conflict also brought about gestures of goodwill in Sino-Vietnamese and 
American-Vietnamese bilateral relations. 43  This is because in China’s mind-set, 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia was interpreted as Hanoi’s “pursuance of 
regional hegemony’ and was regarded by Beijing as the ‘fundamental cause for the 
deterioration of relations between the two countries.”44 
As a result, the solution to the Cambodia conflict gave Vietnam the opportunity 
to improve bilateral relations with great powers and other regional nations. Le Hong 
Hiep suggested that the most important achievement of Vietnamese diplomacy in the 
early 1990s is the normalisation of ties with China in 1991, which significantly 
helped Vietnam out of its international isolation and facilitated Vietnam’s improved 
                                                 
40Thayer, C.A., ‘Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1975-2015: From Member of the Socialist Camp to 
Proactive International Integration’, p. 6. 
41 Interview 3, Southeast Asian official, 14 February 2012. 
42Thayer, C.A., ‘Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1975-2015: From Member of the Socialist Camp to 
Proactive International Integration’, p. 5 
43 Pike, D., ‘Vietnam in 1991: The Turning Point’, Asian Survey, 32(1), 1992, pp.74-81 at 81. 
44Mcgregor, C., ‘China, Vietnam and the Cambodian Conflict: Beijing’s End Game Strategy’, Asian 
Survey, 30 (3), 1990, pp. 266-283 at 267 
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relations with the US and ASEAN. 45  Nguyen Vu Tung also claimed that the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989 and the 
conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991 facilitated Vietnam’s 
normalization of relations with ASEAN.46Accordingly, the multi-directional foreign 
policy has brought about fruitful results for Vietnam in 1995: its diplomatic 
normalisation with their former adversary, the US, and its official membership in 
ASEAN.  
 In 1996, Vietnam’s foreign policy at the Eighth National Party Congress (28 
June to 1 July 1996) was slightly adjusted from the wish “Vietnam wishes to be a 
friend” to the affirmation “Vietnam is a friend” of all countries in the world 
community. This is a more pragmatic approach in Vietnam’s active foreign policy. 
As Thayer stated, the foreign strategy of the Vietnamese in this congress proved the 
practical perspectives of policy strategists.47 Indeed, this pro-active strategy prepared 
favourable conditions for Vietnam to integrate further into the world community. 
Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN laid the basis for stronger cooperation with other 
Asia-Pacific nations. As a result, Vietnam was encouraged by other ASEAN 
members to join APEC at the Kuala Lumpur Ministerial Meeting in November 
1998.48 
At the Ninth National Party Congress (19-23 April 2001), there was a stronger 
affirmation in Vietnam’s foreign policy. From the desire “Vietnam wishes” stated in 
the Seventh Congress to the words “Vietnam is a friend” of the Eighth tenure, there 
are more commitments about the trustworthiness of Vietnam with the reaffirmation 
that “Vietnam is a friend and a reliable partner to all countries in the world 
community.”49 It brought about advantages for Vietnam’s economic integration into 
                                                 
45Le Hong Hiep, ‘Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External 
Engagement’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2012, pp. 1-20 at 5 
46Nguyen Vu Tung, ‘Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 29 (3), 2007, pp. 483-
505 at 484-485 
47Thayer, C.A., ‘Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1975-2015: From Member of the Socialist Camp to 
Proactive International Integration’, p.7. 
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regional and global economies. In 2001, Vietnam was granted normal trade relations 
on a year-by-year basis with the US. In mid-2003, the CPV Central Committee’s 
eighth plenum resolution called for deepening Vietnam’s defence cooperation with 
the US.50 
At the Tenth National Party Congress (18-25 April 2006), Vietnam continued 
its foreign policy of “multi-lateral and diversified relationships while staying 
proactive in integrating into the world economic community and expanding in 
international cooperation in other fields.” 51  This foreign policy also suggests 
Vietnam’s comprehensive attempt at integration with the wider world. With this 
approach, a number of multi-lateral diplomatic successes were reached, such as the 
chairmanship of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2006, 
WTO membership in 2007, non-permanent membership on the United National 
Security Council in 2008-2009, and chairing ASEAN, including hosting the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in 2010. 
The Eleventh National Party Congress (12-19 January 2011) strongly 
reaffirmed that “Vietnam is a trustworthy partner and a responsible member of the 
world community” and that “Vietnam is ready to make friends with countries in the 
international community, for peace, independence and development.”52 The more 
specific phraseology demonstrates the progress in Vietnamese foreign policy: from 
the passive manner of “the wish,” to the active fulfilment of the deeds, and then to 
the pro-active well-prepared strategy to have bilateral cooperation with countries in 
the world community.  
Since then, Vietnam’s adoption of multilateralism and diversification in its 
foreign policy has been advantageous, as the nation has became a strategic partner of 
a number of countries. Vietnam has set up diplomatic ties with over 181 out of 193 
members of the United Nations and has trade ties with nearly 230 out of 255 
countries and territories worldwide. The country is today an active member of more 
than 70 regional and international organisations. To date, Vietnam has established 98 
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representative offices in five continents. 53  Vietnam has established strategic 
partnerships with 15 nations including major powers and neighbouring countries, 
such as Russia in 2001 (then upgraded to comprehensive strategic partnership in 
2012), Japan in 2006 (then upgraded to Extensive Strategic Partnership in 2014), 
India in 2007, China in 2008 (then upgraded to comprehensive strategic partnership 
in 2009), South Korea and Spain in 2009, the UK in 2010, Germany in 2011, and 
Italy, France, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore in 2013 and Malaysia in 2015. 
Vietnam and the Netherlands became strategic partners in climate change adaptation 
and water management in 2010. Vietnam has comprehensive partnerships with 4 
countries – Australia in 2009, New Zealand in 2010, and Denmark and the US in 
2013. For the time being, Vietnam has entered into negotiations to join TPP (Trans-
Pacific Partnership) and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). 
1.3.2. China-US Relations 
From 1991 to 1997, the Sino-American relations experienced competition 
and co-operation. According to Yan, the relationship between the two great powers 
in this period was described as a “false but nice description of China-US strategic 
relations” in the “policy of pretending to be friends” or “neither-friend-nor-enemy”, 
as written in the book titled “Same Bed Different Dreams” previously.54 
The year 1991 marks a new situation in international relations after the Cold 
War, when China and the US competed with each other but still acknowledged the 
necessity of bilateral cooperation. In spite of the contradiction in political ideologies, 
the two great powers are well aware of each other’s value in maintaining the stability 
and strategic balance for economic development. According to Chen, the economic 
relationship between China and the US is more complementary and less competitive 
than that of China and Japan. Moreover, China and America share more common 
interests in the maintenance of peace and stability in both Southeast and Northeast 
Asia. The two great powers also share mutual concerns over international 
cooperation and collective security issues such as arms control, the prohibition of 
weapons of mass destruction, crackdowns on drug trafficking, and the environment. 
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Chen supposed few possibilities of worsening bilateral cooperation between China 
and the US during the Clinton administration.55 
In the Clinton tenure, re-establishing “strategic dialogue” was a key 
component of the new policy initiative of a ‘comprehensive engagement’ with China. 
After no high-ranking visits were exchanged between the two great powers for 10 
years, Chinese President Jiang Zemin officially visited the US in November 1997 
and US President Clinton reciprocated in July 1998. The Chinese and American 
governments then agreed to “build towards a constructive, strategic partnership for 
the 21st century”.56 
However, the constructive strategic partnership between China and the US 
could hardly resolve the deeper issues faced by the two powers. Peng57 theorized that 
there are five structural contradictions in Sino-American relations: the difference in 
ideology between socialism and capitalism, the dissimilarity in culture between the 
East and the West, the geopolitical competition between the west Pacific Ocean and 
the Euro-Asian continent, the contradiction over the Taiwan issue, and the potential 
conflict between a rising power and the existing dominant superpower. Among these 
differences, the most notable and basic contradiction is the strategic conflict of 
interest between the US, which favoured a uni-polar system with its domination, and 
China, which wished to be a major force in a multi-polar world.  
As a result, the ‘constructive strategic partnership’ has been criticised inside 
the US since 1999. According to Sambaugh, in a criticism of President Clinton’s 
China strategy, the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush replaced the 
phrase “strategic partnership” with “strategic competition.” Winston Lord, a former 
US official under Clinton’s tenure, even considered the strategic partnership to be 
“erased from the vocabulary of US-China relations.” The clearer description of Sino-
American relations in this period could be called “strategic competitors,” but not 
necessarily “strategic adversaries.” This means that China and America, in spite of 
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their cooperation in limited sectors, will still compete.58 According to Yuan, until 
mid-2005, the ‘China threat’ was discussed in the US and phrases such as ‘China’s 
Rise,’ ‘a strong China,’ and ‘the world of China’ have replaced ‘China issue,’ ‘a 
weak China,’ and ‘China of the world.’59 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the complexity of Sino-
American relations has continued, which made China-US relations appear friendlier 
than they actually were. Though American military strength is far stronger than that 
of China, the US still needed China’s cooperation in international political and 
economic affairs. Thus, the Sino-American relationship is defined by “cooperation 
based on competition.”60 There are over 60 platforms of dialogue and cooperation 
between China and the US, including the Strategic Economic Dialogue. The two 
sides have reached a number of economic consensuses, most notably the “Ten-year 
Plan of Energy and Environmental Cooperation.”61 
In Southeast Asia, the triangular relationship between the US, China and 
Southeast Asia reveals a complicated nexus of sophisticated interests between a 
global hegemon and a regional power. Thanks to these strategic interests, the leaders 
of both countries have remained committed to a path of constructive engagement 
together with respective efforts geared toward improving each side’s influence and 
national interests through various private channels. Thus, in spite of significant 
differences with strongly competing interests, both powers see the benefit of positive 
Sino-American engagement without disruptive confrontation with the other.62 This 
shows that balancing the interests of great powers in the region can benefit Southeast 
Asian nations.  
At the regional level, the literature will focus on the academic literature 
dealing with US-China engagement with ASEAN-centric multilateral institutions, 
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including ASEAN Plus, the three key regional trading states: the People’s Republic 
of China, Japan and the Republic of South Korea (ASEAN+3); ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), which is the main forum for discussing security, and the East Asia 
Community (EAC), which is emerging as a free trade zone. On the basis of the US-
China interactions with regional principal mechanisms, different approaches and 
frameworks launched by China and the US towards the region are investigated. 
As a rising dominant power in the region, China has exercised regional 
multilateral diplomacy since the 1980s. China became a member of Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 and was a founding member of ARF in 
1994. China’s intention in these diplomatic moves has been to prevent its neighbours 
from allying with the US, with respect to the issues encompassing Taiwan. 
Furthermore, China seeks to diffuse the fear that it is a threat by using multilateral 
channels through regional institutions in order to consolidate friends and strengthen 
its role as a leading economic power in the region.63 The “Shanghai Five” of China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1996 expanded into the “Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation” (SCO) with the admission of Uzbekistan in 2001.64 
At the same time, as the global hegemon, the US has made China uneasy and 
by undertaking recent significant diplomatic initiatives to rebalance towards the Asia 
Pacific in general, and Southeast Asia in particular. The US supported the 
establishment of ARF to discuss security.65 The Bush Administration (2001-2009) 
strongly supported APEC. Bush began to use the annual APEC leaders’ summit to 
engage multilateral meetings and also attended ASEAN leaders’ meetings from 
November 2005. At the APEC Summit Meeting in November 2006, Bush urged 
APEC members to consider forming an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area.66 
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The highlight of US multilateral policy towards the Southeast Asian region is 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed by the US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton at the 16th Annual ARF on 22 July 2009 in Phuket, Thailand. The 
TAC creates favourable conditions for the US to engage with Southeast Asia in 
general and ASEAN in particular. On the one hand, the TAC paves the way for the 
US to join the East Asia Summit and be involved in the East Asia community based 
on the current “10+6” framework (10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand). On the other hand, the TAC also helps 
American economic recovery by exploring a wider market in East Asia, which is 
considered to be the world’s fastest growing region in terms of economic growth, 
and it is likely to overcome the Global Financial Crisis earlier than other parts of the 
world.  
Another initiative that proves the US gave higher priority to engaging with 
Southeast Asia is President Obama’s big push for a TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) 
in mid-November 2011 during the APEC forum in Hawaii. The TPP is the 
multilateral free trade agreement that seeks to reduce and finally eliminate trade 
tariffs among member countries. The bar for joining the TPP is set high, with big 
differences over tariffs that created a severe challenge to China’s current 
management systems and mechanisms, which put a fair distance between China and 
joining TPP.  
Zhang examined a number of difficulties for China: the rules of trade in 
goods, trade in service, investment rules on the border issues; standards unification, 
environmental protection, labour standards, state-owned enterprise governance, 
government procurement, intellectual property rights, and electric commerce as well 
as internet freedom and other related issues.67 As a result, the TPP may be difficult 
for China to join for many years. Later that month, President Obama became the first 
US President to attend the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, where he stressed the US 
commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the 
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need to settle regional disputes by following international law, including the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).68 
In general, China and the US each gain different benefits in developing 
bilateral and multilateral ties with Southeast Asian nations. For China, it is a matter 
of building a good neighbour policy and a regional development strategy to seek 
common prosperity throughout Southeast Asia in an atmosphere of a “harmonious 
Asia”. It was reported that the bilateral trade volume between China and ASEAN in 
2010 had increased 36 fold in comparison from 1991, the year when formal bilateral 
relations were established. According to Ma Mingqiang, Secretary of the ASEAN-
China Centre, the trade volume of China and ASEAN was US$267 billion in the first 
three quarters of 2011. China has now become ASEAN’s largest trade partner while 
ASEAN is numbered third among China’s trade partners.69 
For the US, the traditional alliance and close trade ties in current years play 
an important role in its relationship with Southeast Asian states. The Foreign Trade 
section of the US Census Bureau notes that Southeast Asia, as an entity, has become 
a major partner for US trade in goods. Specifically, US trade with Southeast Asia for 
the last twenty years have tripled from US$45.9 billion in 1990 to US$176 billion in 
2010.70 For Southeast Asian countries, what made the US presence desirable was the 
size and wealth of the market for ASEAN exports, American technological 
advancement, and the potential for US investments. Thus, ASEAN warmly 
welcomed the US back to Southeast Asia so that this region could gain a greater 
presence against the regional power China. However, the policy of maintaining 
balance among big powers is the strategy that Southeast Asian nations are seeking.71 
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On the basis of the analysis of Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia, both 
bilaterally and regionally, this thesis aims to conclude with applicable policies and 
strategies for Vietnam to maximise its national advantages.  
The political and security perspectives show that the national interests of China 
and the US in Southeast Asia can have positive and negative impacts. The positive 
impact is that when the two powers are in strategic competition, they need other 
smaller countries to gain leverage against their competitor. Consequently, both 
powers need to enhance bilateral ties with countries in the region. The negative 
impact is when the two powers have too severe a level of competition, forcing 
countries in the region to decide whether to follow China or the US. At that point, the 
bilateral relationship of ASEAN with China and the US will be affected. If one 
country is close to China, this will affect its ties with the US adversely; if one 
country is close to America, this will affect its ties with China.72 Southeast Asian 
states face significant consequences if there is a situation of growing rivalry between 
China and America’s interests in the region. Rizal Sukma, Director of the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta revealed why they are worried: 
ASEAN will be polarized because of different national interests. Some countries may 
be very close to China because of the economic dependence and so on. Some 
countries are already very clear, they are American allies: the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Singapore. Then we also have countries that choose to be neutral: Indonesia, 
Malaysia. The polarization can take place. Once ASEAN is polarized, ASEAN will be 
less effective. If ASEAN can no longer maintain its strategic centrality, ASEAN will 
stop centrality. These are the possibilities and challenges of the growing China US 
rivalry that we face.73 
Moreover, it is predicted that if China and the US compete to spread their 
influence in the region, Southeast Asia can be in “the stage of the war of influence” 
between the two countries. Countries in Southeast Asia will be divided into two 
opposing sides, one with the US and the other with China. If this happens, ASEAN 
will be polarized, resulting in the marginalization of ASEAN’s role as one of the 
pillars of security in East Asia.74 Hence, as Pitono Purnomo, former Ambassador of 
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the Republic of Indonesia to Vietnam, notes, Southeast Asian states can gain regional 
benefits when “China and America are the two great powers and the two major 
powers in the region, so our policy is we try to encourage them to engage positively 
in Southeast Asia by complementing each other for the development of the region.”75 
Therefore, from the implications of Chinese and American interests in the region, 
Southeast Asia should have appropriate strategies and policies in dealing with these 
two great powers by making an autonomous region that is not dominated by major 
powers.  
1.3.3 Vietnam’s Relations with China and the US  
Vietnam is a country with a long history of continuous fighting and struggling 
against foreign invaders seeking to disrupt the sovereignty of the nation. Located at a 
strategically vulnerable, yet important, position in Southeast Asia, Vietnam has 
attracted the attention of regional powers and global powers in their strategic 
rivalries. Vietnam places its national benefits as a top priority, so exercising tact in 
diplomacy regarding its relations with China and the US is necessary for balancing 
its interests. Tactful diplomacy means making efforts to maximise the positive 
bilateral relationship with both China and the US on economic and political issues.  
First, a stable environment for Vietnam’s national establishment and 
development can only come once Vietnam is capable of managing its relations with 
both China and the US. Ang investigated hat both historical tradition and geopolitical 
evolvement shaped the nature of tensions between Vietnam and China. 76 
Historically, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was managed through deference of 
the tributary system for 10 centuries from 3 B.C. to A.D. 1000. Later on, the 
combination of external forces and geopolitical interactions among major powers 
such as China, the Soviet Union and the US has added to the dynamism of relations 
between the two neighbours. The interplay of these factors can bring about 
construction or destruction depending on Vietnam’s management of its relations.  
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 Le Hong Hiep77 discovered that a strong China is a geopolitical threat to 
Vietnam’s national security because of the geographical proximity and asymmetry of 
size and power between Vietnam and China. Although Vietnam ranks as the 14th 
most populous country in the world, its size of population is equivalent to one 
medium province of China. Vietnam has no choice but to live, in Carlyle Thayer’s 
words, in a “tyranny of geography” with a northern neighbour 29 times larger than 
itself. 
  According to the author’s interview with Dr. Tuan, the dynamics of 
Vietnam’s relations with its huge northern neighbour has long been a discussion 
among Vietnamese scholars. The question of bandwagoning, hedging or balancing in 
bilateral ties with China has remained since the end of the nineteenth century. Some 
Vietnamese scholars came to recognise that China, a big power in Asia with great 
influence on Vietnam traditionally, also experienced political and military pressures 
from western countries during the 19th and 20th centuries; suggesting that following 
China with blind consistency is not always beneficial. Meanwhile, Vietnam at that 
time began to be influenced by western nations like France. Thus, the question of 
following China, balancing with China, or hedging against China, is not a new line of 
inquiry.78 
This issue has now become more urgent. However, the choice Vietnam must 
now consider should not be whether to follow the US, as they have recently returned 
the region of Southeast Asia, or follow China, as they remain a geographically close, 
regional neighbour. These two major powers both have great impacts on Vietnam in 
economic, political and security affairs. Consequently, there should be no question of 
choosing to leave China to follow America, or conversely, leave America to follow 
China. Both China and America are important partners of Vietnam. Vietnam’s 
productive relationship with China has created a favourable foundation to create and 
maintain better bilateral ties with the US. Similarly, Vietnam’s advantageous 
cooperation with the US in economic, political, defence and security affairs has 
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created better relations with China. Thus, the relationships between Vietnam, China 
and the US complement each other.79 
Second, balancing the relations with both China and the US can help Vietnam 
protect its national interests and balance major powers interactions. Vietnam should 
establish the equally close or equally distanced relationship with both powers. 
Consequently, Vietnam should not choose between the US or China because 
Vietnam gains benefits from both relationships. Vietnam should advance its own 
national interests to gain national benefits. From that point of view, to boost bilateral 
ties with both China and the US should be its objective. Le Hong Hiep shares this 
view by ascertaining that the best foreign policy for Vietnam is to maintain a balance 
between China and the US. The improvement in Vietnam’s bilateral relations with 
the US, even in its attempt to counter China’s aggression in territorial disputes, 
should not come at the expense of China.80 
Finally, Vietnam should do the utmost to prevent being drawn into the China-
US strategic rivalry. This means that Vietnam should try to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the China-US competition while taking advantage of the positive 
development of China-US cooperation. In short, this thesis is significant in its 
contribution of analysis of the triangular relations of Vietnam between China and the 
US since 1991 to the present. It is different from previous studies due to its inclusion 
of a comprehensive perspective regarding the triangular relationship between a 
global superpower, a regional developing power, and Vietnam. On the basis of 
proving the position of Vietnam in the balancing strategy with both China and the 
US, the thesis argues Vietnam is not moving closer to one power more than the other. 
Indeed, Hanoi benefits from keeping equally close and equidistant with Beijing and 
Washington. This balancing strategy is clearly stated in Vietnamese foreign policy of 
multi-lateralisation and diversification, which continues to work effectively for 
Vietnam to move forward in the dilemma of manoeuvring between China and the 
US. 
1.3.4 Key Concepts in International Relations Theory  
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As a study of diplomacy, a number of key concepts in politics and international 
relations theory such as national interest, realism, constructivism, balance of power 
and hedging are employed in this research. Firstly, regarding the concept of “national 
interest,” this phrase has become significant not only to contemporary global states 
but also to Vietnam itself. It is common to find that a nation aims to advance its 
interests to maximise benefits for itself, and realism believes states pursuing self-
interest is paramount in international relations. 81  In realism, pursuing national 
interest is seen to be the obligation and responsibility of individual nations in the 
global system: to do otherwise is seen as negligent and a betrayal of the basic 
responsibility of the state to protect its people and territory. This point was made in 
1848 by the British Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister), Lord Palmerston in 
a speech to parliament, when he noted: “We have no eternal allies and we have no 
perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our 
duty to follow.”82 
Realism is the main theoretical foundation for the thesis. With its emphasis on 
history “as it is,” realism has been the dominant way of understanding international 
relations since the beginning of academic studies on world politics. The realist 
believes there is no authority above that of the state, and that alliances, while useful, 
are not a guarantee of security. As realists view the world as having no supra-state 
authority — anarchic, in the sense of no overall government— if a state’s security 
cannot be taken for granted, states can and do seek to protect themselves. For 
example, while China was a developing country, it was only a potential threat to the 
rest of the world. However, when China began to develop, a rising China is seen as 
an enormous threat to the existing world political system.83 In such circumstances, 
states will find it reasonable to compete for power and security.84 In the case of 
Vietnam with its history of wars with both the US and China, realism is a helpful 
approach to analyse Vietnamese foreign relations. Realism however has its 
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limitations, and alternative approaches allow a more nuanced understanding of 
motives behind state action. 
Social constructivism can be useful in international relations theory as it helps 
to identify the relationship between the historical evolution of the states, rules and 
regimes that govern international politics, and the actual behaviour of states in 
international relations in fashioning the international system. A constructivist can be 
described as one who sees world politics as an evolving social reality, not as an 
immovable series of interests based around the state. This is to say, what a nation 
does in international relations, its interests and structures of operation, are defined by 
social norms, and ideas, rather than by objective or material conditions.  
Hence, for realists, constructivism is proved to be useful for research 
methodology thanks to its corrective to the assumptions of individual rationalism and 
materialism, which have been central to definitions of realism for the past few 
decades.85 This can be illustrated by the understanding in constructivism that states 
should avoid destructive disputes and respect the vital interests of others. Every 
nation has its own national benefits, however, to live in harmony for development, 
the constructivist perspective sees that one should respect the other as any national 
interests without aspirations and values of others can result in ruin to the state and 
surrounding neighbours.86 Gain is not necessarily a zero sum game: because one 
state’s benefit does not mean that another state loses. Using a constructivist 
approach, the thesis will analyse the individual interests of China and the US in 
Southeast Asia to find how the region can gain regional profit from the competitive 
and cooperative relations of these two powers. 
The concept of “balance of power” is defined as a system “in which the 
power possessed and exercised by states…is checked and balanced by the power of 
others.”87 Balance of power is thus a mechanism for states to prevent each other from 
dominating. For example, although for the time being the US is a global hegemon, its 
conduct in foreign policy, from a realist perspective, should still respect the global 
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and regional balances of power in the international system, especially regionally. 
This is becausein an interdependent world, when every nation has been “globalized” 
more than ever before, the US is strong enough to discourage aggression in others, 
but is not so strong that it can practise aggression itself.88 
This can be illustrated by the US security approaches to Southeast Asia after 
the Cold War, such as the revitalization of military alliance with the Philippines89 
and Thailand90 as well as the rapprochement with other countries in the region. These 
alliances can form a balance of relationships with the emergence of the regional 
power China.  
China’s security approaches towards Southeast Asia are to have new 
adjustments in strategy, such as the enhancement of dialogue in relations with 
Southeast Asian nations. In the context of territorial disputes with Southeast Asia, 
this reaction of China is seen to be softer and more flexible, aiming at giving little 
chances for the US and western countries to interfere in regional disputes. Thus, in 
the argument of realists, the regional order of Southeast Asia is shaped by the 
balance of big powers, mostly by the relations of the two biggest powers currently, 
namely China and the US.  
As small and vulnerable states, of significant interest to big powers, Southeast 
Asia should study the lessons from history with respect to balance of power to 
guarantee its stability and development. Southeast Asia should develop relations with 
various powers in the global system to welcome the presence of other big powers in 
the region for economic and commercial cooperation as well as to maintain equal 
benefits among big powers for security and military guarantees. To this end, thanks 
to its scholarly characteristics, the balance of power theory is used to carry out 
research on this study of the triangular China, US and Vietnam relationship.  
Hedging is another approach that is used in the thesis to analyse the 
implications for Southeast Asian states in the dilemma of sitting among great powers. 
                                                 
88Chace, J., ‘The Balance of Power’, World Policy Journal, 15(4), 1999,  pp.105-106. 
89The US has a formal treaty with the Philippines. 
90The U.S.-Thailand "alliance" is based on an exchange of letters between the U.S. Secretary of State 
(Dean Rusk) and the Thai Foreign Minister (Thanat) extending the security guarantees of the 
Southeast Asia Collective Security. 
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Chien-peng Chung explained that the inspiration for ASEAN states to facilitate the 
practical strategy of hedging (limiting risk) against major powers is the necessity of 
ensuring economic advantages while controlling security threats. This is a pragmatic 
response of countries in the region amid the ascension of China’s growing economic 
and military capability, resulting in a greater suspicion of its peaceful rise. Thus, 
welcoming the US back to Southeast Asia to ensure the strategic balance of power is 
also adopting a policy of hedging by regional states. The US military presence in 
Southeast Asia is an essential guarantee for regional economic development.91 
Le Hong Hiep shares the view that together balancing, bandwagoning 
(alignment with a strong power) and hedging are three strategies adopted by nations 
in international relations to protect their national interests. Accordingly, the hedging 
strategy is examined as the rational choice for countries in Southeast Asia in dealing 
with a more powerful China. However, he also admits that, on the basis of each 
regional country, the degree of hedging may vary across the spectrum from 
bandwagoning to balancing. For Vietnam, after long experiences in relations with its 
northern neighbour, national strategists have come up with the belief that there is no 
better way for Vietnam to move forward more than through hedging tactics.92 
1.4 Methodology 
The thesis will adopt a historic-analytical approach and comparison in its study 
of Chinese and American foreign policy towards Vietnam. First, the historic 
approach is used to break down the 24 years from 1991 to 2015 into two periods: 
from 1991 to 2001, and from 2001 to 2015. The ten years frame after the Cold War 
from 1991 to 2001 is considered the time of reconciliation and unity in the 
cooperation of Southeast Asian states with one another; Vietnam joined ASEAN in 
1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.  
This is also the time when the US is still the dominant global superpower, 
whereas China has not yet become as influential as it has now. On the contrary, the 
stage from 2001 to 2015 witnessed the completion of China’s “hidden dragon 
                                                 
91 Chung, C.P., ‘Southeast Asia-China Relations: Dialects of “Hedging” and “Counter Hedging”’, 
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, p. 1 
92Le Hong Hiep, ‘Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization’, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International Strategic Affairs, 35 (3), 2013, pp. 333-368 at 335-339. 
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policy,”93 especially after the financial crisis of the US in 2008, when China’s overall 
economic position rose substantially, with reserves of up to US$3,000 billion, while 
the US had large economic problems that required government bailouts of industry 
and federal agencies.94 The first period thus demonstrated US interest in Southeast 
Asia when there is no potential threat from China, while the latter period shows 
interactions and relationships of Southeast Asian states with a rising power, China, 
and a power that is being challenged, the US. 
Next, the author aims to use comparative politics to analyse the alterations of 
American and Chinese foreign policy and interests towards the region. Regarding US 
strategy with the region, analysis from American history showed that each President, 
on assuming office, has exercised some actions in foreign policy, which becomes 
known as a Presidential doctrine and which has characterised his period in office. 
The first American post-Cold War President, Bill Clinton, shifted US foreign policy 
focus from Europe to Asia, with the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and in this 
Southeast Asia played an important part.95  
This change was partly to support American national interests in the region, 
but also to contain the rising expansion of China’s influence, which has been 
challenging the dominance of the US. Until the first term of President George W. 
Bush, there still existed the commitment of America administration to the region.96 
Southeast Asia was a low priority during the Bush administration despite its 
economic significance to the US as its fifth largest trading partner and the geo-
strategic importance of the region’s maritime lines of communication both for the 
American navy and for the transit of much of Asia’s energy supplies. However, the 
situation changed fast in the aftermath of 9/11 as Washington viewed the region as a 
“second front” in its war on terror.97 
                                                 
93 Interview V, Southeast Asian official, 6 May 2012 
94 Ibid.  
95 Pham Cao Cuong, US Security Engagement with Southeast Asia during the Clinton and Bush 
Administration, PhD Thesis, UNSW, 2009, p. 31. 
96 Pham Cao Cuong, US Security Engagement with Southeast Asia during the Clinton and Bush 
Administration, p. 188. 
97 Mauzy, D.K. and Job, B.L., ‘US Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after Years of 
Benign Neglect’, Asian Survey, 47(4), 2007, pp.622-641 at 629. 
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In addition to analysis, the originality of this research lies partly in the 
twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with Southeast Asian diplomats and political 
officials, who were at the time holding positions in the Parliament or Government of 
Vietnam, or in ASEAN states. Acting as an expert in the Asia-Pacific Division, 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of the National Assembly of the S.R Vietnam, 
I was able to contact the regional experts to observe first-hand the discussions on 
regional security. In my capacity as a researcher, I conducted interviews with high-
ranking officials I met through my working relations, and these are a valuable source 
of policy-oriented empirical examination. 
Due to the position of these officials during the time of interview, the thesis 
data collection follows the formal standard of UOW Ethics Approval to gather 
information from ten ASEAN diplomats in Jakarta, where the ASEAN Secretariat is 
situated and eighteen Vietnamese diplomatic officials in Hanoi for the research. A 
number of such direct interviews can help to create a diversity of views for the 
objective purpose of the research. The responses and comments of all participants are 
voice-recorded on audio files (MP3), followed by transcription and translation at the 
University of Wollongong (UOW). Anonymity is applied for seven interviewees that 
requested the unidentified contents of answers to the subject matter (see attached in 
the separated paper to this thesis to protect the identities of anonymous officials). All 
thesis data collection, including MP3 files are stored in locked cabinets until the 
conclusion of the project. 
The data collected from these interviews provides primary evidence to be 
integrated into my textual analyses. The flowchart of thesis data collection is as 
follows: 
 
Request with participants for interviews  
(contacted by email) 
 
 
Follow up email to establish location, date and time of interview (with participant 
information sheet attached) 
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Reconfirm involvement of participants (by email) 
 
 
At arranged meeting explain proposed time taken for interview, conditions of storage 
and use of data, any risks, inconveniences and discomfort, the capacity of 
participants to withdraw from the research project. 
 
 
Transcribe interviews from audio files to word files. 
 
 
Seek feedback from participants on the sections that relate to their words and ideas. 
 
 
Refine Thesis 
 
 
Seek additional feedback if necessary. 
 
The data collected from these interviews provides practical evidences of how 
diplomats and political officers of regional ASEAN states are responding to the 
China-US balancing act. There are a number of famous individuals in the study of 
Vietnamese foreign relations, namely former foreign ministers Nguyen Manh Cam, 
Nguyen Dy Nien, Pham Gia Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, former 
Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung, Ambassador Luu Van Loi, Deputy 
Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh that I really wish to interview. However, due to 
their time constraints, I will use their insights and ideas through their written articles 
and/or statements made around the time they held office. 
These views are supplemented by secondary sources that explore American 
and Chinese security policy and their interactions with Southeast Asian states. 
Secondary sources such as articles of newspapers and journals are also used in the 
thesis. By adopting a critical lens toward the primary source of interviews, party 
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sources, government documents, texts of high-ranking government official speeches 
and press interviews together with the secondary literature, this thesis hopes to make 
a contribution to the study of foreign policy for Vietnam, and in a wider sense for 
ASEAN. 
1.5 Structure of the Study 
The introduction, CHAPTER 1, is about the relevant literature, the thesis 
research question and the methodology. Using international relations theories of 
realism, constructivism, balance of power and hedging, the literature identifies gaps 
of research that needs to be addressed. It focuses on three main points: Vietnamese 
foreign policy, China-US relations and Vietnam’s relations with China and the US. 
The methodology uses a historic-analytical approach and a comparison in a study of 
Chinese and American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, followed by implications for 
Vietnam.  
 CHAPTER 2 analyses the rise of China as an increasing influence in the 
region, its growing strength in the global economy and impacts on economic 
development in neighboring states regions. China’s military modernization is also 
analyzed to understand China’s ambition to obtain greater influence in Southeast 
Asia. Based on that context, the role of Southeast Asia in terms of economics, 
strategy and security for China’s power in the region is investigated. China regards 
this region as vital for its growth and prosperity. This chapter also assesses research 
on the strategic policy of China towards Southeast Asia on the basis of its 
significance. Particularly, among countries in the region, Vietnam is of significant 
importance to China both traditionally and after the Cold War due to its unique 
location in the neighbor areas of China and buffer geopolitical zone. 
CHAPTER 3 analyses the transformation of the new world order into a multi-
polar system, in which the US cannot impose its dominant role unilaterally in 
international relations in spite of its superpower. The new tendency in world politics 
towards both cooperation and competition in relations among great powers has made 
the US to adjust its foreign policy to protect its national interests. Amid this 
alteration, this chapter also assesses research on the strategic policy of the US 
towards Southeast Asia on the basis of its significance. The chapter focuses on 
Vietnam’s central role in the US “pivot” or “rebalance” to Southeast Asia. This 
 
49 
 
significant role has brought about both pros can cons for Vietnam in the bilateral ties 
with its former adversary, the US.  
CHAPTER 4 discusses the strategic interaction of the US and China in 
Southeast Asia. In Washington’s perception, in the long term, China will be a 
challenge for the US both economically and militarily. The emergence of China as a 
serious threat to US dominance can jeopardize American interests and benefits in 
Southeast Asia just as the US is making a return to the region. However, for the time 
being, US-China competition and cooperation still coexists in various fields. The 
thesis will look into this relationship in terms of security, socio-economic and 
cultural development as well as the enlargement of influence and power. The South 
China Sea dispute is also analyzed to examine different benefits and the interests of 
various parties.  
CHAPTER 5 explores the characteristics of the triangular Vietnam, China, 
US relationship. Due to its geo-strategic location, Vietnam suffers from the effects of 
sitting between a regional power and a global superpower. When the two powers 
cooperate, then Vietnam can benefit from the positive impacts of win-win Sino-
American relations. When the two powers compete, then Vietnam suffers a dilemma 
of which side to align with. In the situation that both powers interact with each other 
in cooperative and competitive relations, Vietnam becomes more vulnerable in the 
security, socio-economic and human rights characteristics of the triangular 
relationship between Vietnam, China and the US. 
CHAPTER 6 investigates the development of the triangular Vietnam, China, 
US relationship since 2001 up to present (2015). Vietnam and China entered a new 
period of cooperation after the normalization of bilateral ties from 1991 to 2008, then 
suffered a tougher time in the territorial disputes over the South China Sea from 2008 
onwards. With the US, bilateral ties started slowly in the period after normalization 
of diplomatic relations from 1995 to 2008, then witnessed a closer Vietnamese-
American military cooperation from 2008 onwards.  
The purpose of Vietnam’s rapprochement with the US in defense ties is 
examined to test the hypothesis that Vietnam benefits from increased military 
capacity and professionalism in national defense. The chapter argues that Vietnam 
can defend its national independence and sovereignty as well as play a greater role in 
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contributing to regional security. It also questions the belief that Vietnam wants 
closer ties with the US as leverage against China. Vietnam is pursuing a more 
independent and imaginative foreign policy, and a closer Vietnam-US military 
relationship is only a part of Hanoi’s broader strategy of defensive diplomacy with 
other countries such as Russia, India, Australia and France. The final feature that the 
chapter explores is the rapprochement between Vietnam and the US, and the chapter 
argues that this is not a strategy to counter the rise of China in the region, nor is it a 
response to China’s military building up or its assertive sovereignty claim in the 
South China Sea.  
CHAPTER 7 discusses the implications both for regional countries and for 
Vietnam. It argues that the US aims to seek friendly relations with Vietnam to 
prevent China’s influence in Southeast Asia while China has tried to put pressure on 
Vietnam to replace the “power gap” after the Soviet Union’s collapse reduced the US 
presence in Southeast Asia. In this context, Vietnam should follow a foreign policy 
of balancing the strategic rivalry of great powers. However the chapter also asserts 
that in its external relations, Vietnam should focus on a more imaginative approach 
than simply great power balancing, and should seek enhancement of relations with 
regional countries within ASEAN, and use other multilateral forums to gain 
international support to deal with regional disputes with China. Vietnam’s foreign 
policy makers should engage in a charm offensive, with the main task being 
protecting national sovereignty, independence and freedom as well as seeking to 
maintain national benefit.  
The conclusion, CHAPTER 8, highlights the position of Southeast Asia in US 
and China’s strategic policy. For the US, despite speculation about its position in the 
world, retaining primacy at both regional and global level remains a policy goal. 
Given the huge and enduring power disparities in the world, the increasingly 
symbiotic nature of power relations in economic terms, and the networked 
relationship among states, the thesis argues no power can take advantage of the 
current situation to dramatically upset this status quo. Thus, the US-led balance of 
power system in the region will endure, and the US-centred liberal order will 
continue. In this scenario, China will continue to make a re-emergence in a multi-
polar system while seeking to avoid conflicts with the US. As long as cooperative 
relations between Beijing and Washington remains constructive and stable, there will 
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be no surge of military acquisition and no spike in defence spending that could cause 
an arms race in the region overall. In this context, this chapter concludes the thesis by 
recommending Vietnam’s foreign policy maintain friendly ties with major powers 
and stay in harmony with other regional actors. This will be to Vietnam’s benefit, 
and ASEAN states should also follow this policy as much as is possible for their own 
benefit. 
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CHAPTER 2.  CHINA’S STRATEGIES TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
This chapter studies Vietnam’s position in China’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy, It will assess China’s ascension in the new world order and its foreign policy 
amid global trends and the regional situation in the post-Cold War era. It will focus 
on China’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia and China’s strategies towards the 
region. The main argument of the chapter is that Chinese interests and foreign policy 
towards Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular are to advance its power 
and influence in Southeast Asia, leading to significant implications for Vietnam. 
2.1 The New World Order after the Cold War 
2.1.1 Global Trends and the Rise of China in the New World Order 
The fall of the most famous symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, on 10 
November 1989 was followed by declarations of independence from many Soviet 
Republics and the collapse of the Soviet Union on 8 December 1991 historically 
marks the end of the Cold War. As the danger of superpower confrontation receded, 
global peace maintained by non-violent means had become a popular trend of 
international relations. Roberts argued that a major war during this period is now 
highly unlikely. 1  Arguably, the threat of war has been reduced due to the 
development of crosscutting cleavages caused by the disappearance of the Soviet-
American poles of power in the international system.2 However, the post-Cold War 
peace has not been entirely tranquil, and it is forecasted as an unsteady peace 
characterised by strategic uncertainty. Simultaneously, there appeared new 
challenges to peace, namely: the revival of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, 
and ethno-nationalist disputes in various parts of the world. At the same time, global 
security was threatened by regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and uncertainties surrounding the reform process in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (made up of former Soviet Republics) and in other former 
                                                 
1 Roberts, A., ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, International Affairs, 84(2), 2008, pp. 335-
350 at 350. 
2 Singh, H., ‘Prospect for Regional Stability in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War era’, Millennium-
Journal of International Studies, 22(2), 1993, pp. 279-300 at 290. 
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socialist countries.3 As a result, the international trends in the post-Cold War are 
notably recognized as the mix of both stability and uncertainty. 
Politically, the most significant characteristic of global geopolitics in the 
aftermath of the Cold War is the trend of cooperation and competition, contradiction 
and harmonization in international relations. Great states tend to adjust their policies 
towards maintaining long-term stable strategic partnerships. Although serious 
competition still exists, states make an effort to avoid direct rivalry. They strive to 
make stability and economic development priorities to advance their national 
interests. This adjustment aims to strengthen national power to maximise national 
interests in the international arena.  
In terms of national hard power, military power continues to play its 
traditionally important role. However, in a world of continuing diversity, economic 
and technological power have become crucial strengths. Hard power used to be the 
ideal tool in international relations, but influence can also be achieved by methods 
other than the use of force. So-called “soft power” includes the attraction of national 
values such as culture, ideology, education that is extended through internal or 
external policies. In addition to these two normal powers, the post-Cold War era also 
witnessed the appearance of “smart power,” which is comprised of the combination 
of both hard and soft power.4 As the concept of “national power” becomes less 
relevant with “hard power,” “soft power” and “smart power” tend to play a more 
significant role in identifying the relative influence of a nation.  
Socio-economically, globalization and international integration is another 
feature of political reality in the new millennium. In the years of world-
interdependence, states face a variety of global issues that cannot be resolved alone 
such as poverty, environmental pressures, weapons of mass destruction, trans-border 
diseases, trans-national crimes and terrorism. In this context, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 
                                                 
3 Shuja, S.M., ‘Post-Cold War International Relations: Trends and Portents’, Contemporary Review, 
2001; 278(1621), pp. 82-86 at 83. 
4 Nguyen Thai Yen Huong, Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung: Hợp tác và Cạnh tranh luận giải dưới góc độ cân 
bằng quyền lực [Trans: The US-China relationship: Cooperation and Competition looking at the 
perspective of balance of power],Nha xuat ban Chinh tri Quoc gia-Su that [Trans: National Political 
Publisher, Truth], Hanoi, 2011, pp. 20-27.  
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to advance the free trade agenda. WTO is more comprehensive than GATT and has 
four key objectives: to enforce rules for international trade; to create a forum to 
negotiate and monitor trade liberalization; to improve trade transparency; and to 
reduce trade disputes.5 Advocates of globalization argue nations all over the world 
should integrate globally, striving to become WTO members so as to facilitate the 
development of their own national economies. 
 Technically, the advancement of digital technology has brought about a 
significant revolution to every sector of modern society including international 
relations. The scientific and technological evolution has made knowledge and 
informatics play a crucial role in global economic affairs, laying the foundation for 
the knowledge economy. The main lesson from the Cold War is that military rivalry 
was expensive and it took a great toll on both the US and the Soviet Union, while 
economic cooperation and competition seems to work effectively for the European 
Union (EU), North America and East Asia. In this there is a continuing economic 
trend towards tri-polarity with the EU, North America and East Asia as the major 
poles since “each of them accounts for approximately one-fourth of the world’s gross 
national product (GNP).”6 Economic power is now pursued at a regional, rather than 
a national, level.  
More importantly, the end of the East-West confrontation left the US with 
dominant superpower status. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was 
increasingly considered as a new giant both in Asia and the world. China’s rise in the 
global trading system has been dramatic: “in thinking strategically about modern 
international affairs, there is no more important challenge than to understand the 
nature and implications for a rising China.” 7  From one of the least developed 
countries in the 1970s, China has made tremendous economic progress to become 
one of the largest economies in the world by the end of the 20th century. Considering 
                                                 
5 Anderson, K.,‘The Future Agenda of the WTO’ in World Trade Organisation Secretariat (ed.), From 
GATT to the WTO: The Multilateral Trading System in the New Millennium, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague and London, 2000, p. 8. 
6 Shuja, S.M., ‘Post-Cold War International Relations: Trends and Portents’, Contemporary Review, 
278(1621), 2001, pp. 82-86 at 83. 
7 Scott, D., China Stands Up: The PRC and The International System, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 
83. 
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the traditional elements of national power, China’s land area and population have 
already made it a major power. Historically, it had been a regional power. China has 
the largest population in the world with over 1.2 billion people in July 2000.8 A 
decade later, China maintained its status as the most populous nation on earth with 
1.3 billion, a labour force of 780 million and some 389 million Internet users.9 
Accordingly, China’s largest population has steadily affirmed its strength as a global 
power.  
The rise of China as an economic power is a remarkable feat by any standard. 
The annual growth rate of the Chinese economy, measured by the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), has been no less than 10% for over three decades. China’s GDP in 
1978 was reportedly 7% of its GDP in 2007, and with economic output doubling on 
average every eight years, the structure of the economy has witnessed significant 
changes. The primary sector of the economy accounted for 70% of employment in 
1978 but this was reduced to 40% by 2007. 10  Other statistics demonstrate that 
China’s economic growth rate has been at least 12% per year since the 1990s, fuelled 
by rising exports and a staggering $180 billion in foreign investment. According to 
the Director-General of the Chinese government policy agency, the State 
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, Mr Lu Yong Hua: 
We believe we can keep our growth rate around 9% per year for the next 15 years. 
China’s GNP (Gross National Product) will become the first in the world in the next 
century. It will surpass America’s.11 
This economic achievement started in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping, the 
successor to Mao Zedong, introduced free-market reforms that led to three decades 
of explosive growth rates in the economy under the political control of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 12  By the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations 
programme made the Chinese economy a “remarkable accomplishment” with an 
                                                 
8 Pumphrey, C.W., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications, Strategic Studies Institute, US. 
Army War College, 2002, p. 2 
9 World Fact Book 2011 (C.I.A), ‘The Rise of China’, New York Times Upfront, 2011,14(1), p. 21. 
10 Knight, J. and Ding, S., China’s Remarkable Economic Growth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012. 
11 Bob, D., ‘Empire Rises, Fall with Hong Kong Turn Over, China on Track to be Biggest Economic 
Power’, General Interests Periodicals-United States, Austin, Tex, US, 1997. 
12 Michael, W., ‘The Rise of China’, New York Times Upfront, 14(1), 2011, p. 21. 
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annual growth rate of 10%. In the OECD’s perception, “in just one decade and a half, 
China has transformed itself from a dormant, introspective giant into a dynamic 
powerhouse.” 13  China overtook Japan and became the world’s second-biggest 
economy by the second quarter of 2010, with its GNP of US$1.337 trillion and GDP 
of more than US$4.9 trillion.14 China has become the world’s largest exporter15 and 
is projected to have the single largest economy in the world by 2016.16 Although this 
growth has slowed down slightly due to the global financial crisis, the overall 
achievements are still remarkable.17 More impressively, according to calculations by 
some American scholars, China’s GDP could reach 25% of global GDP in the year 
2030, and 40% in the year 2040, becoming the largest world economy.18 
The increased importance of the Chinese economy in the global economic 
system has resulted in a greater influence for China in the global political arena. 
China is set to achieve more power on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
governing board, both for the developing world and for itself. China’s voting share 
within the IMF increased from 2.9% to 3.6% in 2006 and then to 3.8% in 2010. 
Moreover, China has suggested replacing the current dominant currency (USD) with 
a basket of currencies that represent the value of special drawing rights (SDRs) used 
within the IMF.19  
                                                 
13 Scott, D., ‘China Stands Up: The PRC and The International System’, Routledge, New York 2007, 
p. 84. 
14 Bloomberg News, 16 August 2010, ‘China overtakes Japan as World’s Second Biggest Economy’ 
15 ‘China becomes World’s number 1 Exporter, passing Germany’, The Associated Press, 10 January 
2010 in Travis Nelson and Matthew Carlson, ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese 
Influence in Asia’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 2012, p. 477. 
16 Nelson, T. and Carlson, M., ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese Influence in 
Asia’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 2012, pp. 330-359 at 477. 
17 Nelson, and Carlson, ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese Influence in Asia’, p. 
477. 
18 Nguyen Tat Giap, Chien luoc dai khai pha mien Tay cua Trung Quoc giai doan 2010-2020 [Trans: 
“The Chinese Grand Strategy to exploit the Western Region 2010-2020], in Do Tien Sam and 
Kurhara Hirohide (eds), Hợp tác Phát triển: “Hai Hành Lang, Một vành đai Kinh tế” Việt Nam -
Trung Quốc trong bối cảnh mới [Trans: “Cooperation Development: “Two Corridors, One Economic 
Belt: Vietnam and China in the New Situation”], The Social Science Publisher, Hanoi, 2012, p. 227. 
19 Dittmer, L., ‘China’s Global Rise’, Americas Quarterly, 2012, 
http://www.americasquarterly.org/China-Global-Rise (Date of visit 6 January 2015). 
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China’s phenomenal economic expansion has made it an Asian giant with 
greater ambition. For some countries, this ambition is a threat. Former US Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice argued: 
China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that 
China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of 
power in its own favour. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the “strategic 
partner” the Clinton Administration once called it.20 
China’s ambitious strategy to further its power in Asia is focused on 
Southeast Asia. The geo-strategic reality is that China is surrounded by strong and 
influential nations: Japan and Korea lie in the east and both are protected by the close 
US alliance; Russia to the north has a formidable military capacity and possesses 
nuclear arms; to the west lies India, a populous country with nuclear arms and 
protected from land invasion by the Himalayan mountain range. The only outlet for 
Chinese ambitions is Southeast Asia. Thus, it is China’s intention to become a 
predominant force in the region by building up close relationships with countries 
here, so as to place Beijing in the position of leadership and influence while isolating 
the US from its traditional role in this area. For Southeast Asian states, China is 
already recognized as the regional dominant superpower, largely due to its effective 
translation of burgeoning economic clout into political influence.21  
Finally, China’s rapid economic development and growing influence has led 
it to seek an expansion of its military capability and force projection. While the US 
continues to be the world’s biggest military spender with a defence budget of 
US$711 billion in 2011, China has become the second largest spender with an 
estimated US$143 billion that year. China has increased its military spending by 
170% in real terms since 2002. 22  It has also increased defence spending at 
approximately 12% per year. Although Chinese defence spending is only less than a 
quarter of the size of the US today, China’s generals are ambitious. According to the 
                                                 
20 Rice, C., ‘Promoting the National Interests’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000 
http://www.cfr.org/world/campaign-2000-promoting-national-interest/p10456 (Date of visit 14 July 
2015) 
21 Dillon, D. and J. Tkacik Jr., ‘China’s Quest for Asia’, Policy Review, Dec 2005/June 2006, 134, pp. 
31-33. 
22 http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/apr/17/military-spending-countries-list (Date of 
visit 7 October 2014) 
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annual report from the US Congress, China spent as much as US$139 billion on 
modernizing its military forces in 2007, more than three times its announced defence 
budget. That actual figure would overshadow the military budget of Russia, Japan 
and South Korea combined.23 Chinese total military spending, including defense and 
other military items, such as research and development, could be as much as US$160 
billion. The defence expenditure of China is expected to exceed that of the US by 
2035, as China is expected to be the world’s largest military spender that year.24  
However, China’s modernization of its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 
raised concerns about the future of peace and stability in East Asia. Although 
Chinese leaders claim China’s emerging power is a peaceful rise and its military 
expansion is only for defensive purposes, the global community is still concerned by 
what they see as China’s unclear motivations. China’s military activities have 
rekindled American interest in the Asia-Pacific region.25 There is no doubt that China 
maintains the largest standing army in the world. The rise of China is undoubtedly 
one of the most salient features of international relations in the 21st century. 
However, whether China’s rise will be peaceful is uncertain.   
2.1.2 The Regional Situation after the Cold War 
In evaluating the regional situation in the Asia-Pacific, it is essential to 
understand the geographical extent of the area. Southeast Asia is an important part of 
the Asia-Pacific. The term “Asia-Pacific” emerged in the post-Cold War world and 
denotes a vaguely defined region that covers around two-thirds of the world’s 
population and more than half of global trade. The meaning of the term varies in 
different contexts. In a geographic sense, the Asia-Pacific is the part of the world in 
or near the Western Pacific Ocean, and it typically includes at least East Asia and 
Southeast Asia, and even Russia in the north of the Pacific. From a Western geo-
strategic perspective, the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War is comprised of several 
groups of nations. One group includes the former and rising great powers of China, 
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Japan and Russia. Another group includes the regionally influential powers such as 
Australia, India and Indonesia. The Asia-Pacific can also be divided into the five 
sub-regions of East Asia, Heartland, Offshore Asia and Oceania, South Asia and 
Southeast Asia.26  
Another study considers the Asia-Pacific as a loosely comprised region 
moving from Pakistan in the west to the Americas in the east, and from Russia in the 
north to Australia and New Zealand to the south. 27  The Asia-Pacific can be 
understood geo-politically through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
inaugurated in Australia in 1989. It comprises 21 members from Southeast Asia, 
Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, 
Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, The United States and Vietnam.28 
 The end of the Cold War has shifted the distribution of powers in the Asia-
Pacific towards regional multi-polarity and the movement towards alignment. In this 
regional political landscape, the US plays the role of both global superpower and 
active player that is still settling on its post-Cold War role. Meanwhile, China and 
Japan are seeking more influential roles in regional and global politics. From the 
early 1990s, the two Koreas and Southeast Asian states have started focusing on a 
sub-regional order.29 Therefore, the Asia-Pacific is not only a region of economic 
growth, but also a geopolitically strategic area. 
 Southeast Asia is a crucial part of the Asia-Pacific. Geopolitically, Southeast 
Asia is often understood through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), a geopolitical and economic regional organization formed on 8 August 
1967. Geographically, Southeast Asia consists of the area to the south of China, east 
of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia. It has two geographic sub-
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326 at 322. 
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regions. Mainland Southeast Asia comprises Cambodia, Laos, Burma (Myanmar), 
Thailand, Vietnam and Peninsular Malaysia. Maritime Southeast Asia comprises 
Brunei, East Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and East Timor. 
ASEAN covers a land area of 4.46 million km2, but its sea area is three times larger. 
With a population of approximately 600 million people, ASEAN accounts for 8.8% 
of the world’s population. As a single entity, ASEAN’s combined nominal GDP had 
grown to US$1.8 trillion by 2010.30 It makes the grouping the ninth largest economy 
in the world and the third largest in Asia. With rapid growing economies, rising 
purchasing power and affluent consumers, Southeast Asia’s combined GDP 
exceeded US$2.2 trillion in 2011.31 The size and location of Southeast Asia has been 
a factor in the struggle between great powers for influence. In the context of the 
global political change following the fall of the Soviet Union, the US withdrew its 
forces from Southeast Asia, Japan remilitarized, and China invested heavily in 
defence. Therefore, Southeast Asia had to face a changing regional hierarchical 
order. Despite withdrawing its forces, the US has maintained its alliance 
relationships, strategic cooperation and economic involvement in Southeast Asia. 
Meanwhile, as a rising regional power, China seems content not to directly challenge 
the dominant status of the US. At the same time, Japan and other leading Southeast 
Asian states were successful in establishing cooperative mechanisms to create mutual 
understanding and regional identity. The result has been cooperation of major powers 
and the socialization of China within Southeast Asia, bringing about more 
commitment from the US to the region.32  
This temporary security in Southeast Asia was enhanced because of the 
regional political system after the Cold War. Writing in 1993, Hari Singh argued that 
the bipolar international system had a strong impact on Southeast Asia politics and 
regional conflicts could be significantly reduced due to the absence of a single pole 
in international politics. However, together with increased security, there would be 
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increased uncertainties that will undermine regional stability.33  Tensions such as 
contending forces of economic liberalisation and protectionism, repression and 
democratisation, nationalism and supranationalism, integration and fragmentation, 
hegemony and resistance to great power influence are bound to affect the regional 
politics of Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War world.34 Others domestic conflicts 
within some Southeast Asian state members including the Philippines (Mindanao), 
Indonesia (West Papua) and Thailand (Patani) are also the region’s most pressing 
security issues.35 
 Singh has been largely proved right by history. However, the post-Cold War 
world threw a new challenge to the region in the shape of the “global War on 
Terror”. Until the Bush administration, and with the development of Southeast Asia 
as the “second front” in the “global war on terror,” there is little doubt that 
Washington had, to some extent, lost interest in ASEAN as a regional bloc, 
preferring to deal directly with the Philippines and Thailand, in particular.36 The US 
has also stepped up security relations with former adversary Vietnam by organising 
“security dialogues” on political and military issues.37 The US and Vietnam held 
their first annual Political, Security and Defence Dialogue in Hanoi in October 2008. 
Both countries have also held an annual Defence Policy Dialogue since 2010. These 
dialogues have enhanced the Vietnamese-American defence relationship. However, 
Vietnamese Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vịnh has stated the limitations of the 
cooperation and reiterated the necessity of bilateral trust between top leaders of the 
two nations: 
A better defence relationship should be based on the efficiency of practical 
cooperation, including overcoming the aftermath of war…Generally speaking, the US 
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has offered Vietnam active cooperation in this issue, but it is not enough as the 
consequences of war are terrible.38  
Acharya and Tan have argued that American engagement in Southeast Asia 
with limitations can be useful for the regional order. If Washington gets involved in 
regional affairs with its unilateral interests and assertion of power, the US risks 
coming into conflict with China. However, if the US adopts a measured presence and 
respects China’s growing claims, the situation will be less hostile.39  
Southeast Asia has long been considered by China as the “vital region for its 
own growth and prosperity.” 40  Thus, US presence in the region can challenge 
China’s regional strategy and create a fierce competition between the two major 
powers. As Carlyle Thayer concluded, Southeast Asian security was affected by 
Sino-American relations due to the US re-engagement with the region and Chinese 
assertiveness in the South China Sea. Southeast Asia will continue to be affected by 
Sino-American rivalry and military competition.41 The coming of a new world order 
has brought about major changes in Southeast Asia’s political landscape. A bipolar 
structure has given way to a dynamic multi-polar regional mechanism. Sino-
American relations have had a great impact on regional security and development, 
requiring further detailed analysis about the practical implications for Southeast 
Asian states. 
2.2 China’s Strategic Interests in Southeast Asia  
2.2.1 Political Interests  
China’s principal political interest in Southeast Asia is to advance its power 
in the region, in recognition of its greater regional status. For centuries China has 
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considered Southeast Asia as its most important gateway to the outside world.42 
Another perspective is to see Southeast Asia playing a vital role in China’s attempt to 
expand its global influence. 43  According to Thayer, China has been developing 
stronger relationships with Southeast Asian states. Between 1999 and 2000, China 
signed long-term cooperative framework agreements with all ten ASEAN members. 
Besides general cooperation, each agreement is different in details. While the six 
documents mention defence cooperation with Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, three other agreements with Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Laos refer to human rights. Three of these agreements with the 
Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia specifically address the territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea.44  
With the agenda of reinforcing sub-regional cooperation, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai reached a consensus in 
2004 on a new initiative of “two corridors and one ring.” The first corridor stretches 
from Nanning (in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) via Lạng Son to Hanoi, 
Hai Phong and Quang Ninh. The second corridor will be from Kunming (in Yunnan 
province) via Lao Cai to Hanoi, Hai Phong and Quang Ninh.. The one ring is the 
Beibu Gulf Rim.45   
China has two economic strategies requiring cooperation with Southeast Asia 
through ASEAN: the “Great Western Development Strategy,” and the “Gulf of 
Tonkin Economic Belt” in Vietnamese or the “Beibu Gulf Economic Rim” in 
Chinese. The former covers six southern Chinese provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, 
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan) and five autonomous regions (Guangxi, 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang) and the municipality of Chongqing. 
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This region contains 71.4% of Mainland China’s area but only 28.8% of its 
population (as at the end of 2002) and 19.9% of its total economic output (as at 
2009). 46  The second strategy highlights China-ASEAN cooperation as it links 
Guandong, Hainan and Guangxi provinces with northern and central Vietnam.47 
These strategies represent a new era in China-Southeast Asian cooperation.  
With a new Asian regionalism stimulated by the 2010 China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that binds China and six ASEAN countries, and 
expanding to all ASEAN members by 2015, China is laying the firm foundation in its 
relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours. While the CAFTA opens up a bilateral 
framework for cooperation at the strategic level, the other sub-regional mechanisms 
facilitate the progress of bilateral cooperation at the grassroots level. Through these 
frameworks, China aims to convey its peaceful rise and to bring about economic 
development for its southern provinces and make Kunming a regional operation 
centre for trade and transport. China’s active role in these cooperation projects 
reveals its strategic vision of strengthening bilateral relations with ASEAN.48 
According to Thayer, China also views Southeast Asia (and especially the 
South China Sea) as its traditional sphere of influence and has attempted to engage 
the region in all spheres of bilateral relations. With its reliance on regional energy 
sources, China has an interest in enhancing stability and security of regional states, 
where these resources are exploited and sent through the sea lines of communications 
(SLOCs).49 
Between 70 and 80 per cent of the PRC’s vital energy imports pass through 
the Straits of Malacca, the narrow and congested waterway in Southeast Asia.50 The 
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region was where Chinese migrants have settled down for centuries and it can 
provide China with the space to expand its power and influence. In the sub-continent, 
India is always a key player, no matter how close the friendship between China and 
Pakistan. After the Cold War, China’s rivalry with India in South Asia brought the 
former to a strategic partnership with Pakistan. In Central Asia, China has to compete 
with Russia and a growing American presence. Therefore, China finds it easier to 
deal with Southeast Asia. 51  Stuart-Fox argues that Southeast Asia, in particular 
mainland Southeast Asia, is where China can deploy its influence due to a strong US 
military presence in Korea as long as the division of the peninsula remains, and with 
a US-Japan alliance in place. Southeast Asia is the only choice for Beijing to 
cultivate its “sphere of influence.”52 
In addition, China needs to establish a safe zone in the south or if possible, a 
“sphere of influence” as a “spring-board” to reach out to the outside world, aiming 
both to achieve greater international influence and to limit US global hegemony. 
Thus, ASEAN is always regarded as an “outer shield” with the role of protecting 
China’s western and southern security. Major powers tend to use the surrounding 
neighbours as the starting point for a national grand strategy. For example, the US 
succeeded in using Canada and Mexico as strategic grounds, taking advantage of 
Latin America for strengthening its strategic position.53 Eastern European countries 
have distanced themselves from Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.54 
Preserving a peaceful and stable atmosphere in Southeast Asia is a long-term 
requirement for China with its agenda for the “Great Renewal of Chinese Nation.”55 
China is well aware of the crucial significance of ASEAN in implementing major 
power diplomacy with a “responsible image” to advance its influence in the world. 
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The South China Sea in particular is regarded as one crucial gateway for an 
emerging China to carry out its ambition of becoming a sea power and global power 
to reach the “green ocean.” China considers the South China Sea as the “unique 
path” that can provide either a major convenience or a great obstacle for China in its 
expansion. According to Do Minh Cao, the South China Sea is located in an arterial 
sea traffic route connecting the Pacific with Indian Ocean, Europe and Asia, the 
Middle East and Asia. Five of the world’s ten biggest commercial sea routes are 
connected to the South China Sea. The Sea is also regarded as the second busiest 
international traffic route with 150 to 200 vessels per day passing through it. Half of 
these vessels weigh more than 5,000 tons, and at least 10% of these vessels weigh 
more than 30,000 tons. There are 536 seaports in the South China Sea, with two of 
them, Singapore and Hong Kong, the world’s largest and most modern ports 
respectively.56 
Do regards the South China Sea not only as an area of great territorial 
importance to China, but it is also vital for its plans to be a regional power.57 China is 
blocked to the East by the solid American-Japanese-South Korean alliance, and to 
the South West by the Indian Ocean, the traditional sphere of India. Without the 
South China Sea, China’s geo-oceanic advantage will be non-existent, making it 
solely a continental power. The South China Sea provides a region for China to 
achieve its ambition of becoming a sea power and exert global influence.  
China favours a multilateral approach to cooperate with Southeast Asia 
through the ASEAN regional mechanism. Baviera claims that, since the 1990s, 
China has started to evaluate Southeast Asia as a region of strategic value with a 
unified ASEAN, which is likely to be an ally for China’s ambition of balancing 
powers in Asia.58As a regional power, China finds that a useful method of countering 
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US dominance is to accelerate and enhance a multi-polar structure. China expects 
ASEAN to evolve into one “pole” in a multi-polar system since the organization 
aims to create a peaceful and neutral region.59 
ASEAN members are mostly small- to medium-sized countries. If each state 
acts on its own, its political strength and international leverage are limited. However, 
since the 1990s, ASEAN has developed into one of the most successful integrated 
regional associations in the world. If ASEAN succeeds in establishing the ASEAN 
Community with its three pillars – Political-Security, Economic and Social-Cultural 
cooperation – by 2015, then it will be possible for ASEAN to form one important 
geo-political pole in a multi-polar world. Consequently, China, with its rising 
position as a regional power, will attempt to affirm its role as a major power in this 
area and attempt to influence ASEAN. This is a reasonable assumption because once 
China imposes itself on this region it can broaden this greater influence into the 
international arena. 60  China values its relationship with ASEAN because the 
association represents the whole region. China regards ASEAN as a driving engine 
for other important and related multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Closer ties with ASEAN are also 
valuable for China, in helping to limit Taiwan’s international quest for legitimacy 
since ASEAN supports the One-China policy.61   
It is also in China’s interest to constrain the US and reduce American 
influence in Southeast Asia. China wants to develop good relations with Southeast 
Asia through multilateral cooperation in order to project an image of a regional 
power with no potential threat. This image can help constrain American influence.62 
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Furthermore, a policy of good cooperation with ASEAN is beneficial for China as 
the latter intends to ensure that Southeast Asia has a balanced relationship with other 
major powers in the region, including the US, Japan and Russia. 63  
Chinese interests in Southeast Asia are not uniform across each regional state. 
Southeast Asia is not always docile due to the different national interests. 
Specifically, China’s attempts to develop bilateral ties with ten Southeast Asian 
countries must satisfy each of the ten countries’ national interests. This argument can 
be explored by examining China’s relations with several key Southeast Asian 
countries. 
Among Southeast Asian maritime nations, Indonesia is acknowledged as 
being of great interest to China due to its size, population, strategic location and its 
traditional policy of non-alignment.64 Indonesia’s positive features can bring about 
major advantages for China, especially after Jakarta and Beijing normalized 
diplomatic relations in August 1990. Maintaining a strong relationship with 
Indonesia, which is regarded as the de facto leader of ASEAN, can help create more 
leverage for China in international issues. Indonesia’s policy of non-alignment is in 
line with Chinese interest in a Southeast Asia free of the dominance of outside 
powers.  China can also benefit from good bilateral relations with Thailand with the 
latter’s foreign policy of “go with the strength.”65 Thai diplomats claim that among 
Southeast Asian nations, they are enjoying the best relations with China in spite of its 
close security engagement with the US. China is aware that Thailand never takes part 
in any coalition in opposition to China. Weaker and more vulnerable Southeast Asian 
states like Laos and Cambodia consider China as more of a protector than a probable 
threat.  
Myanmar also regards China as a peaceful neighbour and Sino-Burmese 
relations have allowed Chinese trade expansion through to the Bay of Bengal. Bert 
argues that China has an interest in good bilateral relations with Myanmar because of 
the latter’s geopolitical strategies, arms transfers and response to military logistics 
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and other communications problems. Myanmar is now a firm political and military 
ally of China. 66 Brunei has historic trade links with China and remains influenced by 
China. Malaysia and Thailand have the friendliest relations with Beijing to date 
because of closer economic ties with East Asia. 67 
Southeast Asia, despite enjoying effective cooperation with China, is not 
always docile in its relations with China, especially in the event of conflict between 
the US and China. For example, Singapore is not willing to be closer to one or other 
of these two powers. Stuart-Fox believes that Singapore, which has been providing 
facilities for American warships, is very careful in extending any influence beyond 
its borders. It is impossible for Singapore to act as China’s advance garrison or 
America’s lone bastion. The Philippines is the ASEAN country most in line with 
American interests. Since the Aquino Administration took office, it has given priority 
to revitalizing its treaty alliance with the US and both countries signed an Enhanced 
Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2014. Diplomatic ties between the PRC and the 
Philippines also lack depth due to the Philippines’ closer ties with Taiwan and to the 
strong influence of Roman Catholicism in the Philippines. Lastly, Vietnam has more 
than a thousand years of Chinese influence. Arguably, the Vietnamese understand the 
Chinese better than any other ASEAN state because they share much of the Chinese 
worldview. The failure of the Soviet model demonstrated to Vietnam that China 
should be dealt with on its own terms. Vietnam has learned from historical 
experiences that to be tough and self-reliant can be the best course of action.68 
2.2.2 Economic Interests  
China has significant investments in Southeast Asia through bilateral 
relations and multilateral cooperation, and its persistence in the South China Sea 
disputes reveals the region’s economic attractiveness for China.  
Much of China’s imported energy is transported through regional sea-lanes 
and the region has important natural resources that can meet China’s future needs. A 
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peaceful environment in Southeast Asia is regarded as an important precondition for 
China’s continued economic growth. ASEAN states have enjoyed strong economic 
growth and it is believed this will bind the area more closely to the Asia-Pacific 
through ASEAN-led institutions.69 Furthermore, China derives economic benefits 
from cooperation with Southeast Asia at a multilateral level in order to check the 
interests of its competitors, particularly the US. Khoo et al. argue that the planned 
establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2010 was seen as a tool for 
China to enhance its power over the region and reduce the influence of China’s 
competitors such as Japan, Taiwan and the US. The ASEAN+3 forum (ASEAN, 
China, Japan and South Korea) attempted to strengthen China-ASEAN relations by 
excluding the US. In this sense, China’s active participation in multilateral 
mechanisms such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in 2003, the 
EAS, and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area from part of China’s intentional grand 
strategy. This tactic is carried out on the basis of “non-threatening trade-focused” 
approach using “formal and informal mechanisms of interdependence as a de facto 
strategy to restrain the US.”70 
Additionally, China’s main economic engagement with Southeast Asia is 
related to the ethnic Chinese living in the region. According to Vaughn and 
Morrison, there are about 30 to 40 million ethnic Chinese residing in Southeast Asia. 
Most of them are descendants of migrants from the southern Chinese provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian. Among Southeast Asian states, Indonesia has the largest 
Chinese ethnic community with eight million people (3.2% of the total population). 
Chinese ancestry and the Chinese Lunar New Year were officially recognized in 
Indonesia in 2003. There are also significant ethnic Chinese populations in other 
Southeast Asian states – two million in Singapore (about 80% of its population); five 
million in Malaysia (28% of population); five million in Thailand (10% of 
population) and two million in Myanmar (3.5% of population).71 The majority of the 
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Chinese community in these Southeast Asian states have played an important role in 
China’s economic interests in the region due to their huge contribution to the 
regional economy.  
From a bilateral viewpoint, China has maintained its economic interests in 
Southeast Asia through amicable relations with individual states. This is because 
Southeast Asia, through ASEAN-10, is a diversified group in its relations with 
China. Three nations of ASEAN-10 that enjoy a higher per capita GDP than China 
are Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Two countries in this group, Indonesia and 
the Philippines, have a lower per capita GDP than China, but have enjoyed strong 
growth in domestic industrial and modern service sectors in the past four decades. 
China has helped Indonesia to build bridges and roads in Surabaya, East Java and in 
some islands. In the coming years, China is expected to assist Indonesia build a 
bridge to connect Java and Sumatra. Indonesia also has cooperated with China in 
military technology in order to reduce its dependence on the US and other Western 
countries.72 Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have made impressive efforts in GDP 
growth, and Vietnam has achieved faster economic growth than any other economy 
in the region.73 China aims to gain a bigger share over Cambodia’s natural resources. 
In exchange for enhancing bilateral relations with Cambodia and boosting the 
Cambodian economy, China can achieve favourable leverage in its mediation of 
regional conflicts.74 China has built the closest bilateral relationship with Myanmar.75 
Its economic interests in Myanmar can serve its purpose of economic and military 
expansion. These policies are likely to help China secure a stronger access to the 
Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean.76  
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Bert concluded that China’s interests in the expansion of roads, railways and 
other transportation infrastructure is focused not only in Myanmar, but also on parts 
of its general strategy to improve access to and from Southeast Asia, including 
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. A large land zone in the south of Yunnan province 
called the Golden Peninsula has three routes through Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. It 
is expected to create favourable conditions for Chinese commercial penetration into 
Southeast Asia. Chinese investment in infrastructure in the region comes from not 
only its intentional strategy, but also from the objective requirement of Chinese 
economic expansion due to Yunnan province’s limited connection with China’s coast 
and the outside world.77  
 Tran argues that China’s economic interests in the South China Sea are of 
vital importance. Several East Asian nations such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and China have national economies heavily dependent on the maritime 
route through the South China Sea. The Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) are 
the lifelines of navigation for the transfer of oil and other natural resources between 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. More than 90% of global commercial 
transportation is carried out through navigation, of which 45% is done through the 
South China Sea. Furthermore, the volume of oil and gas transferred through this 
area is 15 times larger than that transferred through the Panama Canal.78 Do claims 
that China controls 29 out of 39 maritime routes, and that 60% of its imports and 
exports, and 70% of its oil, are transported through the South China Sea annually. 
The sea routes in this region play a crucial role for China’s exportation of its own 
products, worth US$31 billion in 2012.79  
Given its recent assertiveness in the territorial disputes with Southeast Asian 
neighbours, little further evidence is required to gauge China’s interest in the South 
China Sea. Zhao clarified that Chinese assertiveness is the result of a Chinese energy 
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security “emergency,” when the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East 
placed China and its energy strategy at risk of probable constraint and cost increases. 
As a result, China had to implement new energy diversification tactics, shifting oil 
and gas development to the ocean, especially to the South China Sea.80 China is now 
an energy superpower gobbling up coal, electricity, oil and other raw materials. In 
2003, China consumed more than 40% of the world’s cement output, and was 
responsible for one-third of the world’s growth in oil consumption and 90% in steel 
demand.81 China’s oil importation is set to increase from 6.2 million barrels per day 
(bpd) in 2004 to 12.7 million bpd in 2020. China’s current domestic problems of 
pollution caused by coal burning are also adding urgent pressure to explore new 
alternative energy resources to replace traditional sources. 82  Therefore, partly 
because of its future energy needs, China has become the major player in Southeast 
Asia, especially in the South China Sea. 
2.2.3 Security Interests  
China aims to increase its influence in Southeast Asia through maritime 
expansion and counter the presence of the US in the region. The Malacca, Sunda, 
Lombok, Makassar and Ombai-Wetar Straits have turned out to be important for 
China in its security strategy. Lee83  has argued that these straits were not only 
significant in terms of economic values but also crucial with regards to security 
perspectives. The Straits of Malacca is about 500 nautical miles long, 200 miles wide 
to the north and about 11 miles across at its narrowest point. It provides the shortest 
passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Due to its location, the 
Straits of Malacca is often viewed as China’s most important waterway to expand 
Chinese naval power into the Indian Ocean and beyond. People’s Liberation Army 
                                                 
80  Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Disputes and China-ASEAN Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1), 
2013, pp. 27-43 at 32. 
81 Kim, M.J. & Jones, R.E., ‘China’s Energy Security and the Climate Change Conundrum’, Natural 
Resources &Environment, 19(3), 2005, pp. 3-8 at 3.  
82 Vaughn, B. and Morrison, W.M., ‘China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues and Implications 
for the United States”, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, 2006, CRS 19-20. 
83 Lee, J.H., ‘China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24(3), 2002, pp. 549-568 at 560. 
 
74 
 
(PLA) strategists have a clear objective of controlling this strait so that no other 
power can impede its movements.84  
The Sunda Straits, between Sumatra and Java, is the major sea link from the 
Indian Ocean to the Java Sea, but it is less strategic than the Malacca Straits as it is 
shallow and incapable of taking the largest shipping. The Lombok Straits, between 
Bali and Lombok, is a crucial waterway for ships travelling from Malacca to the 
Indian Ocean. The Makassar Straits, between Kalimantan and Sulawesi, contains a 
large number of offshore and coastal oil fields. The Ombai Straits lies between the 
islands of Alor and Timor, while the Wetar Straits divides the northern coast of 
Timor and the southern coast of Wetar. After the Straits of Gibraltar, the US regards 
both the Ombai and Wetar Straits as most important for its defence policy.85  
Lanteigne argues that China’s security interest in Southeast Asia, especially 
the Malacca Straits, is to serve the purpose of expanding the operational space for the 
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Although China is an emerging Asian 
giant, its naval forces are still underdeveloped compared to those of the other powers. 
Moreover, the PLAN is deficient in large-scale operations far from Chinese waters. 
Hence, the Chinese find it essential to shift naval capability from “green water,” 
which covers the coastal areas, to “blue water,” which allows force projection into 
deep ocean waters.86 
 China also harbours an ambition for greater security influence in Southeast 
Asia. The region plays a vital role for China’s stability and development due to 
traditional security concerns and reform-era economic concerns. From a historical 
perspective, the previous collapse of Chinese dynasties has led to Chinese 
encirclement or an invasion from the periphery. The PRC remains committed to 
maintaining a good relationship with Southeast Asia with the view of creating a 
stable periphery and a good security environment for Chinese economic 
development.87  
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Maintaining relations with Southeast Asia also helps China to reduce 
American influence in the region. De Castro advanced this argument by showing 
China’s strategy of creating “unstable power balancing” to undermine America’s 
well-established alliance systems and force deployment in Asia. To carry out this 
strategy, China introduced a “New Security Concept” (NSC) in 1998, which became 
a prominent theme in China-Southeast Asia relations by 2008. The NSC presents a 
model of diplomatic-defence relationships with countries that are neither Chinese 
allies nor opponents. Since then, China has consistently promoted the usage of this 
new concept in regional and international security forums such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), ARF or EAS as a push for regional community 
building. These initiatives are believed to help China to unbalance the influence of 
the US through multilateral consultation. 88 China seeks to maintain good relations 
with each individual Southeast Asian state over energy security.89 It considers the 
South China Sea as a strategic region.90 Lee claims that China has to make efforts to 
enhance its maritime capability so as to exercise greater control over the Sea by 
safeguarding the sea-lanes from the Middle East to Chinese ports.91 
China’s interest in Cambodia is a security issue, as it may need Cambodia as a 
strategic location to get access to the sea in a response to an escalation of the South 
China Sea dispute. China has invested around US$1.2 billion for weapons and other 
military equipment for Myanmar, in exchange for securing a beneficial future market 
for its large defence industry. More importantly it will now be able to collect 
intelligence data on movements through the busy shipping lanes from the Indian 
Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.92 
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2.3 China’s Strategies towards Southeast Asia  
A historical analysis of Chinese political, economic and security strategies 
towards Southeast Asia can help understand changes and continuities in Chinese 
foreign policy. We can divide the post-Cold War era into three main periods: the 
“new diplomacy” period from 1991 to 2000; the “good neighbour” period from 2001 
to 2008; and the current period since 2009 after Hu Jintao came to power. 
2.3.1 Political Strategies  
In the early 1990s, China commenced a strategy of “new diplomacy” toward 
its Southeast Asian neighbours. This policy emphasized international cooperation for 
economic growth with China as a responsible regional power. The main 
characteristics of the policy were the establishment of more active diplomatic 
relations, having frequent leadership meetings, placing greater priority on people to 
people exchanges with an emphasis on “peaceful development”, and on the use of 
soft power to achieve international goals. This more flexible Chinese diplomatic 
strategy aimed to assure Southeast Asia that China’s economic and political rise 
would benefit the region.93  
Since China’s new diplomacy was launched, it has carried out a successful 
diplomatic campaign in Southeast Asia. In August 1990 China re-established 
diplomatic relations with Indonesia. Two months later, Singapore extended formal 
diplomatic recognition to China. In 1991, China normalised diplomatic relations with 
Brunei and Vietnam, completing diplomatic ties with all Southeast Asian states. It 
opened a new era of fruitful bilateral relations with frequent high-ranking exchange 
visits. Between 1990 and 1992, there were 110 visits from China to ASEAN 
countries and 109 from ASEAN states to China. In 1993, the Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, brought an entourage of 290 political elites and 
entrepreneurs in “the most successful foreign visit” to China for a series of business 
deals worth US$3.2 billion. The year 1993 was heralded in the Chinese media as “the 
year of China’s ASEAN diplomacy.”94 
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Since 1991, China can be considered the primary supporter of Southeast Asia. 
As part of its commitment to multilateral security cooperation, China has engaged 
institutionally with Southeast Asia at the regional level through the ARF and 
ASEAN+3. China joined ARF as an official member for the first time in July 1994 
and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in July 1996. In December 1997, 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin attended the unofficial ASEAN+3 Summit in Kuala 
Lumpur and signed the Joint Declaration on “ASEAN-China Cooperation towards 
the 21st Century.” On the basis of this meeting, the ASEAN-China Summit has been 
held annually, creating a useful regional forum for cooperation in mutual concern 
matters. China also announced its “new security concept” in 1998 with a focus on 
multilateral security, a precondition for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on 
the South China Sea in 2002. 
For long-term strategies, China has made efforts to boost its bilateral security 
relations with regional states, undertaking high ranking exchanges, conducting joint 
military exercises, and selling weapons to its neighbours. These active approaches 
were effective in projecting a more positive image of China to Southeast Asia.95 
From the early 1990s to the 2000s, Chinese strategy was to gradually reduce any 
perception of a “China Threat” among Southeast Asian countries. Chinese Vice-
President Hu Jintao remarked at the opening ceremony of the Annual Conference of 
the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in 2004: 
China is an Asian country. China’s development is closely related to Asia’s prosperity. 
Persisting in building good-neighbourly relationships and partnerships with the 
neighbouring countries, we pursue a policy of bringing harmony, security and 
prosperity to neighbours and dedicate ourselves to strengthening mutual trust and 
cooperation with the fellow Asian countries, easing up hot spot tensions, and striving to 
maintain peace and tranquillity in Asia. China’s development cannot be achieved 
development in isolation of Asia, and Asia’s prosperity also needs China. China will 
follow a peaceful development path holding the banners of peace, development and 
cooperation, join the other Asian countries in bringing about Asian rejuvenation, and 
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making greater contribution to the lofty cause of peace and development in the 
world”.96  
With this win-win approach, some Southeast Asian states have shown less 
hostility towards China. Hu also remarked at the same conference that: 
It is China’s sincere wish to cultivate with the fellow Asian countries an overall and 
close partnership geared to Asian rejuvenation, a partnership that features equality and 
mutual trust politically, mutual benefit and win-win economically, exchange and 
emulation culturally, and dialogue and cooperation on the security front.97 
From 2001 to 2008, the Chinese “Good Neighbour Policy” aimed at “hòa 
thuận với láng giềng, yên ổn cho láng giềng, giàu có với láng giềng” [Trans: the 
policy of peace, stability and wealth with neighbours] with the view to achieve “cùng 
phát triển, cùng an ninh, cùng phồn vinh” [Trans: mutual development, security and 
wealth] thanks to “khối cộng đồng lợi ích xung quanh Trung Quốc” [Trans: the 
beneficial community block around China]. China, in this strategy, must promote 
“đoàn kết bên trong, hữu nghị bên ngoài, mưu cầu cùng thắng” [Trans: internal 
solidarity, external friendship for win-win relationships with neighbours].98 
According to Chen, China’s foreign policy is omni-directional; while it wants 
to improve relations with every country, the priority is a good neighbour strategy 
with surrounding countries, followed by a more active role in the international 
community. Chen argues that this policy had its roots from the status of China as an 
Asian country with limited national strength. In order to go further into the world, 
China needed to have close cooperation with Western nations such as the US. 
China’s post-Cold War foreign policies show its determination to create advantages 
for domestic reform and economic development.99 
Since 2001, China continued its strategies towards Southeast Asia actively 
and responsibly by hosting summits and proposing new multilateral mechanisms. 
Bilateral ties were sealed by a Joint Declaration in December 1997 of “partnership of 
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good neighbourliness and mutual trust towards the 21st Century,” China and ASEAN 
officially signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity in October 2003. Following these guidelines, China and ASEAN have 
since established the dialogue mechanism and multi-level agreements such as 
ASEAN+1 (ASEAN and China), ASEAN+3, economic and diplomatic consultations 
at ministerial level, political consultations at high ranking levels, and joint 
cooperative commissions, which aim at creating close cooperation over regional and 
international issues. China is the first power to appoint a Resident Ambassador to 
ASEAN.100  
After Kuala Lumpur was announced as the host of the first EAS to be held in 
December 2005, China expressed its desire to host the summit in 2006. China also 
hosted other defence meetings and made positive proposals for regional defence 
transparency. China arranged reciprocal high-ranking exchange visits to ASEAN 
countries to show Chinese willingness to invest time, effort and resources to improve 
bilateral relations with neighbouring countries. These active approaches towards 
Southeast Asia have allowed ASEAN to gain trust in China and to move from a 
position of suspicion to an acceptance that China is a responsible and constructive 
regional power.101  
Since 2009, China has become even more influential since the financial crisis 
in 2008. The negative side of Chinese foreign policy after 2010 is its rising 
aggressiveness. This is particularly evident in Southeast Asia where some analysts 
have suggested that China is carving out a “sphere of influence” through a kinder, 
more nuanced “new” diplomatic approach. China’s stridency is clear due to its 
assertiveness in the South China Sea territorial disputes. It has conducted an 
increasing number and range of military exercises. Chinese maritime patrols in the 
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region and its enhanced military activities in the South China Sea disputes have led 
to a number of clashes with Filipino and Vietnamese vessels.102 
2.3.2 Economic Strategies  
From the early post-Cold War period China has aimed to deepen its economic 
relations with Southeast Asia as part of China’s strategy to develop dynamic 
economic relations with Japan, South Korea, the US and ASEAN. This has been 
done to ensure China’s continued economic development and to provide 
comprehensive security. Yong Deng noted that, in the 1990s, China’s trade with six 
Southeast Asian states (excluding Vietnam) had increased at an annual rate of over 
20% from US$6.02 billion in 1990 to US$13 billion in 1994. It jumped to US$18.44 
billion in 1995 as ASEAN surpassed Taiwan to become China’s fifth largest trading 
partner.103  
China focused itself on its economic relations with Southeast Asia in order to 
create favourable conditions for its domestic development. Renato Cruz De Castro 
notes Beijing’s principal goals are to strive for fast economic growth, continuing 
economic liberation, globalization, social harmonization and political consolidation 
as well as a modern military capability against Taiwan with a view to enhance 
regional influence. It does not aim to challenge the US at the global level. 104 
Following this strategy, China has played an important role as a driving force to 
boost regional economic development, an important factor in helping Southeast 
Asian states maintain high rates of economic development and financial stability, 
especially after the complications of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis.  
Glosny described China’s loans and aid through multilateral channels such as 
the International Monetary Fund as more than meeting ASEAN countries’ 
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expectations.105  Similarly, ASEAN also appreciated the Chinese refusal to devalue 
its currency (renminbi), which could have set off another round of competitive 
devaluations that could do more harm to ASEAN. During this time, China behaved 
as a “responsible and unselfish power,” and did not seek to take advantage of 
Southeast Asia’s economic woes. ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino 
commented, “China is really emerging from this smelling good.”106  
In 2009 ASEAN was China’s largest trading partner with trade to the value of 
US$178 billion. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), inaugurated on 1 
January 2010, has now become the world’s third largest free trade area after the EU 
and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), with the total GDP of member 
states equivalent to US$6 billion. It has a total trade volume of US$4.5 billion and a 
market of 1.9 billion people living in an area of 13 million square kilometres.107 For 
the first eight months of 2010, bilateral trade increased by 47% and ASEAN exports 
to China increased by 54%.108 Closer economic integration has clearly worked for 
China, and has bought it a good deal of political goodwill, although tensions remain. 
2.3.3 Security Affairs  
The stronger the Chinese are, the more assertive they become in developing 
security strategies towards Southeast Asia. Hoang Oanh notes that China has recently 
developed a security of “opportunity” policy to replace that of “assertiveness.” In the 
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past, China used to be very careful in choosing the opportunities for its security 
strategies to avoid the risks of facing strong external reaction from overseas.109 In 
most of the disputes with its ASEAN neighbours, China made efforts to resolve or 
reduce tensions to show China’s responsible behaviour. In the land disputes with 
Laos and Vietnam, China showed its willingness to compromise in bilateral 
agreements with Laos (in 1991) and Vietnam (in 1999) to delineate their common 
land border.110 In 2000, China and Vietnam agreed on the maritime boundaries and 
fishery cooperation in the Beibu Gulf. Five years later, China ceased its assertiveness 
in the South China Sea with the commitment to move towards a signing of the 
multilateral code of conduct. After several multilateral efforts the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed by concerned parties in 
November 2002 in Phnom Penh. As noted previously, China has made efforts 
towards greater military cooperation with Southeast Asia to reduce ASEAN’s 
mistrust, such as military exchanges with Thailand, a close military relationship with 
Myanmar, and proposed joint military exercises with Vietnam and the Philippines.111 
In the past few years China has acted differently in security affairs, causing 
problems for political analysts. Unlike its previous cooperative manner in dealing 
with Southeast Asia, China since 2009 has carried out a more aggressive security 
policy towards the region. According to Le Thu Huong,112 the state-owned China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has deployed the HD-981, a deep-sea 
oil-drilling rig, in the disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands along with another 
80 vessels since 2 May 2014. Since the HD-981 was located within Vietnam’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the deployment of this oil rig led to strong anti-
Chinese riots in Vietnam. A demonstration on 7 May 2014 was organised by 20 civil 
society groups that opposed China’s invasion of Vietnamese territory and called on 
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measures from the Vietnamese government to deal with the crisis appropriately. 
More peaceful demonstrations occurred from 11 May to oppose China’s presence in 
the Vietnamese EEZ. The demonstrations were followed by violence in Binh Duong, 
Dong Nai and Ha Tinh provinces on 13 May 2014.113 China’s assertiveness in the 
South China Sea territorial disputes has led to rising tension and a revival of old 
suspicions in Southeast Asia of China’s potential threat to the region. Southeast 
Asian states such as Vietnam and Indonesia remain wary of China’s position as an 
emerging regional power and believe that one day it will impose its dominance on 
the region.114 
2.4 Implications for Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular 
2.4.1 Implications for Southeast Asia 
Trade between China and ASEAN is now greater than ASEAN trade with the 
EU or the US. 115  Thus, from the perspective of the business sector, China’s 
spectacular economic development can be a leading engine for ASEAN’s economic 
expansion. China’s tariff-free market is a huge benefit for ASEAN exporters. Some 
analysts have even argued that China’s increasing economic power can help 
Southeast Asia to reduce western influence.116   More advantageously, Southeast 
Asian is beneficial from China’s efforts to have win-win cooperation with Southeast 
Asian nations as Chinese President Xi Jinping stated: 
China cannot achieve development in isolation from the world, and the world also 
needs China for development. China is fully committed to the path of peaceful 
development, the independent foreign policy of peace and the opening-up strategy for 
win-win results. A stronger China will add to the force for world peace and the positive 
energy for friendship, and will present development opportunities to Asia and the 
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world, rather than posing a threat. China will continue to share opportunities for 
economic and social development with ASEAN, Asia and the world.117 
Consequently, Southeast Asia through ASEAN can gain great benefits from 
the four-point program developed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is a 
favourable condition for the region to boost its economic development and bilateral 
relations with its giant neighbour. Xi’s plan is to increase bilateral trade from 
US$326 billion in 2011 to US$500 billion in 2015, encourage Chinese companies to 
step up investment in ASEAN, promote transportation on land and sea between 
China and ASEAN as well as enhancing people to people two-way exchange of 
100,000 youth and students over a ten-year period.118 
Southeast Asia can also gain great benefits from bilateral relations with China 
to attract Chinese tourists to the region, the number of which increased sharply to 4.5 
million in the year 2008. Even after the Global Financial Crisis led to a regional 
financial crisis in Southeast Asia, in 2010 Thailand reportedly received 45% more 
Chinese tourists than in 2009.119 
In general, Southeast Asia through ASEAN can seek advantageous benefits 
from China’s interests in the region. However, China’s rise is likely to bring about a 
variety of risks for Southeast Asia. Chinese military modernization and 
aggressiveness over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea may be seen as 
threats for the ASEAN region. 
China’s expanding budget for naval modernization has created concerns for 
regional stability. Chinese defence transformation can be seen as part of the normal 
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process of military modernization, and quite reasonable given Chinese economic 
expansion. However, the United States, Japan and Australia as well as other regional 
states have raised concerns that China’s military build-up is more than defensive. To 
some extent, China’s development of blue water navy may be viewed as an effort to 
ensure the security of SLOCS and to protect China’s growing global interests.120  
Most notably, China’s growing assertiveness of sovereignty over the South 
China Sea has become the biggest threat for Southeast Asia in the context of bilateral 
relations. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea represent the greatest 
challenge to ASEAN unity and cohesion in its road map towards an ASEAN 
Community in the year 2015. This unresolved matter not only pits Southeast Asian 
claimant states against China, but also pits ASEAN as a collective against China.121 
The disputes have divided Southeast Asian states into mainland (Myanmar, Thailand, 
Laos and Cambodia), littoral (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysian and Brunei) and 
maritime (Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) camps on the South China Sea issue. 
This “security complex” of individual attitudes towards the problem exists while the 
mainland states have adopted a position of greatest deference towards China, at the 
same time as the littoral countries carried out a policy of both deference and defiance 
with a noticeable military component, and the maritime neighbours supported the 
approaches of deference as well as defiance with a notable focus on diplomatic 
efforts.122 
Historical lessons demonstrate that all superpowers are potential threats to 
stability because superpowers aim to use power to achieve strategic ends. China is an 
emerging superpower, so it is reasonable to test whether China will be a threat to 
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regional security and stability.123  In the realist’s view, China poses a clear and 
obvious threat to US power and to the region as it aims to expand its influence in the 
world. The question is, how exactly should ASEAN react or respond to the situation 
of living next door to an emerging regional power? 
In the past, Southeast Asia has traditionally views its northern neighbour at a 
threat. China’s great size and proximity, the longevity of Chinese civilization, the 
traditional tributary relations with Southeast Asian kingdoms and the presence of 
wealthy Chinese ethnic communities in Southeast Asia have all contributed to fuel 
anxieties about the “China Threat.” China’s recent economic and military 
development has raised the spectre that China will soon attempt to impose its agenda 
on the region, and will try to dominate Southeast Asia.124 However, in spite of all 
these potential challenges, China appears to have recently persuaded most of its 
Southeast Asian neighbours that China does not pose an immediate security threat to 
the region.125  Beijing has dispelled most of the suspicions that the PRC will in the 
future act as a great superpower and try to dominate the region. ASEAN should 
however be well-prepared for the possibility that a powerful China may request 
special privileges that could threaten the autonomy and independence of smaller 
states.  
In the long term, hedging or balancing in harmonization is the most practical 
strategy for Southeast Asia to deal with Chinese possible domination. This hedging 
approach aims to establish relations with other large outside powers to counter-
balance the Chinese influence. For example, Southeast Asia through ASEAN has 
built up close linkage with not only the US, but also with Japan, Russia and India, 
while the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which is an agreement 
covering Malaysia and Singapore, connects the region with the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand (through Malaysia and Singapore). This is an appropriate 
way for Malaysia and Singapore to invite multiple powers, both “great” and 
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“middle”, to check each other while continuing to play an important role in the 
region.126  
Additionally, the policy of engagement should also be used as another 
effective tool for Southeast Asia to avoid Chinese domination. This strategy involves 
encouraging China to participate in multilateral organizations, dialogues/forums and 
agreements to exercise its responsibility as regional power. Consequently, 
engagement can help to reduce tensions and bring about political convergence in 
terms of a favourable position towards a China that is connected to the region in 
partnership relations and which will act in a cooperative “ASEAN way”.127 As a 
result, the most effective response can be to create a win-win solution, not a zero-
sum game for ASEAN’s partners in the region, including China, as engagement also 
appears to be its policy for reducing tensions and building confidence. ASEAN’s 
policy of engaging all players can help development of the region through having 
outside powers complement and not compete with each other. This policy is analysed 
by Evelyn Goh in the concept of “omni-enmeshment”.128  
Accordingly, Southeast Asian nations find themselves in a disadvantageous 
situation if they face an unstable multi-polar regional system with major powers 
competing against each other. In order to hedge against that possibility, ASEAN 
chooses to neither pick sides nor to exclude any major powers, but to make efforts to 
include all different powers in the regional affairs. Indeed, according to a seasoned 
ASEAN political official, it is not ASEAN’s desire to see outside powers compete, as 
this would be unlikely to produce a general benefit: rather, it is ASEAN’s duty to 
make efforts to have all powers engaged in Southeast Asia to cooperate with each 
other to bring benefits to the region.129 
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2.4.2 Implications for Vietnam 
Vietnam has a unique position in Chinese foreign policy. In the mindset of 
the Chinese ruling class, Vietnam used to be considered as the “shield” to protect the 
Chinese southern border region against foreign invaders that China wanted to 
subdue. After more than 1,000 years of Chinese rule, Vietnam gained its 
independence from China in AD 939. During the Ming dynasty, Vietnam was 
dominated by China again, though briefly, from 1407 to 1428. 130  According to 
Thayer, ideology could sometimes bring Vietnamese and Chinese bilateral relations 
to be as “close as lips and teeth.” The relationship was once praised by Ho Chi Minh 
as “comrade plus brother,” but on other occasions China considered Vietnam a “little 
hegemonist” and the “Cuba of the East.”131  
In the author’s interview with a Vietnamese official, he considers Vietnam a 
unique country in the region, having experienced both positive and negative 
historical relations with China. After it joined ASEAN in 1995, its role is improving 
positively. Vietnam has the third largest population in Southeast Asia after Indonesia 
and the Philippines. Vietnam is taking part in regional matters actively, contributing 
to ASEAN and in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, if China wants to have good relations with 
an ASEAN state, it should build up a good relationship with Vietnam. As a result, 
Vietnam plays an important role in China’s foreign policy.132 Its long sea border of 
3,444 km has also given Vietnam a strong connection to maritime Southeast Asia.133  
Furthermore, Vietnam plays the role of “a buffer zone” in China’s foreign 
policy. Major powers often feel more secure with neighboring regions as buffers 
against rival powers. The buffer state’s position is important as it can help one 
power, encircle or wedge into the territory of another power. Trying to manage 
neighboring states by cooperating, forcing into obedience or preventing outside 
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powers from interfering into regional affairs are options for the regional power.134 
With its S-line geographical location, Vietnam situates as a bridge for China to go 
further into Southeast Asia. According to Le, China always considers Vietnam as the 
gateway to Southeast Asia. Thus, maintaining a good relationship with Vietnam is an 
assurance of the “good neighborhood” policy that China aims to show its regional 
partners, and the world, about China’s peaceful rise. Womack described the meaning 
of Vietnam in China’s foreign policy: 
For China, Vietnam has been the southern boundary stone of its grand notions of itself. 
Vietnam viewed China as the inscrutable northern giant. Even at peace the giant is 
feared because the fateful decision of war or peace is largely in the giant’s hand.135 
Among Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam is the one that understands most 
about Chinese strategic thinking and interests in the region. Vietnam is also the 
unique country that had wars with the two great powers - China and the US - and the 
only one that defeated both of them.136 Thus, Vietnam in the strategic calculation of 
both China and the US can be used as the buffer zone to manage the other power. As 
a close neighbour, Vietnam is affected by the rise of China and its strategic interests 
in Southeast Asia. Examining the growth of China stems from a pragmatic need to 
understand this Asian giant, and by doing so to recommend appropriate policy 
strategies for Vietnam. 
If China refrains from the more expansionist aspect of the Đại Hán (Great 
China) ideology, bilateral relations between Vietnam and China can be positive, as in 
the motto of “friendly neighbours, both comrades and brothers.” Vietnam can gain 
positive political and economic benefits from a benign regional power. Vietnam 
could speak publicly of both countries as “mountains to mountains, rivers to rivers” 
that share a number of identical features in history and culture, with a long tradition 
of bilateral relations. Sino-Vietnamese relations should be strengthened under the 
guideline of sixteen (Vietnamese) “golden words”: “Láng giềng thân thiện, Hợp tác 
                                                 
134 Lin, K.D., ‘Good Neighbor or Bad Neighbor? Explaining China’s Neighborhood Policies’, 
prepared for the 16th Annual North American Taiwan Studies Conference, 2010, pp. 1-20 at 2. 
135 Le Thu Huong, Vietnam: Straddling Southeast Asian’s Divide, Trends in Southeast Asia, p. 12. 
136 Le Thu Huong, Vietnam: Straddling Southeast Asian’s Divide, Trends in Southeast Asia, Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2014, pp. 1-50 at 33 
 
90 
 
toàn diện, Ổn định lâu dài, Hướng tới tương lai [Trans: Friendly Neighbourhood, 
Comprehensive Cooperation, Long-term Stability, Future Orientations]. This 
relationship can take place within four “goods”: good neighbours, good friends, good 
comrades and good partners.137 The bilateral relations and a comprehensive strategic 
partnership could also be deepened further on the basis of the two states operating 
under similar Marxist ideological and economic principles.138  
China’s peaceful rise could bring about a more influential stance for Vietnam 
as its closest neighbour because of Vietnam’s geographical location and strategic 
importance in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. With its long coastline and a 
shared mainland frontier with China, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam could gain from 
the active involvement of major powers in the region, as well as by playing the role 
of a connecting bridge between Northeast and Southeast Asia. In addition to its 
stability and attractive investment environment, the dynamic economic development 
of Vietnam has created a favourable impression of Vietnam in the calculation of 
major powers.139 Consequently, in the fluid and dynamic developing Southeast Asian 
region, Vietnam has become a factor to be noted in how any shift in power will affect 
the region and the interests of all states within it.  
China’s spectacular economic rise has created export opportunities for 
Vietnam. China and Vietnam were initially strategic partners, but this was later 
upgraded to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in 2008. Both nations 
have some remarkable achievements in economic cooperation. According to 
Vietnam’s General Department of Customs, China is still Vietnam’s largest trading 
partner in 2013, with a total import and export value of US$50.21 billion, up 22% 
from the previous year.140 Vietnam imports machinery, refined oil and steel from 
China while exporting to China unrefined oil, coal and rubber. Statistics show that 
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the most crucial problem in the bilateral trade relationship is the imbalance in 
China’s favour. Vietnam has a trade deficit with China. From US$9.1 billion in 2007, 
it increased to US$12.6 billion in 2010.141  
China’s expansion gives Vietnam the opportunity to bring its bilateral trade 
with China to a more balanced level. Vietnam should take advantage of this. China 
has now become the world’s largest importing market. While a lot of developed 
economies are still suffering from the global financial crisis, China continues to 
import goods. The value of China’s imports is 10% of the global GDP, a figure 
equivalent to that of the entire EU. Moreover, the speed of China’s economic 
development over the past three decades has created a growing middle class, which 
stimulated higher demand. Vietnam is likely to increase its exports to China due to 
its geographic proximity.142  
Furthermore, Vietnam can attract substantial FDI from China’s interests in 
the region due to its central position in Southeast Asia. The FDI from China to 
Vietnam in the first decade of the 21st century increased markedly following the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1991. There were sharp increases in projects 
numbers, investment volume and capital registered. By April 2011, there were a total 
of 790 projects, with investment capital totalling US$3.7 billion, placing China 14th 
out of the 92 countries and states that invest in Vietnam.143 
Nguyen Dinh Liem144 predicted that in the coming years, Vietnam could 
enjoy favourable investments from China because of the Chinese government’s 
development strategy towards exports. More investment from China is a reasonable 
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proposition, as Vietnam has benefits over other markets in the region. According to 
the World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPs) from 2009 to 2011 conducted by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Vietnam was 
assessed to be one of fifteen most attractive economic markets for investment 
because of its stable political system, good economic growth and rising international 
stance. Vietnam will figure in the thinking of Chinese investors in Southeast Asia. 
On the less positive side, if China develops in the direction of Đại Hán, and if 
it adopts an expansionist ideology in the territorial sense as a major power, then the 
scenario can be risky, creating many challenges for Vietnam. The negative impacts 
will worsen the traditional friendship and cooperation between the two communist 
parties. Domestically, China can cause difficulties for Vietnam by disrupting national 
unity, dividing the Vietnamese leaders and people. Internationally, China can isolate 
Vietnam in the regional and international arena. In the past, China has shown that it 
could do this, especially when Vietnam deployed troops into Cambodia in late 
December 1978 to remove the Pol Pot regime.145 
 According to Do Tien Sam, the rapid rise of China’s economy has created 
more favourable conditions for the “Great China” ideology to exist and develop. 
While shaping a new order in Southeast Asia, China will point to its economic 
expansion and military enhancement as proof of its leadership credentials. China is 
actively expanding into the surrounding region, aiming to use the whole of Southeast 
Asia, especially countries in the sub-Mekong delta, as the springboard to achieve 
global influence. Nguyen Manh Hung claimed that the Chinese strategy to increase 
exploitation of resources could negatively affect the environment of Southeast Asian 
nations including Vietnam. To carry out this policy, China is likely to move energy-
intensive industries that use raw materials, low skilled manual labour and 
environmental pollution to neighbouring countries in ASEAN and sub-Mekong Delta 
region.146  
                                                 
145 Do Tien Sam, Báo cáo tổng hợp Đề tài Sự phát triển Chính trị bảo đảm sự trỗi dậy của Trung Quốc 
giai đoạn 2011-2020 và những vấn đề đặt ra cho Việt Nam [Trans: General Report of the Project on 
Political Development of the rise of China period 2011-2020 and implications for Vietnam], Vietnam 
Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Science, pp. 104-106 
146 Nguyen Manh Hung, ‘Một số đặc điểm mới của bối cảnh quốc tế và hàm ý đối với Việt Nam và 
Quan hệ Việt Nam-Trung Quốc’[Trans: Some Characteristics of the International Situation and Its 
Implications for Vietnam and the Vietnam-China Relationship] in Do Tien Sam and Kurihara 
 
93 
 
China’s aggressive manner against Vietnam in the South China Sea can be 
seen clearly through evidence found in several incidents caused by Chinese fishing 
boats in 2011 (Bình Minh 02 cable cutting incident on 26 May and Viking 02 cable 
damaging incident on 9 June) and the HD 981 affair which lasted from 2 May, when 
China placed an oil rig in an area claimed by Vietnam, to 16 July 2014, when China 
withdrew it. These activities are explained as accidents from the Chinese but then 
again, most of the vessels are well equipped with modern technology designed to 
exercise sea control. The Chinese explanation of accidents is no longer persuasive. 
These incidents show that China’s assertive attitude in the South China Sea is 
demonstrated through Chinese vessels disregarding the claims to sovereignty of 
Vietnam and the Philippines.147 
The bilateral relationship between Vietnam and China is a strategic 
partnership, steeped in history, and the Vietnamese have always respected the 
traditional solidarity with the Chinese Communist Party, the state and the people of 
the PRC. Through historical experience, Vietnam has suffered from seventeen wars 
in total, fourteen of which were with the giant northern neighbour China.148 Of these 
fourteen wars, thirteen wars happened in the feudal period and only one occurred in 
modern times. The Vietnamese people have not forgotten the great assistance of the 
Chinese people in the cause of building and defending the nation during wars against 
the French and the Americans. Similarly, the Vietnamese have not forgotten that they 
conquered the powerful army from the north after more than one thousand years 
under Chinese feudal dynasties. The South China Sea territorial dispute is intricate 
and complicated, and Vietnam considers this a matter that requires patience, 
calmness, sober judgements and avoidance of hasty decisions. Vietnamese policy in 
the South China Sea disputes is to refrain from conflict, build trust and cooperation 
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in less sensitive areas, and to establish communication channels, conduct joint 
military activities and increase the influence of, and adherence to, maritime law. 
Although Vietnam wishes to be friend to all neighbouring countries, this should not 
come at the expense of its national interests.149 
Vietnam strongly condemns all acts of aggression, especially the armed 
solution to resolve tensions in the South China Sea.150 It is reasonable for Vietnam to 
defend its claims to sovereignty, and not allow any force for any reason to enter the 
sea and air space of Vietnam. There are historical grounds to assert Vietnam’s claims 
over disputed islands and Vietnam should maintain its attempts to settle the disputes 
peacefully in the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the basic principles of the United Nations chapters. Arguably, the 
Vietnamese understand the cost of a war better than its Southeast Asian neighbours, 
so Vietnam should be patient and firm in its diplomatic initiatives and in the legal 
attempt to resolve disputes through peaceful negotiation and not resort to war. 
Vietnam has expressed its willingness to settle the problem calmly and according to 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and in 
moving forward to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), proposed by 
ASEAN countries.151 
The next chapter will explore the position of Vietnam in US foreign policy. It 
will examine the basis of American interests and strategies towards Southeast Asia, 
and the geopolitical importance of Vietnam for the US. 
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CHAPTER 3.  US STRATEGY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
This chapter will assess the role of the US in international relations. The 
dominance of the US is declining, as it cannot impose its influence on every part of 
the globe. With a trend towards cooperation and competition among great powers, 
the US has had to adjust its security and foreign policy in order to protect its national 
interests. The Obama Administration announced a strategy of a “pivot” to Asia and 
stronger re-engagement with Southeast Asia through military co-operation. The main 
argument of this chapter is that US interests and foreign policy towards Southeast 
Asia are to engage the rise of China. This will have significant implications for 
Southeast Asia and especially Vietnam. 
3.1 Transformation of the New World Order 
3.1.1 Overview of US Hegemony after the Cold War 
In the immediate post-Cold War era, the US was the world’s sole 
superpower. Today, while China has grown in importance, the value of the US 
economy is still more than double the Chinese economy. The US economy grew by 
27% between 1990 and 1998, which was almost double the growth rate in the 
European Union and three times that of Japan.1 According to the Sydney Morning 
Herald in January 2000, seven of the world’s top 20 companies are American. On 
the basis of its economic power, the US continues to dominate the globe’s most 
influential institutions, including the United Nations (UN), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO).2 This influence 
over the global economy and its international mechanisms has created political and 
economic leverage for the US. Even China or Russia needs its support to join these 
institutions. Moreover, with the American economy central to the world economy, 
US dollars have long been the basic means of global payments in the world market. 
                                                 
1 Ikenberry in, Capie, D., ‘Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: the ‘War on Terror’ and Southeast 
Asian-US Relations’, The Pacific Review, 17(2), 2004, pp. 223-248 at 224. 
2 Hodson, J. ‘Intercourse in Every Direction: America as Global Phenomenon’, Global Networks 1, 
1(2001), pp. 79-87 at 82.  
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This reinforced the centrality of American political and financial strength to the 
system as a whole. Just as Britain once demonstrated with the pound sterling, the US 
has achieved sufficient global power to have its currency as the central unit of trade 
due to its superpower position of protecting trade routes, controlling the sources of 
oil, and storing financial property at the global level.3 
The US has the world’s largest defence budget with modern well-equipped 
digital forces. Despite a reduction in the defence budget, however, the US still 
accounted for 37% of total global military expenditure in 2013. According to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, the US spent US$618 
billion on its defence in 2013, more than three times the US$171 billion budget of 
the second-placed China.4 The US remains the only country with the capacity to 
project its military power to the most remote corners on the planet.5  
A hallmark of American defence policy in the 21st century is to maintain a 
decisive advantage over possible rivals. During the Bush Administration, neo-
conservatives argued that the US should have the power was to reshape the world, 
and that the country should take the opportunity to do so in order to prevent the 
emergence of rivals.6 American military power allows it to pursue interventionist and 
unilateral policies around the world, usually with a degree of support from its allies. 
However, the US now faces a number of internal and external problems. It is 
confronted by a growing China, a state that has increased the size of its economy 
fourfold since 1978. China’s economy is likely to equal and then surpass that of the 
U.S.7  According to the combination of assumptions from The Economist, China 
                                                 
3 Gowan, P., ‘US Hegemony Today’, Monthly Review, 2003, 55(3), 2003, pp. 30-50 at 40. 
4 ‘Countries Spending the Most on Military’, 12 July 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/12/countries-spending-most-on-
military/12491639/ (Date of visit 6 October 2014) 
5 Capie, D., ‘Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: the ‘War on Terror’ and Southeast Asian-US 
Relations’, The Pacific Review, 17(2), 2004, pp. 223-248 at 225.  
6 See the Project for the New American Century. http://www.globasearch.ca/the-neocons-project-for-
the-new-american-century-american-world-leadership-syria-next-to-pay-the-price/5305447  
7 De Santibanes, F., ‘An End to the U.S. Hegemony? The Strategic Implications of China’s Growing 
Presence in Latin America’, Comparative Strategy, 28(1), 2009, pp. 17-36 at 19. 
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would overtake America as early as 2019.8 According to Rachman, China is the 
world’s leading exporter and biggest manufacturer, and now controls over US$2.5 
trillion in foreign reserves.9 
The US faces mounting challenges to its defence capabilities. Russia can 
compete with America in strategic nuclear arms. The United Kingdom, France, 
China, Pakistan, India and North Korea also have the ability to produce nuclear 
weapons. In terms of homeland security, the attacks in New York and Washington on 
11 September 2001 demonstrated America’s vulnerability to non-traditional forms of 
warfare. The engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq were costly and have not resulted 
in stability in those regions. Layne has argued the ascension of China and India into 
“great power” status will return them to positions held two centuries ago when China 
and India produced 30% and 15% respectively of global wealth. By 2025, China is 
expected to be a first-rank military power, while India, as a member of the Brazil-
India-Russia-China-South Africa (BRICS) group, has attempted to bring about a 
multi-polar international system in which New Delhi will be one pole. Russia, 
despite its domestic instability, has opposed US domination in the UN Security 
Council to ensure its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.10  
In 2008, Fukuyama claimed that while the US remains the dominant power in 
the world, the story is not so much about American decline but how the rest of the 
world has been catching up with the superpower.11 The indebtedness of the US 
contrasts with large reserves in other countries and economic centres, exposing 
American economic vulnerability. As mentioned earlier, China held $2.5 trillion in 
reserves by 2011. In 2008, Russia had $550 billion, South Korea $260 billion and 
Thailand $110 billion. Presently, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
                                                 
8 ‘Chinese and American GDP Forecasts’, The Economist, 22 August 2014. Available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/08/chinese-and-american-gdp-forecasts (Date of 
visit 10 August 2015) 
9 Rachman, G., ‘Think again: American Decline’, Foreign Policy, 184, 2011, pp.59-63 at 59 
10 Layne, C.‘The Warning of U.S. Hegemony: Myth or Reality’ A Review Essay, International 
Security, 34(1), 2009, pp.147-172 at 152. 
11 Fukuyama, F. ‘Is American ready for a Post-American World’, 2008, pp. 42-46 at 42 
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collectively have around $300 billion in reserves. Saudi Arabia alone is saving 
money at the rate of approximately $15 billion per month from its energy exports.12  
The American economy is also declining. Its proportion of the global 
economy is likely to reduce from 28% in 2004 to 27% in 2025 and 26% in 2050. 
Moreover, the US is facing escalating competition from emerging economies and 
regional trade associations such as the EU, Japan, China, Russia, India and Brazil.13 
In Fortunes’ latest rank of the world’s largest companies, only two American firms 
are in the top ten, namely Walmart and Exxon Mobile, while there are already three 
Chinese firms on the list – Sinopec, State Grid and China National Petroleum. 
According to Gideon, American military power has largely been maintained through 
deficit spending and ‘the war in Afghanistan is effectively being paid for with a 
Chinese credit card.’ 14 The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen 
told business executives on 22 September 2011 that ‘I’ve said many times that I 
believe the single, biggest threat to our national security is our debt.’15 
American financial power has been unchallenged since the end of World War 
II, due to the strength of the US dollar. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 
plunged the US and the world to the worst downturn since the Great Depression. It 
also opened up speculation about the waning of American hegemony. Whispers 
about the end of the “American Empire” had led to concerns about the long-term 
prospects of the US dollar as the international system’s reserve currency. Khanna 
argues that while globalization was once equated with Americanization, the reality 
was that global integration could come at the expense of a Pax Americana.16 Should 
                                                 
12 Fukuyama, ‘Is American ready for a Post-American World’, p. 42. 
13 Nguyen Thai Yen Huong., Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung: Hợp tác và Cạnh tranh luận giải dưới góc độ Cân 
bằng quyền lực [Trans: The US-China relationship: Cooperation and Competition looking at the 
perspective of balance of power ],Nha xuat ban Chinh tri Quoc gia-Su that [Trans: National Political 
Publisher, Truth], Hanoi, 2011, p.196 
14 Rachman, G., ‘Think again: American Decline’, Foreign Policy, 184, 2011, pp.59-63 at 61. 
15 Mike Mullen Remarks to the U.S. Business Executives on 22 September 2011. Available at ‘Debt is 
Biggest Threat to National Security, Chairman says’, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65432, Date of visit 16 July 2017. 
16 Layne, C. ‘The Warning of U.S. Hegemony: Myth or Reality’ A Review Essay, International 
Security, 34(1), 2009, pp. 147-172 at 158. 
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the value of the US dollar decline, the US will face a major challenge in getting 
domestic support for any ambitious foreign policy goals.17  
Fukuyama also explores signs of the decline in spreading American values to 
the rest of the world.  Chinese and Indian movies, Korean pop stars and Japanese 
anime/manga are popular all over Asia. There are also worrying trends in the 
education sector, especially in the growing reluctance of foreign students to attend 
American universities due to the obstacles the US has placed on them to study in the 
country. New magnets for high quality education are competing in the field. Among 
five destinations in 2012 that hosted nearly one-half of total global students, the 
United States had 18%, the United Kingdom 11%, France 7%, Australia 6% and 
Germany 5%.18 
 On balance, American military and economic strength is likely to decline. 
Some emerging states are likely to catch up with the US. A multi-polar structure is 
likely in the coming decades.19 At the end of the Cold War, the US enjoyed a brief 
uni-polar moment, but it should now prepare for a multi-polar system.20 
3.1.2 Overview of US Involvement in Southeast Asia after the Cold War 
Post-Cold War American involvement in Southeast Asia is generally seen as 
positive. Most of the ASEAN nations welcome all major powers to the region. In 
2011, the former US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton argued that Asia is more eager 
to welcome US leadership and business now than at any time in history. She 
observed that the US is the only power with a strong network of close alliances in the 
region, as it has no territorial ambitions. US cooperation with its allies has helped to 
preserve regional security for decades, patrol the security of sea lanes, enhance 
stability and create an environment for development. She went on to say that the US 
is also the region’s major trade and investment partner and a source of innovation 
                                                 
17 Layne, ‘The Warning of U.S. Hegemony: Myth or Reality’, pp. 151-154. 
18 ‘Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students’, 5 May 2014, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx (Date of visit 6 
October 2014). 
19 Yilmaz, M.E., ‘The New World Order: An outline of the Post-Cold War Era’, Alternatives: Turkish 
Journal of International Relations, 7(4), 2008, pp. 44-58 at 55. 
20 Ayerbe, L.F., ‘The American Empire in the New Century: Hegemony or Domination’, Journal of 
Developing Societies, 2005, 21(301), pp. 301-320 at 306. 
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that benefits the region. Despite other options being available in the education 
market, the US still hosts 350,000 Asian students every year. It remains an outspoken 
advocate of open markets and universal human rights.21  
Most of these issues resonate with Southeast Asian states. Muzaffar argues 
that the Philippines and Indonesia have not been the only pro-Washington states in 
Southeast Asia from 1975 to 1997. From the early 1970s, Singapore began to seek a 
closer relationship with the US through economic and security cooperation. Brunei is 
a US informal strategic partner, while Thailand has been a US ally since the mid-
1950s. Malaysia is also a friend of the US with a vibrant trade relationship, and in 
security matters Malaysia has conducted joint military exercises and provided port 
facilities for US warships.22  
States such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar joined ASEAN from 
1995 and they have adopted a more careful view of US engagement in the region due 
to historical factors, such as American military actions from the 1960s and the 
political orientation of their own governments at the time. Through the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, Vietnam maintained a lukewarm attitude to the US in spite of its market 
reforms and initial integration into the global economy. Laos made no attempt to 
interact with Washington and Cambodia had little interaction with the US. Myanmar 
also chose not to be a close ally of the US. In a divided region six out of ten ASEAN 
states appeared to be close to Washington during the early 1990s, while the other 
four stayed outside the US sphere of influence.23 Vietnam and the US opted for 
bilateral diplomatic normalization from 11 July 1995. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 
1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. It ushered in a 
new period of ASEAN reconciliation and unity. ASEAN has a policy of engaging 
any power that supports the development of the region.24  
                                                 
21 Clinton, H. R., ‘American’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy Magazine, 11 October 2011. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175215.htm (Date of visit 
25 August 2015). 
22 Muzaffar, C. ‘The Relationship between Southeast Asia and the United States: A Contemporary 
Analysis’, Social Research, 72(4), 2005, pp. 903-912 at 907. 
23 Muzaffar, ‘The Relationship between Southeast Asia and the United States: A Contemporary 
Analysis’, pp. 907-908. 
24 Interview Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Director of the Political and Security Directorate, ASEAN 
Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 April 2012. 
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Accordingly, ASEAN states look to the US to play a role in the Mekong 
Basin and in the South China Sea. A shared concern about China’s rise has 
contributed to a growing strategic convergence between Vietnam and the US. The 
high-profile remarks by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the South China 
Sea were made at the 2010 ARF, when Vietnam held the ASEAN chairmanship:  
The Obama Administration is prepared to take the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to the 
next level on these issues and in new areas of cooperation. We see this relationship not 
only as important on its own merits, but as part of a strategy aimed at enhancing 
American engagement in the Asia Pacific and in particular Southeast Asia. We spoke 
about a range of challenges affecting regional security, including Burma, North Korea, 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and we welcome Vietnam’s constructive 
leadership and its excellent contributions to ASEAN, including its very important role 
as ASEAN chair.25 
This rapprochement has made Hanoi a valuable partner in the US engagement 
strategy in the region. Not only Vietnam, the three other lower riparian countries of 
the Mekong River Basin (Cambodia, Laos and Thailand) also saw enhanced US 
involvement in the Lower Mekong Initiative as a positive development. Myanmar, in 
spite of its long close relationship with China, now considers the US reengagement 
as a window of opportunity for this nation to adjust its overall alignment posture.26  
Singapore considers the US as “indispensable” for Asia-Pacific security and 
in 2010 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong commented that the US must be a part of 
the “stable architecture” of the region. The Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Albert del 
Rosario remarked that he welcomed the assurance from Hillary Clinton concerning 
the US commitment to the region to ensure freedom of navigation, open access to 
Asia’s sea-lanes and respect for international law in the South China Sea. In a 
meeting with Clinton, before the APEC meeting in Hawaii in November 2011, 
Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang also declared the US as “a leading strategic 
                                                 
25 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks with Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham 
Gia Khiem, Government Guest House, Hanoi, Vietnam, 22 July 2010. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145034.htm (Date of visit 25 August 
2015) 
26 Kuik, C.C, Idris, N.A and Nor A.R.M. ‘The China Factor in the U.S. “Reengagement” With 
Southeast Asia: Drivers and Limits Coverged Hedging’, Asian Politics & Policy, 4(3), 2012, pp. 315-
344 at 323. 
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partner” and welcomed stronger US cooperation with the Asia-Pacific for peace, 
stability and development in the region.27  
Although the US rebalancing strategy towards Southeast Asia is largely seen 
as a positive development by regional states, the US no longer has dominance in the 
region. Tao argues that Southeast Asians experienced mixed feelings towards 
American presence in the region.28  On the one hand, people fear that the complete 
withdrawal of the US troops from the region will alter the balance of power, causing 
instability and insecurity to the region. On the other hand, nationalists in Asian 
countries desire US troop withdrawal. This explains why the Philippines Senate did 
not ratify the extension of the US-Philippine military base agreement, causing US 
troops to withdraw in 1992. A US approach to the Thai government to establish a US 
logistics base in the Gulf of Thailand was also rejected. Thus, it is doubtful the US 
can maintain a troop presence in Southeast Asia for long.  
US influence over Southeast Asia is also in decline as a result of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997. Southeast Asian states were dismayed over the slow and 
inadequate response of the US to the region’s economic problems. Mauzy and Job 
argued that Washington failed to offer any bilateral bailouts to the hardest-hit states 
and instead wielded the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to impose a “one size fits 
all” solution to the region. Asian values were held up as the cause of the crisis, due to 
their tendency toward non-democratic governance and a lack of transparency. 29 
Resentment towards the IMF after the crisis resulted in a widespread anti-US 
sentiment in Southeast Asia.30 
The US perceived lack of concern for Southeast Asian states during the crisis 
was in contrast to that of China. Southeast Asian states are still grateful to China for 
not devaluing its currency and offering the region bilateral aid and loans with no 
                                                 
27 Kuik, Idris, and Nor, ‘The China Factor in the U.S. “Reengagement” With Southeast Asia: Drivers 
and Limits Coverged Hedging’, p. 337. 
28  The following discussion is drawn from Tao, W.Z., ‘US Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region’, 
Peace Review, 11(3), 1999, pp. 423-499 at 425. 
29 Mauzy, K.D. and Job B.L., ‘U.S Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after Years of 
Benign Negnect’, Asian Survey, 47(4), 2007, pp. 622-641 at pp. 625-626. 
30 He, K. ‘Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and 
Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia’, European Journal of International Relations, 14(3 ), 
289), 2008, pp. 489-518 at 507. 
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strings attached.31 Mauzy and Job note that bilateral relations between Southeast 
Asia and the US were at their nadir when US President Bill Clinton dismissed the 
Thai and Malaysian currency crisis as “a few small glitches in the road” at the APEC 
Summit in November 1997. Through the IMF, the US resisted any effort to seek an 
“Asian solution” to the general crisis. This inaction of the US caused Southeast Asia 
to appreciate the more attentive and sympathetic approach to the region’s difficulties 
by China.  
3.2 US Interests in Southeast Asia  
3.2.1 Economic Interests  
From a geo-strategic perspective, Southeast Asia is situated in an integral part 
of the Asia-Pacific. It is in an area favourable to the economic interests of the US as 
an Asia-Pacific power. The previous chapter explained how Southeast Asia’s key 
strategic value comes from its geographic position as well as its economic 
development. Apart from the sea-lanes, energy reserves in and around the South 
China Sea, Indonesia, and Burma give the region added strategic importance.32 This 
important feature of Southeast Asia has made the US pay attention to the region out 
of economic interest. In 2011, Hillary Clinton stated that one of the most important 
tasks of the US over the next decade is to lock in a substantially increased investment 
including diplomatic, economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Harnessing the growth and dynamism of Asia is a central priority in American 
economic and strategic interests. Open markets in Asia can supply the US with 
burgeoning opportunities for investment, trade and gaining access to cutting-edge 
technology. America’s economic recovery will largely depend on exports, and the 
operations of the American firms that invest in the vast and growing consumer bases 
in Asia.33  
                                                 
31 The following discussion is drawn from Mauzy, and Job, ‘U.S Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited 
Re-engagement after Years of Benign Negnect’, pp. 627-628. 
32 Lum, T., Dolven, B., Manyin, M., Martin, M and Vaugh, B. ‘United States Relations with 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for 
Congress, pp. 1-24 at 6. 
33 Clinton, H. R., ‘American’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy Magazine, 11 October 2011. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175215.htm (Date of visit 
25 August 2015). 
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Southeast Asia is also the region where there appears to be key emerging 
powers and important partners with whom the US will need to work closely to derive 
economic benefits. The US is seeking a new and deeper relationship with Indonesia, 
the world’s third largest democracy, the world’s most populous Muslim nation and a 
member of the G-20. Being one of the key drivers of the global economy, it is an 
important partner of the US and increasingly a central contributor to regional peace 
and stability. Indonesia’s importance is set to increase in the coming years.34 The US 
and its former adversary, Vietnam, also adopted an Agreement on Comprehensive 
Partnership in July 2013 to advance ties. According to Auslin, the US found in 
Vietnam a major shared wariness over China and other strategic interests in 
Vietnam’s long coastline, which may be a future key logistics centre in Vietnam’s 
dynamic and growing economy.35  
The US considers Southeast Asia as a region for trading and commercial 
relations, which will be beneficial to the US economy. Southeast Asia, through the 
primary multilateral organization ASEAN, has grown into a burgeoning economy. 
With a population of approximately 620 million and a combined GDP of over 
US$2.2 trillion, ASEAN is collectively America’s fourth largest export market and 
fifth largest trading partner.36 Southeast Asia and ASEAN have become a focal point 
in American reengagement strategy in Asia.37 Few regions of the world can offer US 
companies as much opportunity as Southeast Asia. With its abundant natural 
resources, including oil, gas, timber, gold and rubber, and arable land for agriculture, 
Southeast Asia has emerged as a principal market in the trade and investment 
strategies of American enterprises. The US is second only to Japan in direct 
investment in ASEAN. In the near future, Southeast Asia represents a vast potential 
for US economic growth, competitiveness, jobs opportunities and security 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/why-u-s-should-embrace-vietnam/ (Date of visit 6 July 2015) 
36 ‘The US-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative’, 9 October 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215235.htm (Date of visit 12 September 2014) 
37 Kuik, Idris, and Nor, ‘The China Factor in the U.S. “Reengagement” With Southeast Asia: Drivers 
and Limits Converged Hedging’, p. 323. 
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enhancement. Trade with Southeast Asia has already created approximately 800,000 
US jobs.38  
The US is pursuing its economic interests in the region through the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) which brings together economies from across the Pacific 
(both developed and developing) into a single trading community with a view to 
create not just more growth, but “better growth”. The US hopes that the TPP can 
serve as a benchmark for future agreements, a potential platform for larger regional 
economic integration and finally a free trade area for the Asia-Pacific.39 The US 
initiative to create the TPP serves both its economic and its strategic calculations as 
US President Barack Obama stated: 
The TPP will boost our economies, lowering barriers to trade and investments, increasing 
exports, and creating more jobs for our people…the TPP has the potential to be a model 
not only for the Asia Pacific but for future trade agreements.40 
From an economic perspective, the US aims to use the TTP as a new 
economic mechanism with more commitment and higher binding legal requirements 
than APEC in commerce, environment, and labour. According to Hoang Anh Tuan, 
if any country, including China, wanted to have an economic role in the Pacific 
through the TPP, it will have to acknowledge the influence of the US. Thus, the TPP 
works effectively as an effective bargaining tool for the US against China.41 This 
US-orchestrated scheme has so far involved 12 nations in the Asia-Pacific region, but 
it will be open to China only when China becomes a market economy. Washington 
aims to undermine Beijing’s commercial clout in the region because, over the past 
decades, China has become the largest trading partner of most Asian countries.42 Vu 
argues that the TPP has both economic and strategic meaning for the US and that the 
                                                 
38 ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, https://www.uschamber.com/association-
southeast-asian-nations-asean (Date of visit 25 September 2014) 
39 Clinton, H. R., ‘American’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy Magazine, 11 October 2011. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175215.htm (Date of visit 
25 August 2015) 
40 ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Building on US Economic and Strategic Partnerships in the Asia-
Pacific’, 5 September 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2013/214166.htm (Date of visit 6 October 
2014) 
41 Interview  Hoang Anh Tuan, 13 February 2012. 
42 Roberts, J., ‘The US-Vietnam Alliance against China’, 30 July 2013, 
http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_65866.shtml (Date of visit 14 January 2014) 
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TPP is in fact a new type of Free Trade Area (FTA) but with a “higher standard.” 
American ambition is to cover all APEC member economies and contribute to global 
trade liberalization as championed by the US.43  
The TPP can also be a calculated US move in the region. Hsieh argues that 
the US is pursuing twofold goals in its motives to promote the TPP. First, the TPP 
provides a substitute pathway towards Asian regionalism other than the Beijing-
preferred East Asia Economic Community (EAEC) based on the ‘ASEAN +3’ 
framework, which is likely to exclude the US. Thus, the TPP not only helps the US 
avoid marginalization from Asian FTA networks, but it also reinforces its leadership 
in the region. Secondly, the TPP’s comprehensive contents can be set as a benchmark 
for prospective partners. This paves the way for the US to have any future FTA 
negotiations based on the TPP process. It elevates TPP standards to meet US trade 
interests.44  
Finally, US economic interests in Southeast Asia emerge largely from the 
significance of the South China Sea. Any conflicts or disputes in the South China Sea 
would have a direct impact on the US and Japan, two of the world’s largest trading 
powers.45 Therefore, in the pursuit of the freedom of international navigation, the US 
became involved in the territorial disputes to protect its own economic interests. 
Wang provides two reasons. First, the Northeast Asian allies of the US (Japan and 
South Korea) obtain 90 percent of their oil through the South China Sea and the 
Strait of Malacca. Second, by the end of the 20th century, trans-Pacific trade was 
twice the value of the Atlantic trade, making the Pacific a region of strategic and 
economic importance for America.46As a result, the South China Sea is more than 
just an area of strategic importance to US trading interests. It also creates the 
                                                 
43 Vu Le Thai Hoang, ‘APEC 2011 and the Future of Regional Architecture in Asia Pacific’, 
International Studies Review, No. 24 (June 2011), p. 210 in Vu Le Thai Hoang, ‘Suc manh thong 
minh va The ky Thai Binh Duong: Nen tang chien luoc doi ngoai cua Chinh quyen My’ (Trans: Smart 
power and the Asia Pacific Century: the foundation of the US Administration’s foreign policy), 
Tapchicongsan (Communist Review), 2012, p.27 
44 Hsieh, P. L., ‘The Roadmap for a Prospective US-ASEAN FTA: Legal and Geopolitical 
Considerations’, Journal of World Trade, 2012, 46(2), pp. 367-396 at 382. 
45 Rowan, J.P., ‘The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute’, Asian 
Survey, 45(3), 2005, pp. 414-436 at 415. 
46 Wang, Y.W., ‘Rethinking the South China Sea Issue: A Perspective of Sino-U.S. Relations’, Pacific 
Focus, 21(1), 2006, pp. 105-135 at 110. 
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opportunity for the US to become involved in the territorial disputes. The disputes 
give a reason for the US to engage China due to the latter’s rising aggressiveness in 
the South China Sea.  
3.2.2 Political Interests  
After a decade when Southeast Asia was of a low priority in US foreign policy, 
the region is now central to Washington’s plans to define and defend US power in 
the Asia-Pacific. Perwita noted that the United States’ formal accession to the 
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) marks a new milestone in US-
ASEAN relations. 47  The US-led global war on terror in the aftermath of 11 
September 2001 has caused the US relationship with several ASEAN member states 
to expand significantly. More common causes were found between Washington and 
Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila in initiatives to strengthen anti-
terrorism measures, such as intelligence sharing, joint surveillance and police 
training. On the other hand, the renaissance of US-ASEAN relations was enhanced 
due to a new appreciation in Washington of China’s rise in the region.  
According to a Vietnamese party official, the US is engaging China with a 
view to limit Chinese economic and military expansion in Southeast Asia, as this can 
be a potential threat to American supremacy. While China regards Southeast Asia as 
the natural theatre of expansion of its political ambitions, and a traditional sphere of 
influence in the past,48 the US views Southeast Asia as a springboard for its East 
Asia strategy.49 It plans to engage China, but will maintain political and security 
arrangements with its traditional allies in the region.50 Washington has enhanced its 
military-security cooperation with Singapore and Thailand in a “network of security 
and military relationships” both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.51 This can 
                                                 
47 The following discussion is drawn from Perwita, A.A.B., ‘The US Growing Interest in Southeast 
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help the US to reassure its commitment with Southeast Asian allies and to engage a 
rising China without containing it, thus avoiding making China feel threatened.52  
 ASEAN has also been able to play the role of a convenor and driver of 
regional cooperative institutions and processes. It has fostered peace and stability in 
East Asia. Through the ASEAN Dialogue partnerships, the ARF, ASEAN + 3 and 
the EAS, it has provided a neutral platform for the major powers to meet and 
promote their economic and security interests in the region. China’s growing position 
in the regional institutions created by ASEAN can affect US economic, political and 
strategic interests as well as its influence in East Asia, which is why the US moved to 
join the EAS.53 In October 2011, Hillary Clinton stated the political interests of the 
US in Southeast Asia: 
So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, 
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions 
supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region 
that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in 
our interests as well that they be effective and responsive. That is why President 
Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To 
pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta 
and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN.54 
To maintain its position as the dominant superpower among its traditional 
allies and closer partners in the Asia-Pacific, and especially East Asia, the US has a 
strategic interest in maintaining confidence among all East Asian states that it 
remains a reliable guarantor for universal freedom of navigation. 55  While the 
proportion of US trade travelling through these waterways is small, American allies 
such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Singapore depend on 
                                                 
52 Singh U.B., ‘Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia’, Strategic Analysis, 24(2), 2000, pp. 
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Southeast Asian sea-lanes.56 Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu have argued that by helping 
to ensure the freedom of navigation, the US can provide comfort to regional states 
and discourage other actors from making efforts to exert influence in ways that are 
detrimental to regional security.57  
Furthermore, US bilateral relations with individual Southeast Asian states 
enhance its influence in the region. The US aims to pursue bilateral initiatives with 
individual Southeast Asian states to promote democracy, human rights and political 
stability, foster market-oriented economic reforms, and reduce the effects of 
organized crime.58 The US seeks to play the key role by using human rights and 
democracy as a leverage against regional governments.59 Limaye argues that human 
rights, democracy and governance are among the contentious issues between 
Washington and ASEAN member states. Although there are disagreements between 
the US and individual Southeast Asian countries, US interest in and attention to these 
matters will not fade. One issue that has near-total consensus among ASEAN 
members is for the military government of Myanmar to move towards democracy 
and improved human rights, and the Myanmar government has started introducing 
political change in response.60  
Wang argues that if the US can maintain its hegemonic status in the South 
China Sea, the US is able to cover the South Pacific Region and strengthen the 
region’s alliance with Australia. To the west, the US can extend beyond the Straits of 
Malacca to enhance its interests in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. To the 
north, the US could directly contain China’s southward expansion efforts. To the 
northeast, the US can go beyond the Taiwan Strait to the Japan Sea to strengthen the 
coastal defence of the Japan Sea. The South China Sea is regarded as the third most 
important potential hot spot in the Asia Pacific Region after the Korean Peninsula 
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and the Taiwan Strait.61 The flow of oil from the Middle East across the South China 
Sea to Japan and South Korea, and most recently the naval aspirations of the PRC, 
have made the constant American naval presence in Southeast Asia a symbol of 
Washington’s security-oriented view of the region.62 
3.2.3 Security Interests  
In terms of its geo-strategic significance, Southeast Asia has a crucial role in 
US comprehensive security. Keeping maritime routes near Southeast Asia open is 
important in order to ensure the US deployment of defence forces in the case of 
events such as natural disasters.63 Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu share this viewpoint, 
showing that, Southeast Asia’s strategic location at the intersection of two of the 
world’s most heavily travelled sea-lanes straddles that the east-west route connecting 
the Indian and Pacific oceans, and the north-south route that links Australia and New 
Zealand to Northeast Asia. Thus, from a military perspective, these sea-lanes are 
critical to the movement of US forces from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean 
and the Persian Gulf.64  
Simon argues that although Southeast Asia has not been defined as an area of 
vital American concern since the Second Indochina War (1963-1975), its importance 
is inherent in its location astride the sea lanes between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and 
the US’s Northeast Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. Unlike US deployments in 
Japan and South Korea, which provide direct deterrence against potential invaders, 
such as the USSR or North Korea, Southeast Asian military facilities in the 
Philippines were not primarily intended to defend the host country. Instead, they 
constituted storage and repair capacities in case of conflicts, and were essential for 
the US Navy or Air Force to provide the capability to move west to the Indian Ocean 
or Persian Gulf or north to the sea of Japan. The US could deploy forces from Guam 
and Okinawa to the Korean peninsula in the event of a conflict. This capability was 
                                                 
61 Outlook East Weekly [liaowangdongfang zhoukan] January 12, 2004. See at <http://www. 
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shown in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, when supplies from the Philippines were 
transferred to the US forces located around Saudi Arabia.65  
The US has revealed its security interests in its bilateral relations with 
Southeast Asian nations. Former Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld emphasized the 
significance of a continuing US role in Asian security in his visits to Singapore, 
Indonesia and Vietnam in June 2006. US military activities were enhanced in the 
region, such as naval port visits to Vietnam since 2003, joint exercises with the 
Philippines, normalization of military ties with Indonesia, cooperation with Thailand 
in delivering humanitarian aid, and the annual US-Thailand Cobra Gold Exercises.66 
Unlike the military unilateralism of the Bush Administration’s first tenure, Secretary 
Rumsfeld asserted at the Shangri-La Conference of Asia-Pacific Defence Ministers 
in Singapore: 
That in the past five years in terms of defence and security cooperation, the United 
States has done more things, with more nations, in more constructive ways, than at any 
time in our history.67 
Geo-strategic considerations in other Southeast Asian states also affect the 
security environment. Opium production in Laos, which by 1990 had grown to be the 
third largest source in the world, made countering narcotics the second highest US 
priority with Lao PDR, after the matter of Prisoners of War and those Missing in 
Action from the Second Indochinese War. In 1990, the US allocated US$8.7 million 
for a crop substitution program involving hill tribes and capacity building around law 
enforcement officers. From 1993, opium production decreased remarkably and the 
US began to shift resources towards drug rehabilitation. The area under opium 
cultivation fell from 42,000 hectares in 1989 to 1,700 hectares in 2006, a decline of 
96%.68  Pholsena notes that countering narcotics operations is now the main US 
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priority in Laos, although the country is considered less a site of a production than 
the area between Myanmar, Thailand and China.69 
Strategically, Southeast Asia is considered as the “second front” in the US war 
on terror, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The arrest in Singapore of 
Jemmah Islamiyah operatives revealed the existence of an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist 
network in Southeast Asia, which was thought to be targeting Western interests. US 
discoveries from several Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Indonesia and the 
Philippines) led to the conclusion of international and regional links between groups 
advocating political violence. Washington considered Southeast Asia as a “fertile 
breeding ground for terrorists operations” due to its majority Muslim population, 
separatist movements, easy trans-national communication, varying levels of regional 
development and occasionally compromised intelligence, police and military 
services.70  
In late January 2002, the Bush Administration deployed 660 US troops to 
southern Philippines to assist in hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations. 
This move was widely seen as the opening of a second front in Washington’s war on 
terrorism.71  Stronger bilateral defence ties between the US and Southeast Asian 
states such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have paved the way for 
improved security relations between the US and ASEAN. It has enhanced the 
stabilizing role of the US in the region and strengthened the basis for engagement in 
multilateral forums, such as the US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to 
Combat International Terrorism in August 2002. 72  The multilateral security 
cooperation through the forums has strengthened American defence interests in 
Southeast Asia.  
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Looking from a long-term perspective, the US engagement with Southeast Asia 
is also a strategy to enhance American presence and counter China’s rising influence. 
Sutter argued that China’s rising position as a regional power has created more 
influence, and a central role in Asian regional multilateral institutions. He argues that 
China’s rise has worked against US national interests.73 In a realist perspective, the 
US seeks strategic interests to defend its influence in Southeast Asia, and engage 
China as a method to defend the superior position it currently holds. The US needs to 
have close relations with the region to protect US strategic interests in Southeast 
Asia, to ensure Southeast Asia is a relatively peaceful and stable region, and to not 
allow any emerging power to dominate the region or make a threat to US interests.74 
Again, US security interests in Southeast Asia are related to the South China 
Sea. Yang notes that the South China Sea is not only important to claimant states, but 
also non-claimant nations including Japan and the US. The US uses the South China 
Sea as a transit point and operating area for the American Navy and Air Force 
between military bases in East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. It also 
has strategically critical interests in the safety of navigation and the freedom of 
SLOCs.75 Hillary Clinton stated officially after the 17th ARF Ministerial Meeting in 
July 2010, when several ASEAN members encouraged the US to make a statement 
on the South China Sea: 
The United States, like every other nation, has national interests in freedom of 
navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law 
in the South China Sea. We share these interests with not only ASEAN members and 
ASEAN Regional Forum participants but with other maritime nations and the broader 
international community.76 
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China’s recent assertiveness in the territorial disputes of the South China Sea 
has provided opportunities for the US to “come back” to Asia. At the ASEAN 
Regional Forum in Hanoi in 2010, the US helped to shape a region-wide effort to 
protect access and passage to the South China Sea, and to uphold international law in 
defining territorial claims. Considering it has security, economic and strategic 
interests in the South China Sea, the US has taken important steps to protect its vital 
interests in stability and freedom of navigation, and unrestricted commerce, by 
paving the way for multilateral diplomacy among the claimants of the islands in the 
South China Sea. The US seeks to ensure that the dispute can be addressed 
peacefully in accordance with the established rules and international law.77 
3.3 US Strategies towards Southeast Asia  
3.3.1 From 1991 to 2000  
In the initial aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the US seemed to ignore Southeast Asia and paid more attention to 
solving its domestic problems. In 1991, Simon felt there was little doubt that the 
demise of the Cold War and domestic effects of a deficit had prompted the US to 
reduce its deployed air and naval forces in Southeast Asia. The number of US aircraft 
carriers declined from 14 to 11 by the mid-1990s.78 Writing in 2000, Singh argued 
that US would prefer to reduce its overseas commitments because of internal 
budgetary issues. Economic constraints have made the US develop an alternative 
security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific, and to readjust its East Asia strategy to 
maintain a strategic troop presence of 100,000 personnel in the region.79 They were 
located in bases in Japan and South Korea and naval forces were withdrawn from 
Clarke Air Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines in November 1992. In the mid-
1990s, US interests were not perceived to be under threat. However, in 1998, the US 
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revived its security engagement with the Philippines after the lease on the bases 
expired, and it then secured additional facilities at Singapore’s Changi naval base.80  
The US strategy to build up “a new Asia Pacific Community” was created 
under the Bill Clinton administration from 1993. He said: 
Our economic relations depend vitally on our ties with the Asia Pacific region, which is 
the world’s fastest-growing economic region. In November 1993, President Clinton 
convened the first-ever summit of the leaders of the economies that constitute the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.81 
Tao notes that President Clinton stated in his Engagement and Enlargement: 
Report on U.S National Security Strategy, submitted to the Congress on 21 July 
1994, that with respect to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: 
East Asia is a region of growing importance for the US security and prosperity; 
nowhere are the strands of our three pronged strategy more intertwined, nor is the need 
for continued US engagement more evident. Now more than ever, security, open 
markets and democracy go hand by hand in our approach to this dynamic region”.82  
Between 1990 and 1992, the Bush Administration drew up plans to reduce 
American troop numbers in the region. During the first term of the Clinton 
Administration, the Pentagon devised a new security strategy towards the region to 
reaffirm US commitment, based on a stable level of 100,000 troops (80,000 in Japan 
and South Korea and another 20,000-30,000 in the West Pacific).83 In the late 1990s, 
Nathan observed that the Clinton Doctrine for Asia claimed the US would be an 
active player in Asia-Pacific growth, stability and prosperity towards the 21st century 
as it would “remain fully engaged economically, militarily and diplomatically.” Such 
a strategy of engagement was seen as an important way in helping to preserve 
American access and influence over the region.84 
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In Clinton’s second term, US strategy towards Southeast Asia was enhanced. 
He continued to affirm American strategic interests in Southeast Asia, as exemplified 
by the 1999 national security strategy Towards the 21st Century that the US was 
keen to “develop regional and bilateral security and economic relationship that 
assists in conflict prevention and resolution and expand US participation in the 
region’s economies.” The US continued to maintain its alliance with Thailand and 
the Philippines, reached security access agreements with Singapore and other 
ASEAN countries, and encouraged the emergence of a strong and cohesive ASEAN 
capable of enhancing regional security and prosperity.85 The US aimed to maintain 
the increasingly productive relationship with ASEAN and to enhance the security 
dialogue under ARF.  
Since the Clinton Administration, the US has normalised diplomatic relations 
with the new ASEAN members of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, in 
addition to maintaining close relations with its old allies in the region. The 
relationship between Vietnam and the US has gradually improved. In April 1991, the 
US provided Vietnam with a roadmap for normalization, and then from 1991 to 1993 
Vietnam cooperated in implementing the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. In 1994 President Clinton lifted the trade 
embargo on Vietnam and finally on 11 July 1995, the normalization of relations was 
announced officially.86 
3.3.2 From 2001 to 2008  
In the first decade of the 21st century, the US enhanced bilateral ties as it 
expanded the war on terror into Southeast Asia. The US arranged close cooperation 
in dealing with terrorists in the Philippines and gave it the status of a Major Non-
NATO Ally. Several cooperative operations were carried out, including a remarkable 
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increase in military supplies to the Philippines. There were joint and prolonged 
exercises which allowed hundreds of US military personnel to train their Philippine 
counterparts in dealing with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the south-western islands of 
the country. Another US ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand, also received increased US 
military aid under the Bush Administration, while Singapore developed a new 
security framework agreement with the US for cooperation on counter-terrorism.87 
During this period, the US supported strengthening ASEAN as a regional 
institution mostly for countering terrorism. A number of activities were carried out 
by the US Government to assist Southeast Asia on the second front on terror. In 
August 2002, the State Department announced the ASEAN Cooperation Plan to 
strengthen the Secretariat, help with the integration of ASEAN’s new members, and 
combat trans-national challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. Terrorism has also been a key issue at APEC meetings since 2001.88 
Since the Bali bombings in October 2002, more than 130 people have been arrested 
in Indonesia on terrorism charges. The US now has a common interest with a leading 
Southeast Asia regional player in addressing the threats of terrorism. Through 
countering terrorism, the US seized the opportunity to deepen relations with 
Indonesia.89 
3.3.3 From 2009 onwards  
The “back to Southeast Asia” approach was stated by US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton at the 16th ARF on 22 July 2009 in Phuket, when the US signed the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with representatives of ASEAN. Clinton 
affirmed that “the United States is back in Southeast Asia” and acknowledged the US 
was fully engaged with ASEAN partners on a wide range of challenges. International 
observers saw the move as a chance for the US to “reoccupy” a sphere of influence 
that had been neglected during the Bush Presidency.90 While Southeast Asia was 
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never totally ignored in US strategic thinking, the US strategy of returning to Asia to 
reengage Southeast Asia should be understood in a symbolic sense. The Obama 
Administration’s foreign strategy aims to draw attraction to a “new” foreign policy 
direction.91  
According to Vu Le Thai Hoang, the diplomatic charm offensive by the 
Obama Administration at the end of 2011 was mostly analysed as the “decisive 
blow” in his relentless efforts over the past three years and can be encapsulated in 
two main ideas: Smart Power and the Pacific Century (also known as the US “Pivot” 
to the Asia-Pacific). The US strategic objective is to enhance its global position 
through three pillars: economics, strategic security, and American values of 
democracy and human rights. In this strategy, the US considers the network of 
bilateral relations as the foundation for its strategic pivot, divided into three groups: 
treaty allies, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand; the 
emerging upcoming powers like China, India and Indonesia; and the newly 
prioritized countries, including Vietnam. Thus, Southeast Asia is valued as a sound 
testing ground for the US to try on its “Smart Power” and “Pivot to Asia-Pacific.”92  
The US has been committed to enhance its relations with Southeast Asian 
states since the Obama Administration took office. In spite of proposing some 
initiatives and improving some particular relations with the region, the Bush 
Administration approached Asia-Pacific in a relatively restrained manner. With 
Obama’s tenure, especially during the second half of his first term, US relations with 
the Asia-Pacific have improved.93 Limaye notes that the US declared its commitment 
to improve relations with ASEAN as an organization and search for opportunities for 
broader and deeper bilateral ties with specific ASEAN members. The new US 
strategy also includes “rapprochement,” “re-engagement” or “revitalization” with the 
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newest members of ASEAN, namely Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. 
These close relationships mark the progress of US ties with Southeast Asia because 
of problematic relations with these nations in the past.94  
Arguably, recent US involvement in Southeast Asia has created more positive 
than negative effects for the balance of power in the region. American engagement in 
the region can now draw more attention to Southeast Asia from other major powers, 
adding strengthened values to the regional institutions and helping to maintain 
regional stability to resolve issues.95 American improvement of bilateral ties with 
Vietnam has added a fresh dynamic to the political situation in Southeast Asia. The 
improved features in this relationship can be seen from the signing of the Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (BTA) in December 2001 and Vietnam’s entry into the WTO in 
January 2007. According to Brown, the US is a leading trading partner of Vietnam, 
with two-way trade increasing from US$220 million in 1994 to US$15.7 billion in 
2008.96 
Improvement in the US-Lao PDR relations also occurred following 9/11 with 
bilateral counter terrorism cooperation. Thayer argues that when the US declared 
Southeast Asia to be the second front on terror, Lao PDR became one of the bases 
that the US needed to cover in its regional counter-terrorism efforts. 97  With 
Cambodia, the US reopened its diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh in November 
1991, following the political settlement of the Cambodia conflict and the entry of the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Since then, the 
rapprochement in terms of economic, political, military and aid dimensions varied 
until early 2007, when the US resumed direct foreign assistance. In September 2009, 
Cambodia and the US amended a bilateral trade agreement to include the provision 
for the US to support Cambodian economic priorities.98  
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As the main regional organisation, engagement with ASEAN has become a 
US priority during the Obama Administration. Swielande notes that the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, Kurt Campbell, had stated that the US has been 
diversifying its strategic and military approach. While keeping its strong 
commitment with Northeast Asia, the US is going to focus more attention on 
Southeast Asia. In the past, the US had developed bilateral relations with Southeast 
Asian countries. However, the Obama Administration considers ASEAN a unified 
organisation. Since 2009, annual summits have been organized between ASEAN and 
the US. 99  The US was the first non-ASEAN country to name a non-resident 
Ambassador to ASEAN with the appointment of Scot Marciel in 2008, followed by 
the establishment of a permanent US Mission to ASEAN in 2009 and a dedicated 
Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in June 2010.100 
The US is now engaged in Southeast Asia through regional cooperation and 
active participation in political institutions. Bower examined these trends from a 
strategic perspective, with both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton starting to recognise that strong relations with ASEAN are vital to America’s 
interests in Asia. In 2010, Clinton outlined the core US principles for Asian regional 
architecture in Honolulu, and Obama signed the protocol of accession to the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which declared that US interests in Southeast Asia 
are significant enough for an annual presidential focus. 101  Thayer regards these 
moves as signalling close engagement with ASEAN.102 The US pledged to attend the 
annual ARF Ministerial Meetings in Southeast Asia, a departure from the Bush 
Administration, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attended only two of the 
four annual meetings.103  
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With Southeast Asia moving towards regional integration to become an 
ASEAN community in 2015, the US has expressed its active involvement in this 
road map since 2009. The US is likely to support Southeast Asia through the ASEAN 
Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration 
(ADVANCE) Program, and it has committed around US$7 million for activities 
towards an ASEAN economic community.104 While not a large amount of money, 
this is symbolic of the commitment shown towards ASEAN.  
Regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes, the Obama Administration 
has shown more commitment towards addressing the problem. China’s assertiveness 
after 2007 had put pressure on foreign energy companies, including US companies, 
not to undertake exploration off the Vietnamese coast. At the ASEAN Regional 
Forum Summit in July 2010, US Secretary of State Clinton indicated Washington’s 
willingness to facilitate tasks on implementing the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: 
The US supports the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the conduct of parties in the 
South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of 
conduct. The US is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures 
consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all claimants and the 
broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful 
conditions.105 
3.4 Implications for Southeast Asia 
3.4.1 For Southeast Asia in General 
Historically, Southeast Asia is a region for a rivalry among major powers. It 
still needs US engagement to keep all major powers engaged in the region. This is a 
strategy of ASEAN’s diplomacy. Once the US demonstrates its presence in 
Southeast Asia, then the ambitions of powers like China and Japan can be kept in 
check. ASEAN has accepted the US as a dialogue partner and an important 
participant in the annual ministerial meeting with the Foreign Ministers and the ARF. 
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Despite ASEAN’s rejection of US claims that the values of democracy and human 
rights are universal, the US is seen as a crucial stabiliser in the region.106 However, 
US involvement in Southeast Asia can cause both positive and negative impacts that 
lead to specific implications for the region.  
Positively, the US “back to Southeast Asia strategy” can benefit the region. 
While the US is still the dominant superpower, its engagement in Southeast Asia can 
draw the attention of regional powers such as China, Japan, India and Russia. Once 
there are a number of powers involved in the region, then regional problems can be 
resolved through balancing as major powers and nations have to work together to 
discuss solutions. Subsequently, the role of regional multilateral institutions is 
strengthened in a positive manner.107  
Nehru shares this viewpoint by arguing that the US presence in regional 
forums, such as APEC and EAS, is potentially to transform them into decision 
making bodies rather than just “talking shops”.108  Moreover, US engagement in 
Southeast Asia brings security balance for the region amid the recent aggressiveness 
of China in the territorial disputes over the South China Sea. From ASEAN’s 
viewpoint, US reengagement in the region is welcomed, as the continued American 
military presence in Southeast Asia can offer some measure of comfort against 
China’s growing regional clout.109  
In addition, in terms of economic benefits, Southeast Asia can also obtain an 
advantage from US rapprochement with the region. Nehru claims that even when the 
US was suffering the effects of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression 
in 2011, it was still the world’s largest market. The US is still an important final 
destination for much of the region’s exports and a key source of foreign direct 
investment. The recent ratification of the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement is likely 
to open the door for a similar free trade agreement with ASEAN, or a broader APEC-
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wide free trade area for the Asia-Pacific, or a concluded TPP agreement.110 The US 
is still among dominant investors in Southeast Asia and this can be a beneficial factor 
for the region. According to the figures from the US Department of Commerce in 
2008, America had US$153 billion invested in ASEAN, US$53 billion in China and 
US$14 billion in India.111  
On the negative side, the US presence in Southeast Asia may pose a difficult 
dilemma for regional states. When major powers get involved in the region, there 
will be suspicion among them. The result can be strategic rivalry, arm races or a 
“rally for allies”, causing concerns both for major powers and other nations when 
participating in new initiatives or regional mechanisms. Moreover, the US approach 
to Southeast Asia can trigger action and reaction, escalate tensions or create distrust 
in the region. By trying to re-engage in the region, the US emphasizes its efforts to 
prevent the rise of China, and US efforts to embrace Southeast Asian nations can 
create a perception that the US is encircling China with its allies. This perception will 
make it harder to reach any settlement of problems faced among countries in the 
region with China. Conflicts may occur over minor incidents involving Southeast 
Asian countries, for example, when they try and modernise their military forces.112  
From an economic viewpoint, Southeast Asia is between “a rock and a hard 
place” due to American involvement in the region, and with the close commercial 
relationship it holds with China. Nehru investigated the passage of the US Senate’s 
Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 designed to punish China for 
alleged currency manipulation. He found it would hurt Southeast Asian economies 
more because Southeast Asia’s economy is inextricably linked to China. 
Furthermore, ASEAN’s ambition to build a free trade area by 2015 and an 
infrastructure network to facilitate intra-regional trade is supportive of a broader East 
Asian regionalism, which China plays an integral part.113 
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From a multilateral perspective, it is essential for Southeast Asia to maintain 
and enhance the relationship with the US amid competition and cooperation between 
major powers in the region. Nguyen Hoang Giap argues that ASEAN countries still 
regard the US as an important actor in the region and wish to preserve a good 
relationship with the global superpower. From ASEAN’s perspective, America is not 
only the dominant world power, but it has particular interests in the region.114 It is 
practical for ASEAN to engage the US and other major powers in multilateral 
mechanisms to carry out ASEAN’s foreign policy of balancing powers. This strategy 
helps ASEAN to invite all major powers to the region, taking advantage of the 
regional interests of great powers while at the same time creating a forum for powers 
to exchange viewpoints. Giap argues that, together with its balance of powers 
attitude towards the major powers, ASEAN needs to acknowledge that strengthening 
multilateral cooperation with all outside partners, especially major powers, requires 
maximising opportunities for regional economic development and a security 
guarantee. This was the reason for the creation of regional multilateral forums, such 
as the ARF from 1994.115  
In the chapters that follow, interviews with regional diplomats demonstrate 
that a method for ASEAN to mitigate negative impacts of US re-engagement in the 
region is to regularly involve all major powers in a security dialogue in Southeast 
Asia. This is the way to build up trust and confidence among powers themselves so 
as to reduce suspicion between each other for more security. For Southeast Asian 
states, bringing all major powers into regional forums to come and share differing 
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viewpoints is also the smart way to gather information from major powers to 
contribute to regional stability, security and development.116 
3.4.2 For Vietnam in Particular 
US engagement in Southeast Asia has pros and cons for Vietnam. The 
bilateral ties between Vietnam and the US have been seen as a “rapprochement.” 
Vietnam can benefit from US re-engagement in Southeast Asia in the political, 
economic and security sectors. Politically, Vietnam’s geographic location makes it 
central to US strategy, adding more leverage for Vietnam in the regional and 
international arena. Huong argues Vietnam’s strategic role is enhanced as it can be 
used as the “buffer zone or springboard” for both China and America in their 
strategies towards Southeast Asia.117 For the US, Vietnam was once regarded as the 
buffer against the spread of communism. It now plays an important role in balancing 
the ascension of China. Moreover, Vietnam’s stable political system, economic 
improvement, and rising regional and international prestige have led to Vietnam 
receiving more attention from the US and China. The US has become the largest 
export market for Vietnam, while China is the biggest source of its imports. Vietnam 
has opportunities to further participate in regional multilateral mechanisms, raising 
its voice and enhancing its role in these forums. With its impressive economic 
development, larger powers now recognise Vietnam as an important partner.118  
At the same time, Hoang claims that for Vietnam, the US has now become 
one of its most important foreign partners. Vietnam is a strategic partner of the US. 
With improved bilateral relations between Washington and Hanoi, Vietnam is one of 
the top priorities for the US in Southeast Asia. New developments in Vietnam-US 
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relations provide support for American broader strategies towards Southeast Asia.119 
US re-engagement in Southeast Asia and rapprochement with Vietnam can help 
bring economic benefits to Vietnam. The statement of Secretary of State Clinton 
during a short visit to Hanoi that the US wished to see a strong and prosperous 
Vietnam was highly appreciated by the Vietnamese people. 120  From the 
normalisation of ties in July 1995 to the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
(BTA) in December 2001, and with Vietnam’s entrance to the WTO in January 2007, 
bilateral trade and investment between Vietnam and the US has become the mainstay 
of the two countries’ relationship.121 Nguyen also points out that the US continues to 
support Vietnam in its market reforms. Its open door policy and new legislation has 
created better conditions for American enterprises to operate businesses in 
Vietnam.122 Vietnam’s economy benefits from US interests in the region.  
In terms of security, American involvement in Southeast Asia is beneficial to 
Vietnam’s regional security to some extent, especially in the current territorial 
disputes over the South China Sea. With China’s assertiveness in claiming its 
maritime territory, American foreign policy of prevention and deterrence over the 
South China Sea has, at least, helped to address the dispute through a more balanced 
approach. US policy in the South China Sea is strongly opposed to the use of force to 
resolve competing claims as it urges claimants to exercise restraint and avoid 
destabilizing actions. The US desire is for the maintenance of peace and stability in 
the South China Sea. The US also considers that maintaining freedom of navigation 
and all maritime activities is consistent with international law and is in the 
fundamental interests of the US. 123  Although the US pursues its own national 
interests in its strategies towards the South China Sea, aiming to protect its 
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economic, political and security privileges, Vietnam as one claimant in this territorial 
dispute can benefit from the US approaches by addressing the problem multilaterally 
under international law.  
Negatively, US policy of spreading human rights and democracy can affect 
Vietnam’s domestic political system and social stability. Vatthana argues that 
Vietnam has made remarkable progress since the early 1990s, emerging from the US 
embargo and international isolation to establish diplomatic and economic relations 
with many partners, including international institutions. However, the Vietnamese 
leaders, in particular those within the conservative elements of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam (CPV), remain suspicious of US diplomatic and strategic intentions in the 
region such as “the plot of peaceful evolution.” 124  Vietnam’s foreign policy 
strategies were largely decided by the interplay of the balance of power between 
conservatives and reformers, along with the leadership style of the General Secretary 
of the CPV. The reformers prefer a friendlier relationship with Washington as it can 
help Hanoi have a greater leverage against Beijing.  
However, the conservatives consider “peaceful evolution” as a dangerous 
development.125 The phrase “peaceful evolution” was previously used to describe an 
imperialist strategy of sabotaging socialism by destroying the party from within. 
Party conservatives today emphasise that a “peaceful evolution” can be understood 
as a “victory without war” over an existing regime. They argue that the objective of 
hostile forces (such as the US) in a “peaceful evolution” is to interfere in Vietnam’s 
domestic affairs and eventually remove the leadership of the CPV and end 
socialism.126 
The negative impact of US rapprochement with Vietnam raises the likelihood 
of affecting bilateral relations with Vietnam’s neighbour China. Geography and 
history have jointly made Vietnam into one of the countries that is most sensitive to 
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developments in China. Vietnam lies on a China’s main route of expansion into 
Southeast Asia.127 China is more of a long-term threat for Vietnam due to both its 
geographical location and its political orientation. The threat from Beijing is greater 
for Vietnam than that from Washington because for the US, the sources of tensions 
are Vietnam’s political system, democracy and human rights issues. For China, the 
matters that Vietnam needs to deal with are more complicated, and concern national 
territory, land and sovereignty.128  
In the short term, Vietnam should maximise its positive bilateral relationship 
with the US in both economic and political issues as the US is Vietnam’s largest 
export market and Vietnam has a huge trade surplus with the US. In tourism, 
Vietnam receives its largest number of foreign tourists from the US. However, this 
temporary advantage should not mean that Vietnam neglects China. Vietnam should 
not choose either the US or China as Vietnam derives benefits from both countries. 
The relationships Vietnam enjoys with both China and the US complement each 
other.129 
In the South China Sea territorial dispute, the different interests of various 
states, not only China and the US, have made the issue complicated. What Vietnam 
should do in the long term is a question of national policy. However, Vietnam should 
do its best to prevent the bilateral relationship between China and America from 
becoming a rivalry in strategic competition in Southeast Asia, especially in the South 
China Sea.  
Vietnam will not participate in any power competitions between/among major powers. 
We will not stand on one side to confront another, rather, we only implement our duty, 
contributing to peace, stability in the region and world on the basis of international law 
and the UN Charter. We try our utmost to maintain our national self-reliance and 
independence. This concept is clearly defined in Vietnam’s foreign policy. This truth 
comes from the valuable lessons from our one thousand-year history of building and 
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defending the country. Maintaining the self-reliance and independence foreign policy 
ensures sustainable and long-time peace for our nation.130 
An ASEAN community is beneficial to Vietnam’s national interests. ASEAN 
can assist in dealing with larger issues of security and development, such as the 
South China Sea territorial dispute. However, progress on such matters is 
complex. 131  Brown argues ASEAN is crucial for Vietnam as multilateralism 
approaches, so membership of ASEAN is a powerful weapon.132 
In the long term, Vietnam’s foreign policy is to make friends with all major 
powers. It is crucial for Vietnam to stand on its own national interest in its foreign 
policy. At the same time it is practical for Vietnam to enhance external cooperation 
to strengthen Vietnam’s security, development and prestige in the regional and 
international arena. Vietnam does need to better address the interests of major 
powers through international integration. Vietnam also tries to meet the interests of 
foreign powers to pursue investment overseas. In its relations with China, Vietnam 
has a large trade deficit and so it must improve its terms of trade. On the other hand, 
Vietnam has a trade surplus with the US, with an export value of US$18.64 billion in 
2013. Vietnam’s imports from the US were valued at US$5.23 billion, while exports 
to the US reached US$23.87 billion.133 To address the balance of trade, Vietnam 
should enhance financial and credit cooperation with the US.134  
The next chapter examines the relationship of cooperation and competition 
between the US and China in Southeast Asia, followed by their implications on 
Southeast Asia.  
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CHAPTER 4.  SINO-AMERICAN INTERACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 
 
This chapter will examine the basis of Sino-American interactions in 
Southeast Asia after 1991. Sino-American interactions reflect a rising regional power 
challenging the global superpower, and the leading creditor against the largest debtor 
in the world. Understanding the dynamic that exists for these two powers is critical in 
order to analyse how Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) should engage with them 
in the region. This chapter will describe the bilateral relations in terms of cooperation 
and competition. The main argument of the chapter is that the approach of Southeast 
Asia to China and the US should not be seen as favouring one side while neglecting 
the other. It is how ASEAN works to balance the interest of rival powers. 
4.1 The Basis of Sino-American Interactions 
4.1.1 Global and Regional Factors in Sino-American Interactions 
In the post-Cold War era, the US has remained dominant in the international 
arena despite its relative decline. China, meanwhile, has been regarded as the main 
challenger to US hegemony with its spectacular economic growth over the past two 
decades. Peng argues that the rise of China’s national power has been impressive and 
it led to the proliferation of ‘China studies’ among American think tanks, along with 
a wave of Chinese language study in America, showing that the US is well aware of 
a real challenge from China’s rise.1 In 2010, Sharma claimed that if the Obama 
Administration carried out an uncompromisingly aggressive policy towards Beijing, 
it would be at a painful economic cost. Owing to fundamental shifts in the global 
landscape, the US is no longer in a unilateral position to call the shots. A new 
economic picture has emerged – China has become the US government’s largest 
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foreign creditor while the US has the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest 
debtor.2  
China’s growth is one of the reasons that led to inter-dependence among 
powers and other countries in the world in general, and to more dynamic bilateral ties 
between China and the US. Peng recognised that the US has, over time, altered its 
strategies and methods towards China, although its tactical goal of changing China 
stays the same.3 From a strategic view, the US expects to see China as a responsible 
stakeholder and has shifted its rhetoric accordingly – from an emotional language of 
“China threat,” it now uses the phrase “China’s responsibility,” from “engagement” 
with China, the US now uses “conditional acceptance.” These alternations 
demonstrate international integration as the US seeks peaceful coexistence with 
China.4  
However, there are other aspects of the relationship that are less peaceful, 
such as arms races, local conflicts and territorial disputes. These serve to complicate 
the post-Cold War environment. One Vietnamese official thought that in the coming 
decades there would be fewer possibilities of a world war, because peace and 
cooperation remains the mainstay of international relations.5 While the world is not 
engaged in major wars between great powers, invasions of smaller nations continue. 
There are also likely to be boundary disputes. 6  As a result, the Sino-American 
relationship has witnessed competition in addition to cooperation. Peng argued that 
the increasing significance of Sino-American ties means not only American strategic 
reliance on China, but also an increase in its strategic suspicions regarding China.7 
Hung and Liu discovered in the 2001 US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that 
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the United States will face a major military challenge from Asia, most notably from 
China.8 The 2001 QDR of the United States clearly claimed: 
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the 
potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten 
stability in regions critical to US interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging 
as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition.9 
Global politics has brought about major changes to Sino-American relations, shaping 
it with specific features of cooperation and competition. 
Southeast Asia has a dynamism that has shaped the Sino-American 
relationship. Nguyen argues that China is the leading engine of economic growth in 
Asia, and Asian countries have stronger trade relations with China than with the 
US.10 China has much to offer to Southeast Asian states, including more convenient 
conditions than the US due to geographical distance, its network of overseas Chinese 
who are deeply engaged with business elites of Southeast Asia, and similarities in 
culture, traditions and customs. Over the past few years, the US had increased 
diplomatic efforts with other regions, such as the Middle East or South Asia, and this 
had given China the opportunity to use ‘soft power’ to broaden and strengthen its 
influence in Southeast Asia.11 Looking at their current position and strength in the 
region, Chinese influence is more prominent than American influence. Nguyen 
argues this trend is likely to continue in the coming years.12 
4.1.2 Background to Sino-American Relations:  
The relationship between China and the US has never been straightforward or 
transparent. From the beginning there was intense rivalry between both countries. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, US-China relations have become increasingly 
unstable, which means greater variations in conflictual and cooperative behaviour 
within short periods of time due to cycles of engagement and friction. This instability 
reflects a fundamental disjuncture between limited cooperative interests and more 
common conflictual ones.13 Sharing this viewpoint, Nguyen Thai Yen Huong noted 
that although the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US 
opened a new page in the bilateral relationship between the two powers, it did not 
mean the end of strain and conflicts. The most important feature in post-Cold War 
Sino-American relations is that China finds it essential to cooperate with the US at a 
time when the US is experiencing a relative decline in power and has to adjust its 
strategies towards China accordingly. The objective cause is rooted in the global 
political trends of peace and a decrease in arm races.14  
The intense rivalry between China and the US can be seen through a range of 
strategies they have towards each other including vigilance, antagonism and conflict. 
The tight cooperation is over security issues, politics, economics, diplomacy and 
military affairs. In this perspective, Glaser discovered that between 2001 and 2003, 
relations between Washington and Beijing underwent a spectacular transition in 
ways that few could think of during the Bush Administration. Global terrorism, the 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, simmering tensions in South Asia, the Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the North Korea nuclear issue have added 
a compelling strategic dimension to Sino-American relations. Not since the Cold 
War have such security issues occupied a central position in the two powers’ 
interactions.15  
US Deputy Assistant Secretary, Thomas J. Christensen, from the US Bureau 
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, gave evidence to the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment, Committee of 
                                                 
13Johnston, A.I., ‘Stability and Instability in Sino-US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s 
Superficial Friendship Theory’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 4(1), 2011, pp. 5-29 at 8. 
14 Nguyen, Thai Yen Huong,  Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung: Hợp tác và Cạnh tranh luận giải dưới góc độ Cân 
bằng quyền lực [Trans: The US-China relationship: Cooperation and Competition looking at the 
perspective of balance of power],Nha xuat ban Chinh tri Quoc gia-Su that [Trans: National Political 
Publisher, Truth], Hanoi, 2011, pp. 55-56. 
15 Glaser, B.S., ‘Sino-American Relations: A Work in Progress’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 
25(4), 2003, pp. 417-424 at 417. 
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Foreign Affairs, on 23 July 2007 that the US-China relationship is candid, 
constructive and cooperative with a solid foundation and that there has been an 
improvement in recent years with some key areas of cooperation.16 Even the most 
powerful country in the world can face a global problem that it is unable to resolve 
alone. The US is aware of the fact that, sooner or later, China is going to become a 
major power and exercise more influence in the international arena. This perception 
has made Washington feel the risk of restraining Beijing with military confrontation. 
Consequently, it would be reasonable for the US to attempt comprehensive strategic 
contacts with China and work together for common solutions. 
However, Sino-American relations also suffer from suspicion and differences 
over several issues, which adds tension to this relationship. Glaser notes that in spite 
of Jiang Zemin’s assurances to US President Bush that China has no ambition to 
challenge American military presence in the Asia-Pacific and it considers the US as 
having a stabilizing role in the region, most Americans are still worried about 
Beijing’s long-term ambitions. Meanwhile, the Chinese were suspicious of Bush 
Administration officials’ assertion that China should not be seen as an adversary. The 
most sensitive issue between the two powers that has not yet been settled is the 
potentially explosive problem of Taiwan. Beijing continues to object to American 
interference in the Taiwan issue, such as US arms sales, closer military ties and 
commitment to Taiwan.17 The suspicion and differences of opinion between the US 
and China obstruct cooperation and increases rivalry between the two countries, as 
evidenced by the enduring scepticism of each other’s long-term intentions and 
persistent differences on sensitive issues.18                                                                                             
4.1.3 Theoretical Basis of Sino-American Relations 
In realist thought, a nation aims to advance its interests so as to maximise its 
benefits. The US national interest rests on preserving power, while for China, its 
                                                 
16 Nguyen Van Sanh, Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung Quốc đến 2020 [The Sino-American Relations till 2020] in 
Pham Binh Minh (eds), Cục diện Thế giới đến 2020 [Trans: The global Situation up to 2020], The 
National Politics Publisher, Hanoi, 2010, pp. 336-366. 
17  Glaser, B.S., ‘Sino-American Relations beyond September 11’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 
24(3), 2002, pp. 223-229, at 226-227. 
18 Glaser, ‘Sino-American Relations beyond September 11’, p. 227. 
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national interest is linked to expanding its influence. However, a US under pressure 
also understands that it is not in its national interests to pursue rivalry with China. 
Policies can be adjusted to maximise benefits. Clinton argued that “nations as well as 
individuals, act for their own benefit, and not for others, unless both interests happen 
to be assimilated.” 19  While China wishes to advance its emerging power, it is 
beneficial to cooperate with the US. China’s interest needs to be supported by a 
peaceful region to focus on its economic development. Nguyen argues that China 
views the relative decline of the US and Japan as an opportunity for its own rise, 
replacing Japan as the leading East Asian economy and grasping a leadership role in 
the region. At the same time, American economic woes have created a perception of 
waning global strength and have narrowed the capability gap between major powers. 
As a result, both China and the US find it difficult to maintain a policy of direct 
rivalry towards each other and, in the near future, China is still likely to accept the 
existing imbalance of power.20 China and the US have to cooperate with each other, 
as it benefits each power’s national interests. Realism and balance of power are 
reasonable tools to explain the theoretical basis for Sino-American interactions. 
Different strategic objectives and national ideologies are the main reasons for 
competition between China and the US. The US-China relationship is a competition 
between major powers over differences in economics, politics, culture and social 
values. Yan shows that after Barack Obama became US President, Beijing and 
Washington officials formulated the concept that the China-US bilateral relationship 
is the world’s most important relationship because of the level of conflicting interests 
rather than shared ones. 21  Shambaugh explained that China and the US have 
competing worldviews, divergent strategic interests, antithetical political systems, no 
intelligence sharing and attenuated military relations. 22  
                                                 
19  Clinton, W.D., The Two Faces of National Interest, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 
1994, p. 12. 
20 Nguyen Thai Yen Huong ‘Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung: Hợp tác và Cạnh tranh luận giải dưới góc độ Cân 
bằng quyền lực’ [Trans: The US-China relationship: Cooperation and Competition looking at the 
perspective of balance of power], pp. 118-119. 
21 Yan, X.T., ‘The Instability of China-US Relations’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(3), 
2010, pp. 263-292 at 270. 
22 Shambaugh, D., ‘Sino-American Strategic Relations: From partners to Competitors’, Survival, 
42(1), 2000, pp. 97-115 at 99. 
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Owing to these differences, the concept of “strategic competitors” describes 
Sino-American ties. Both sides can cooperate in some sectors while having 
competitive, and sometimes contentious, relations at the core. In East Asia, China 
and the US are vying for strategic pre-eminence and leadership. While China claims 
never to seek hegemony or domination over the Asia-Pacific region, it is not 
comfortable with current US regional security domination or multilateral security. 
The Chinese military is not inclined to tolerate either an indefinite US military 
presence or strategic American pre-eminence in the region. Moreover, the 
contradiction in national ideology also adds to the competitive feature in Sino-
American relations. Samuel Huntington sees the “clash of civilizations” as taking 
place between the advanced industrialized nations of the West and other models of 
development, including Confucian thought and culture in China. The major 
differences between the Western and Confucian models can be traced to historical 
experiences, cultural orientation, and political and social institutions. How US policy 
addresses these issues will either separate two powerful nations or bring them closer 
together.23  
These differences in national ideology have led to the pursuance of different 
objectives between China and the US. On the one hand, the American strategy is to 
promote American views of human rights and democracy worldwide as universal 
values. This use of soft power preserves American cultural influence in the world. 
On the other hand, due to its traditional influence in Asia as the largest and most 
populous power in the region, China has a stake in preserving Chinese culture and 
integrity.24 China is the largest socialist country in the world today and, in opposition 
with American views, looks at human rights as linked to stages of development. This 
situation causes mutual suspicion.25 China and the US face strategic competition in 
the regional and global race for national influence and power. 
                                                 
23 Weidenbaum, M., ‘The Future of Sino-American Relations’, Orbis, 43(2), 1999, pp. 223-235 at 
233. 
24 Nguyen, Thai Yen Huong ‘Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung: Hợp tác và Cạnh tranh luận giải dưới góc độ Cân 
bằng quyền lực’ [Trans: The US-China relationship: Cooperation and Competition looking at the 
perspective of balance of power], pp. 123-124. 
25 Tao, W.Z., ‘Sino-American Relations During the George W. Bush Administration’, American 
Foreign Policy Interests, 26(5), 2004, pp. 409-414 at 412. 
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4.1.4 Practical Basis of Sino-American Relations:  
Sino-American relations are also affected by globalization and regional 
integration. Nations all over the world today face common global issues, such as 
cyber security, trans-national crime, terrorism, pandemic diseases and climate 
change. Both China and the US are unlikely to resolve these problems unilaterally. 
All countries need to coordinate with one another to deal with these global issues.26 
Garrett argues that globalization has created a new “strategic independence” among 
globalizing states because they are becoming more dependent on maintaining, 
deepening and broadening economic ties with other states in an international system 
of peace and stability, so that economic relationships can develop. While states that 
have globalized successfully may become economic and political competitors in the 
future, it is unlikely they will enter a zero-sum game of strategic competition, as was 
the case of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Each state will find 
that the growth, prosperity and security of other states are crucial to its own security 
and economic well-being.27  
Therefore, China and the US need to cooperate with each other because it is 
in their national interest and benefit to do so. If China and the US cannot cooperate, 
then both powers will suffer. When the most powerful nation in the world can 
cooperate with the world’s most populous country, the result will be greater 
prosperity and stability throughout the world.28 Since the 1980s, China has been 
aware of the growing influence of economic interdependence and globalization in 
world politics. Not until the 1990s did the Chinese accept economic globalization as 
an irreversible trend, and that China should be adaptive. In a long-term strategy for 
increased wealth and power, China has integrated further into the world economy. Its 
bilateral relations with the US play an important role in this process.29 
                                                 
26 Interview Mrs. Le Khuong Thuy, Head of International Studies, Vietnam Institute of American 
Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 19 September 2012. 
27 Garrett, B., ‘Sino-American Relations in the Era of Globalization-A Framework for Analysis’, 
Procedia, Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2(5), 2010, pp. 7249-7267 at 7250. 
28 Irish, C.R. and Irish, R.W., ‘Misdirected Ire and Lost Opportunities: The False Crisis in Sino-
American Relations’, Journal of World Trade, 39(4), 2005, pp. 719-740 at 719. 
29 Lu, Y.C., ‘From Confrontation to Accommodation: China’s Policy toward the US in the Post-Cold 
War Era’, PhD Thesis, George Washington University, 2009, pp. 1-229 at 116. 
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The Sino-American relationship faces strategic competition because of their 
rivalry for influence over regional or international areas of concern, where Taiwan, 
East China Sea (Senkaku Islands) and South China Sea territorial disputes are among 
the most complicated problems. Tao argues that the Taiwan issue could undermine 
the whole bilateral relationship between China and the US. It could even lead to war 
between the two major powers.30 Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the 
US Defence Department is obligated to sell weapons of a defensive nature to 
Taiwan. The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is expected to participate 
in any conflict with China. The Taiwan issue is always a sensitive matter in Sino-
American relations. China views the return of Taiwan as a natural process following 
the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999. China does not hide its 
intention to use armed force if Taiwan declares independence. Meanwhile, Taiwan 
has exploited the situation to develop and broaden its international space to counter 
Chinese interests. In spite of objections from China, the Obama Administration 
approved US$6.4 billion in arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010.31  
Apart from Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea territorial 
disputes are another area of strategic competition. Wang argued that the South China 
Sea disputes are likely to be among one of the most serious challenges or troubles 
between China and the US in the future. In 2002, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister 
Li Zhaoxing described Taiwan as “a burden on the back of the U.S for more than half 
a century.” Conversely, Wang predicted that it is hard to imagine the South China 
Sea issue will be a burden on the back of the US for the next half century.32 Yee 
argues that the latest escalation of tensions in the East and South China Seas has 
drawn renewed attention to the possibility of conflict over the surrounding areas, and 
both China and the US have made public their intentions. The US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stated at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hanoi on 20 July 
2010 that: 
                                                 
30 Tao, W.Z., ‘Sino-American Relations During the George W. Bush Administration’, American 
Foreign Policy Interests, 26(5), 2004, pp. 409-414 at 412-413. 
31 Nguyen Thai  Yen Huong, ‘Quan hệ Mỹ-Trung: Hợp tác và Cạnh tranh luận giải dưới góc độ Cân 
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32 Wang, Y.W., ‘Rethinking the South China Sea Issue: A Perspective of the Sino-U.S. Relations ’, 
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The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, 
open access to Asian’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the 
South China Sea. The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by 
all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion.33  
For its part, China has asserted that the South China Sea is its core interest.34 
Thus, Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia is inevitable. 
4.2 Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era 
In order to address their national interests, China and the US have 
implemented various strategies in Southeast Asia. In an interview with the author, a 
leading Vietnamese scholar of Chinese studies likened the Sino-American 
relationship in Southeast Asia as a boat that goes against the current. The relationship 
is difficult to move quickly, but if it does not move forward, it is likely to move 
backward. The reason for this conundrum is the lack of mutual strategic trust 
between China and the US.35 As a result, the China-US relationship in Southeast 
Asia can benefit both powers and the region when it is in good standing, a win-win 
solution for all parties. Others employ a different maritime analogy, comparing the 
China-US long-term stable and cooperative relationship to a steamer sailing through 
rough seas, where the four elements of mutual trust/respect, institutionalization, 
transparency and mutual restraints in military build-up are viewed as the ballast that 
ensures the ship will not capsize when faced with huge storms and monstrous waves. 
The two sides need to make sure the relationship results in strategic benefits for both 
nations.36 
If, however, the Sino-American relationship develops into rivalry, then it is 
likely to turn into a zero-sum game for each side. Southeast Asia will be split into 
supporters of the US and supporters of China. An influential Indonesian 
                                                 
33 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at Press Availability, National Convention Center, Hanoi, 
Vietnam, 23 July 2010, http://m.state.gov/md145095.htm (Date of visit 25 August 2015) 
34 Yee, A., ‘Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the South China 
Sea and the East China Sea’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 40(2), 2011, pp. 165-193 at 166-167. 
35 Interview Prof. Dr. Do Tien Sam, Director of the Institute for Chinese studies, Vietnam Academy of 
Social Sciences on 19 September 2012. 
36 Dunn, L.A. (ed.), Building Toward a Stable and Cooperative Long-Term U.S.-China Strategic 
Relationship, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, 2012, pp. 1-139 at 21-24. 
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commentator noted that if this happens, ASEAN would be polarized, resulting in the 
marginalization of its roles as one of the pillars of architecture of East Asian 
security.37 Positive relations between China and America can stabilise and improve 
bilateral relations in Southeast Asia. During an economic downturn, it is essential to 
create a favourable environment for social stability and economic development. A 
more cooperative and stable strategic relationship between an established power and 
a rising power will make it easier to deal with today’s global economic, political, 
security, social and environmental challenges. On the one hand, this positive 
relationship will in turn benefit both powers in politics, economics and domestic 
priorities. By contrast, more confrontational and troubled strategic relations are likely 
to undermine the security and well-being of both powers. Thus, the significance of 
building a more stable and cooperative Sino-American relationship is well-
recognized as important, but a challenge for both China and the US today.38 A 
Chinese saying sums this up nicely: “Heze liangli, douze jushang” (合则两利斗则俱
伤) [Trans: “Cooperation brings benefits to both sides, Rivalry results in harm to 
both sides”]. According to Professor Do Tien Sam, a Vietnamese leading scholar on 
China, the Sino-American relationship in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era is 
described “Đấu nhi bất phá” [“Competition without a break in relations”], meaning 
competition exists, but has not come to rivalry as it did between the superpowers in 
the Cold War. Cooperation exists but has not yet resulted in a ‘G2’ (the US and 
China), although the Americans have proposed this.39 
The relationship between China and the US in Southeast Asia also suffers 
from instability and imbalance. This is because China is still far from being at the 
same level as the US in terms of its comprehensive strength. Being a global 
superpower, US foreign policy is framed by the idea that it is a power like none 
before – an American ‘exceptionalism.’ China watches US behaviour closely and 
carefully, calculating the impact on its own security and then responds accordingly. 
This imbalance between the two powers has contributed to instability and 
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unpredictability, to fluctuations and sometimes low points in China-US relations.40  
Yan argues that instability is an important feature of the China-US relationship and it 
embodies the superficial nature of that relationship. 41  The fluctuations in Sino-
American relations have indeed brought about significant implications for Southeast 
Asia, which will be addressed in chapter 7. 
For Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia, cooperation and competition 
as both “strategic partner” and “strategic competitor” are in co-existence for purposes 
of mutual development. There are certain spaces for competition between a rising 
power and a declining superpower. Simultaneously, when the emerging state has not 
yet achieved enough conditions to challenge the current hegemon, then cooperation 
between the two is another bilateral approach. Both sides will find opportunities for 
cooperation in addition to competition.  
From the Chinese perspectives, So and Kim argue that since the end of the 
Cold War, the nature of the US-China relationship is unclear. 42  It could be 
considered an unstable phase of bilateral relations. The reason mostly comes from an 
uncertain American strategic perception of China. Evidence of this uncertainty can 
be found in the meetings, dialogues, mediations, and cooperation of the American 
and Chinese governments on a range of regional and international issues, such as 
commerce, counter terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons. There is 
disagreement between the two powers regarding political systems, ideology, human 
rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North Korea, the South China Sea and Tibet. As the 
weaker partner in the relationship, China has no choice but to manage affairs in two 
ways: on the one hand, China supports and attends meetings, dialogues, and 
mediations to develop cooperative relations with the US, and, on the other hand, it is 
on high alert for American actions, including further westernization, secession of 
territories from the Chinese state and containment of Chinese power. 
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2010, pp. 263-292 at 266. 
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4.2.1 The Sino-American’s Competition in Southeast Asian Affairs 
4.2.1.1 In Security and Military affairs  
China and the US both consider Southeast Asia as an area of regional 
competition due to its strategic location in the Asia-Pacific. At the beginning of the 
post-Cold War era, when the US was forced to withdraw its troops and vacate its 
bases in the Philippines after the Philippine Congress refused to renew the leases on 
these bases, China moved to fill the gap in Southeast Asia to influence its southern 
neighbours. In the 1997 Asian financial crisis, while the US was late in assisting the 
region, China played a role as the key helper to its southern neighbours to spread its 
influence. Hung and Liu argued that the rise of China has made the Obama 
Administration see the need, in 2008, for the US to return to Southeast Asia.43  
While the US is making efforts to re-engage Southeast Asia by developing 
new partnerships with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, China is losing 
trust and confidence in the region because of the aggressive pursuits of its own 
claims in territorial disputes with the Southeast Asian states of Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The more aggressive China is in dealing with its 
southern neighbours, the more opportunity it brings for America in the region. 
Cabras argues that the first significant signal of US interests in Asian geopolitical 
space was the announcement by US President Obama in November 2011 to renew 
American presence in the Asia-Pacific. The US Marines’ presence was rotational and 
not permanent. It began with small numbers and will build up to 2,500 marines in 
future years to Darwin in northern Australia, just 500 miles from Indonesia. The US 
goal is to strengthen its alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines to 
protect American core interests across Asia. The number of US troops in the Asia-
Pacific will be over 80,000 with 2,500 in Australia, 50,000 in Japan and 28,000 in 
South Korea.44 
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The issue of the South China Sea effectively demonstrates the competition in 
security and military affairs between China and the US in Southeast Asia. While 
China considers the South China Sea as part of its core interests, the US has an 
interest in freedom of navigation with open access to Asia’s maritime routes. While 
China claims its indisputable sovereignty over islands, reefs and rocks above the sea 
surface, it also wants the sea area in which they are located, for access to potential 
natural resources. The US urges all concerned parties to respect international law in 
the South China Sea. While China is interested in dealing only with other claimant 
states to resolve the territorial disputes in the sea area, the US looks to ASEAN 
members, ARF participants and other maritime nations.45 Sovereignty over the South 
China Sea has become a point of competition between the two powers in the region.  
Wang explored the traditional balance of power theory and argued that the 
struggles among great powers are defined by every previous struggle over 
sovereignty. Regional disputes in modern times to some extent continue the past 
struggle between colonial powers, and the South China Sea is no exception. 
Southeast Asia used to be divided by powers such as Britain, France, Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Spain. Japan today has vital interests in the region with 70% of its 
oil carried on the sea-lanes through the South China Sea, but the US is currently 
viewed by ASEAN nations to be the principal deterrent to any outbreak of military 
hostilities. The US has made it clear to China that it will resist any attempt to 
interfere with international sea and air navigation rights through the South China 
Sea.46 Meanwhile, China views the South China Sea as an exclusively Chinese sea 
and claims nearly its entire territory. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi claimed: 
On the South China Sea, the position of the Chinese Government has been consistent 
and clear-cut. China has sovereignty over the islands on the South China Sea and their 
adjacent waters. There is plentiful historical and jurisprudential evidence for that.47 
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Emmers notes that among the islands in the territorial disputes between China 
and its ASEAN neighbours lies the Paracel and Spratly Islands at the centre of 
competing territorial, economic and strategic interests. If China were to realise its 
territorial claims, it will be able to extend its jurisdiction to the heart of Southeast 
Asia. Furthermore, if China can control the maritime communication routes, it could 
endanger the security interests of the US, Japan and other maritime powers that cross 
these waters.48  
Sutter argued that China’s harder line in military, diplomacy and other 
manoeuvres in the South China Sea territorial disputes has tarnished its image in 
Southeast Asia and raises the spectre of Sino-American military confrontation.49 
China can, however, give reason to the US to pay more attention to Southeast Asia, 
to protect its security interests. The US has stepped up its security presence in the 
region, including port-access arrangements in Southeast Asia and joint military 
exercises with the Philippines. While China has conducted ever larger naval 
exercises in the South China Sea in recent years without interference from the US, 
the American naval presence is designed to reassure regional states. Wang argued 
that American activities are aimed at setting up a “United Front” against China.50  
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi made remarks about the US goal to 
contain China by rebalancing its strategy with the region: 
Judging from some recent U.S. moves in the region, including the strengthening of 
military alliance with countries in the region, many people have come to the conclusion 
that the fundamental role of the strategy is to contain China and to thwart China’s 
development.51 
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4.2.1.2 Political and Influential Power  
In the 1990s, as the US downgraded the strategic importance of Southeast 
Asia, a new strategic reality has been evolving in Southeast Asia. China’s economic 
rise has taken place against a background of US foreign policy adventurism and its 
relative economic decline.52 China has adopted a ‘good neighbour’ policy towards its 
surrounding neighbours through the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” (heping 
gongcun wu yuanze 和平共存五原则) in its policy foundation for shaping a peaceful 
international environment. China has introduced its “five guidelines of regional 
cooperation” (quyuhezuo wuxiangzhidao 区域合作五项指导) and consensus to set 
aside problems. China has worked to resolve problems with Southeast Asian states 
through dialogues and negotiations. There has been an improvement in relations 
between China and Southeast Asian states. China entered as a consulting partner of 
the ARF in 1994 and became a dialogue partner the following year.53  
China has an economic influence over its southern neighbours. According to 
Petty, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, ASEAN’s poorest states, have remained in 
China’s orbit as a result of no-strings loans, desperately needed infrastructure 
development, military support and investment opportunities from Chinese 
companies. 54  Moreover, Beijing has strong economic ties with Singapore and 
Malaysia, and has been aggressively wooing Thailand, a traditional ally of America. 
The Director of Chulalongkorn University’s Institute of Security and International 
Studies, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, claims that Southeast Asia has been of geo-strategic 
value to China for centuries, as China has always had a major influence on the 
region.55 An article in The Economist in 2011, the mysteriously named R.G. argued 
that the government in Beijing has launched a charm offensive in Southeast Asia in 
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the last decade. By supporting Southeast Asian development through improved 
infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and hospital buildings, China became the 
largest trading partner of many countries in the region while the US “only whistled a 
lonesome single security-obsessed tune.”56 
Since 2008, the competition between China and the US for political influence 
in Southeast Asia has become increasingly tense due to conflicts of interest between 
the two powers. Both powers issued a joint statement at the conclusion of President 
Obama’s visit to Beijing for the Sino-American summit in November 2009. Both 
leaders agreed to consider each other’s core interests as extremely important to 
ensure a steady progress in US-China relations: 
The United States and China committed to work together to build a cooperative 
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit in order to promote the 
common interests of both countries and to address the 21st century’s opportunities and 
challenges.57 
 However, early the following year, the US sold arms to Taiwan and 
President Obama officially received the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, in the 
White House, causing anger in Beijing. Moreover, while the US has made efforts to 
urge all concerned parties in the South China Sea to respect international navigation, 
China responded that it would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea. 
For US analysts, this was the first time China identified the South China Sea as its 
core interest, along with Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang.58  
Petty explored Washington’s 2012 flurry of engagements with the 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam as a potential source of friction with 
China, especially as tempers flared over the territorial disputes and the rapid Chinese 
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military build-up in the South China Sea.59 The more tensions that China created in 
the territorial disputes, the more Southeast Asian states aimed to improve relations 
with the US, as a natural strategy of balancing powers. However, Southeast Asia is 
not edging closer to the US as a response to the rise of China. ASEAN’s policy is to 
engage all major powers for regional benefit. Rather, it is a matter of fact that 
China’s aggression has brought about the tendency for Southeast Asian states to 
improve their relations with the US.  
Carr asserts that China’s aggressive stance has backfired as it resulted in a 
series of recent maritime stand-offs with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. These 
escalations have made some Southeast Asian states nervous about China’s intentions 
and they are keen to improve relations with the US. Myanmar and Vietnam have 
complex bilateral relations with China and they have worked hard to rebuild their 
relationship with the US.60 Since 2010, occasional Chinese pronouncements on the 
South China Sea territorial disputes have sent Southeast Asian governments “rushing 
for the shelter of the American umbrella.” 61  Thayer has also claimed that the 
downturn of US relations with China contrasted with an upturn in American ties with 
Southeast Asia, as the Obama Administration continued to re-engage ASEAN states 
and developed new partnerships with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.62  
China’s military modernization and its increased assertiveness in the South 
China Sea have prompted Vietnam and other concerned ASEAN members to lobby 
the US to become more involved. The US responded by raising issues concerning the 
South China Sea at the 17th ARF meeting in Hanoi in 2010. The US intervention has 
provoked a hostile response from China and Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, left the forum angrily. In the 2011 East Asia Summit in Bali, Chinese 
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Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated that “outside forces should not, under any pretext” be 
involved in a regional dispute over the South China Sea. According to China, US 
interference in regional affairs, such as the South China Sea territorial disputes, 
worsen the issues. In March 2009, the US and China had clashed in the South China 
Sea as Chinese vessels warned the surveillance ship USNS Impeccable of conducting 
illegal operations and forced it out of the area. This clash proved the geo-strategic 
significance of the South China Sea to both China and the US.63 China has deployed 
nuclear attack submarines on Hainan Island, and they are likely to deploy nuclear 
ballistic submarines to its naval base on that island as well.  
4.2.1.3 Commercial and Economic Sectors  
Competition between China and the US in the commercial and economic 
sectors has been an unavoidable feature of Sino-American relations in Southeast 
Asia. Commerce represents a level of material power that can have a direct impact on 
the development of the relationship between the two powers. Southeast Asia has 
recently been of interest to major powers due to its expanding middle class and their 
growing purchasing power. China has attempted to develop with Southeast Asia a 
relationship for mutual benefit by funding various infrastructure projects, such as the 
Singapore-Kunming railway, the Kunming-Bangkok highway and the dredging of 
the Mekong River for navigation and trade. The growth rate of China-Southeast Asia 
commerce has been rapid, although in real terms, the size has been moderate relative 
to overall trade. Bilateral trade between China and ASEAN grew from US$42 billion 
in 2001 to US$231 billion in 2008.64 This growth rate is more rapid than Southeast 
Asia’s trade with the US. China is reportedly going to overtake the US as the largest 
market for most Southeast Asian countries.  
Southeast Asian trade with the US almost doubled between 1992 and 2001, 
from over US$66 billion to US$ 118 billion, generally to the advantage of Southeast 
Asia. Most of this trade, approximately 80%, takes place with maritime Southeast 
Asia. Chinese and American trade with Southeast Asia has resulted in their 
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intensified maritime coexistence in the region.65 Bilateral trade between China and 
ASEAN blossomed after the Asian financial crisis, and Chinese imports from 
ASEAN increased from US$12.4 billion in 1997 to US$154.6 billion in 2010. 
Chinese exports to ASEAN also increased from US$12.7 billion in 1997 to 
US$138.2 billion in 2010. Although ASEAN is only China’s fifth largest trading 
partner, fifth largest export market and third largest source of imports in 2005, 
China’s trade with ASEAN (US$202.5 billion) has surpassed trade between the US 
and ASEAN (US$171.7 billion) in 2007, making China the largest trading partner of 
ASEAN.66 Accordingly, the Southeast Asian market is very important to the Chinese 
economy, especially when in competition with the US to exploit the region’s 
potential.  
In contrast, the US is ASEAN’s fourth largest trading partner behind China, 
the EU and Japan. The US barely accounts for 10% of ASEAN’s total trade. In 2009, 
ASEAN imports from China contributed to 17% of total trade compared to the US at 
12%.67 Clearly, China enjoys an advantage in economic competition with the US in 
Southeast Asia. These advantages have built on China’s traditional influence over the 
Southeast Asia region. China is well on the way to ease regional concerns about any 
perceived “China Threat,” despite its recent aggressive claims in the South China 
Sea. While the US has not yet been afraid of China’s rise, China has been concerned 
with President Obama’s announcement of the achievement of the broad outlines of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, an Asia-Pacific regional trade 
agreement negotiated among the US and eight other partners, including Australia, 
Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. A viable TPP 
might exclude China and Russia from a proposed free trade regional area in Asia-
Pacific, with a related market of 500 million consumers.68 
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In general, Sino-American competition in Southeast Asian affairs shows the 
nature of interactions between the most two powerful nations on earth. As a dynamic 
region in the Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asia has been, and will continue to be, the 
testing ground for Sino-American relations in the new century because of the impact 
of China’s rise. Competition between Beijing and Washington is inevitable. The 
American rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific can be regarded as the very 
first step toward a clear set of US foreign policies in Southeast Asia that position 
China as the central concern.69 
4.2.2 Sino-American Cooperation in Southeast Asian Affairs 
The new dynamic feature of the regional situation in the post-Cold War era 
has led to greater Chinese and American cooperation to pursue each power’s national 
interests. In 2011, US President Barack Obama addressed the Australian Parliament 
and he said: 
The United States remains the world’s largest and most dynamic economy. But in an 
interconnected world, we all rise and fall together…. Meanwhile, the United States will 
continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with China.70 
Consequently, as the globe’s leading powers, the US and China also found 
room for bilateral cooperation in addition to a level of competition. 71 From the 
Chinese perspectives, So and Kim argue that since the 1990s, China has carried out a 
strategy to establish and develop a “healthy and stable” relationship with the US to 
stabilize and nurture Sino-American relations.72  This is the target that China’s third 
leadership generation adopted from 1989 to 2001. Prior to the official visit of 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to the US, the two states disagreed over Most 
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Favoured Nations trading status (MFN), human rights, Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan 
and even the issue of Chinese participation in the WTO. However, the two countries 
have made efforts to control bilateral relations so as not to become comprehensively 
hostile and antagonistic. Despite the difficulties in Sino-American relations, China 
has made many efforts to develop a “healthy and stable” relationship with the US. 
Cooperation without rivalry has become the long-term strategy of China towards the 
US. This tactic has both specific and general characteristics, demonstrating a basic 
difference between post-Cold War era Sino-American relations and those of the Cold 
War.  
From the American perspective, Sino-American relations have been positive 
since 2001, but both powers are now building up a more constructive bilateral 
relationship.73 There have been a number of initiatives by the Obama Administration 
for US-China cooperation, such as the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 
and the Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE). As Chinese Vice Premier 
Liu claimed: 
The CPE together with political mutual trust and business ties are intertwined and 
reinforcing each other. Since 2010 when the CPE mechanisms was established, China 
and the United States have held five rounds of consultations and achieved nearly 300 
concrete deliverables. I’m happy to see that that people-to-people exchange between 
our two countries today has expanded to cover more areas, as Vice President Biden 
said-that the CPE from four major areas add to the first round of the consultation now 
covers seven areas.74 
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4.2.2.1 Security and Military affairs  
Both powers have shown clearer co-ordination in security and military affairs 
in the aftermath of 9/11. While the relationship between China and the US was 
turbulent between 1991 and 2001, it improved after 2001 during the Bush 
Administration through economic cooperation and anti-terrorism efforts.75 On the 
basis of interdependence, China and the US have found it necessary to cooperate 
with each other in security and military affairs in Southeast Asia. Chinese and 
American military cooperation is focused on three areas – strategic dialogue, 
reciprocal exchanges in functional areas and arms sales. As of today, there has been 
more than sixty annual official dialogues between the US and China to discuss 
strategic and military issues.76  
The US aims for further engagement in military cooperation with China 
through confidence building. The US also participates in military exchanges and 
joint exercises in a bid to engage China as a partner in global defence issues. 
Through cooperation on humanitarian activities and regional security, the US seeks 
to have China integrated as a dependable member of the Asia-Pacific community and 
a more involved member of the world community, following the same principles and 
norms that the US and its allies follow.77 This is the fundamental basis for a close 
cooperation between China and the US, although it is easier to understand in theory 
than in practice. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with the US 
Secretary of State John Kerry before their bilateral meeting at the State Department 
in Washington on 19 September 2013, his statement mentioned a new model of Sino-
American relations with no conflict or confrontation, only mutual respect to achieve 
a win-win outcome. The historical basis for this proposal came from the 
identification of 15 cases of rising emerging powers, and in 11 of those instances, 
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confrontation and war had broken out between the emerging and the established 
power.78  
This is also the new proposal of Chinese foreign policy in Sino-American 
relations, where “cooperation and a win-win approach” is an important result of 
China’s diplomatic approach and a core result of China’s peaceful development path 
and new international relations. The phrase “win-win solution” has been mentioned 
in both the White Paper, China’s Peaceful Development, released in 2011 and in 
Chinese leaders’ statements at international fora about the principle and spirit of 
“sailing the same boat, cooperation and win-win approach.” 79  
Although China and the US differ greatly in foreign policy, objectives and 
concepts, the two countries still have broad common interests. Therefore, exploring 
the avenues for promoting win-win cooperation between the two countries has a 
practical significance for combining China’s new diplomatic theory with its 
practice.80As President Obama stated about US-China relations: 
Inevitably, there are areas of tension between our two countries, but what I’ve learned 
over the last four years is both the Chinese people and the American people want a 
strong, cooperative relationship, and that I think there’s a strong recognition on the 
path of both President Xi and myself that it is very much of our interest to work 
together to meet the global challenges that we face.81 
The cooperation of China and the US when approaching Southeast Asian 
affairs is shown clearly in the strategies of both powers over the South China Sea 
territorial disputes. Since 2009, China has become more assertive in this sea area 
through moves like an expansion of its annual unilateral fishing ban in 2009, the 
continuance of regular maritime security patrols by the Chinese Fisheries 
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Administration and State Oceanographic Administration, and through an expansion 
of scientific activities as well as other naval exercises in the South China Sea. 
Moreover, China’s submission of its “nine-dashed line” claim in the South China Sea 
to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) 
that same year provoked further concerns. Those two incidents in 2009, together with 
Chinese harassment of US surveillance ships in the South China Sea have heightened 
American fears about a probable accidental escalation due to Chinese challenges to 
freedom of navigation. China has not only placed the South China Sea within its core 
interests, the US also claims to have vital interests in maintaining stability, freedom 
of navigation and the right to lawful commercial activities in this sea.82  
In this situation, when both powers have strategic interests in the South China 
Sea, it is reasonable that they will experience tensions or competition in achieving 
their differing national interests. However, together with strategic competition over 
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, both China and the US also made 
efforts to cooperate with each other, as much as possible, for regional stability. Both 
powers fully understand how costly and devastating a war can be, as well as how 
harmful a rivalry could be. As a result, there exists room for cooperation between 
these two powers in resolving this dispute. Since 2010, there is evidence that greater 
US involvement in the South China Sea issue has successfully persuaded Beijing to 
reconsider its policy and return to a more accommodating stance.83  
After the ARF, Chinese officials ceased referring to the South China Sea as a 
core interest in meetings with American counterparts. Beijing dispatched Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun to key ASEAN capitals to listen to their 
concerns, and reassured them about China’s peaceful intentions. Consequently, by 
September 2010, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines stated that China had 
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initiated discussions at the working level with other parties concerned to draw up a 
code of conduct and it is open to different formulas and initiatives in preserving 
peace, prosperity and stability in the region.84  
Furthermore, at the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in 
Hanoi in October 2010, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie responded calmly 
to US counterpart Robert Gate’s reiteration of Hilary Clinton’s ARF comments on 
the South China Sea, opting to use the opportunity to reassure the region that China’s 
military is not challenging or threatening anyone, but is defensive in nature. During 
his trip to Singapore in November 2010, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping stated 
that a “prosperous and stable China does not pose a threat to any country, and it only 
means more development opportunities for other countries.”85 
4.2.2.2 Politics and influential power  
In the modern era of interdependence and integration, both China and the US 
find cooperation with each other more beneficial than mutual rivalry. The declining 
power status of the US does not allow it to pursue a hard line policy of rivalry against 
the Asian giant. Meanwhile, China’s rising regional power is not strong enough to 
challenge US hegemony. As So and Kim explained, while most of the American high 
ranking political officials, including President George W. Bush and Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, often stressed that the Sino-American relationship is 
“complicated and immense,” with Chinese leaders recognizing a number of existing 
disagreements in their bilateral ties, both sides have many mutual concerns. Sino-
American relations should be viewed and resolved at a high strategic and 
comprehensive level.86  
Other evidence of the relationship can be found in the 8th official meeting of 
Chinese President Hu Jintao and American President Barack Obama in January 
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2011. A second US-China Joint Statement expressed the wish for both countries to 
establish “cooperative economic partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefits to 
both countries and to the global economy.”87 It reduced the tensions between the two 
powers and strengthened relations. 
Compared to the 2009 Sino-American Joint Declaration, when the two 
powers wished to develop a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive US-China 
relationship,”88 it is clear that China and the US have achieved remarkable progress 
in their current commitment.89 Consequently, in addition to its strategic competition 
in the Asia-Pacific, the Sino-American relationship is also characterised by 
cooperation to benefit each other. In his speech to the Australian Parliament, US 
President Obama reiterated the importance of Sino-American cooperation with 
reference to Washington’s recognition of Beijing’s balancing role in the Asia-
Pacific: 
We’ve seen that China can be a partner, from reducing tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula preventing proliferation. We’ll seek more opportunities for cooperation with 
Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to promote 
understanding and avoid miscalculation.90 
Both powers have played down talk of a geostrategic rivalry in Southeast Asia. 
Instead, they have welcomed each other’s presence and seek to allay fears in ASEAN 
about the negative effect of their influence in the region.91 The author argues that due 
to ASEAN’s balance of power strategy, the two powers can gain more beneficial 
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advantages if they cooperate in a win-win solution, rather than compete for a zero-
sum game result. For China, its crucial motivation is to actively participate in 
regional and international mechanisms organised by ASEAN so as to reduce 
Southeast Asian neighbours’ suspicion of “the China Threat.” Clearly, these 
multilateral fora, especially the cooperation in “10+1,” has created room for China 
and ASEAN to resolve the current impasse over the South China Sea territorial 
disputes, and to provide a means to engage on potential or newly emerging problems, 
such as bilateral economic competition. As a result, there is progress in the 
discussion over the South China Sea and the trust building measures that China 
applied in ASEAN have increased gradually along with ASEAN’s trust of the 
regional power.92 Moreover, China is making efforts to take advantage of ASEAN’s 
belief in many engagements on a number of fronts to ease Southeast Asian states’ 
concerns over Chinese “hegemony.”  
As Japan was busy with domestic economic recovery and the US with wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, China had seized its chance in Southeast Asia. However, as 
China has found it impossible to replace the dominant position of the US in the 
region, its foreign policy has been to avoid rivalry with the US and enhance bilateral 
cooperation. One tendency in the current Chinese peaceful development strategy is to 
encourage Southeast Asia and economic partners to participate in economic and 
political cooperation at the continental level for peace, order and security.93 
4.2.2.3 Socio-economic sectors  
The Sino-American relationship is particularly complex due to economic 
interdependence: both sides need each other for the health of their own economies. In 
Southeast Asia this manifests itself as peaceful economic development and stability 
enhancement for both the region and the two powers. Sharma argues that China 
needs the US even more than the US needs China. The US is the world’s largest 
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debtor and China is the world’s leading creditor, when the debts become too massive, 
there are always more risks for the creditor.94  
There is a popular saying that “if you owe the bank a thousand dollars you 
worry, but if you owe the bank a million dollars, the bank worries.”95 This economic 
interdependence might define the Sino-American relationship in Southeast Asia in 
two ways. On the one hand, if Sino-American rivalry escalates, and ASEAN 
members split into China-deferring and China-defying camps, this could ruin the 
group’s ability to lead. On the other hand, a peaceful balance of power between 
Beijing and Washington could give ASEAN room to operate independently between 
the two.96  
Cooperation between China and the US in Southeast Asia also brings socio-
economic benefits for the two powers and the region. Both the US and ASEAN states 
face a similar dilemma with respect to China: while they have tight economic 
linkages with Beijing, they still worry about Chinese future intentions as its material 
power grows together with the increased display of Chinese assertiveness. Both 
ASEAN and the US believe extreme approaches are not the answer to the problem. 
Adopting a purely offensive posture prematurely creates a self-fulfilling prophecy 
that could precipitate another Cold War-like confrontation. In contrast, appeasing 
China could risk undermining the territorial integrity of ASEAN states and the global 
standing of American values. Thus, a more nuanced approach involves the 
“Goldilocks Zone” – neither “too hot” nor “too cold” but “just right.”97 Cooperation 
with Beijing is possible, but confrontation with Beijing is likely on issues that the US 
takes a firm stand. This is the way to preserve US interests and ideals, while taking 
into account the needs of American allies.98 The current approach of Southeast Asia 
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to the US should not be seen as an answer to cope with a rising China. It is ASEAN’s 
way to balance power, although this policy is flexible enough to adjust to different 
circumstances. 
In addition, Sarith argues that if the situation arises when China and the US 
need each other to achieve a strategic balance of power in Southeast Asia, ASEAN 
can benefit from the mechanisms of regional cooperation. If the US extends its 
security umbrella and leads the region economically through multilateral forums, 
ASEAN nations would likely sign up to US-led multilateral agreements, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) 
initiatives, with a view to diversify their export markets and increase US FDI flow 
into the region. Currently, four members of ASEAN, namely Singapore, Brunei, 
Malaysia and Vietnam are participating in TPP negotiations. Since the US needs a 
strategic balance with China, ASEAN can benefit from these initiatives. ASEAN 
member states, too, need closer strategic relations with the US in order to counter 
China’s influence, especially on the South China Sea territorial disputes.99 
4.3 The Development of Post-Cold War Sino-American Relations in Southeast 
Asia 
4.3.1 Sino-American Relations in Southeast Asia from 1989-2000 
In the first period after the Cold War during the Bush Administration, the 
Sino-American relationship experienced a level of sensitivity in which both powers 
carried out a preventive policy towards each other. Saunders has argued that in the 
aftermath of the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the US quickly turned to 
economic sanctions to punish the Chinese government for killing protesters and 
applying pressure on the Chinese government to remove martial law and improve 
human rights conditions. 100  Yan Xuetong notes that right after the June 1989 
demonstration, the US imposed sanctions on China in an act that the Chinese and 
American Governments understood marked the end of their friendship. However, 
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with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, neither side was ready for such a 
sudden change. Improving bilateral relations has since been the principal policy. 
While pretending to be friends,  China and the US were “neither-friend-nor-enemy” (
非敌非友: fei di fei you). The nature of Sino-American relations at this time has been 
described as same bed, different dreams.101  
During the Clinton Administration, US constructive engagement policy added 
tensions to the bilateral relationship. Hương argues that the US made propaganda 
about the “China Threat” and launched various strategies to dominate China in 
various sectors, from religion, to human rights and commerce. For the first time in 
more than forty years since the Korean War, the US brought two carrier Task Forces 
to the Taiwan Strait to warn China, and to support the presidential election in Taiwan 
in March 1996. The US had responded to China’s firing of ballistic missiles into the 
Taiwan Strait to intimate Taiwanese voters. 
Back then, the US considered China, with its economic ascension and 
military expansion, as the main challenger to the US in the coming decades.102 These 
tensions between China and the US are a natural feature of the relationship and are 
the result of regional bi-polarity. Tow has claimed that China is the dominant land 
power while the US is the primary maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region. These 
two nations are the only regional key players that own sufficient materials as well as 
the non-material means to competitively project power into the Asia-Pacific. Thus, 
the relationship between China and the US will inevitably be a competitive one and 
this is reflected in the Sino-American rivalry in Southeast Asia. With a view 
countering a US-dominated security regime in Southeast Asia, China has actively 
promoted new security concepts at both bilateral and multilateral levels with its 
southern neighbours.103  
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In the early 1990s, the US neglected Southeast Asia and paid more attention 
to other areas in the world, giving China the opportunity to get closer to its Southeast 
Asian neighbours. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the eventual closure of 
US military bases in the Philippines gave ASEAN countries some concerns about 
American future commitment. It gave China an opportunity to seek long-term 
interests in regional politics. Accordingly, China established and developed its 
relationship with ASEAN in the 1990s and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN 
in 1996. Although suffering from regional disputes over the islands, reefs and rocks 
in the South China Sea, the nature of China-ASEAN relations evolved from one 
based largely on bilateral relations to a multilateral relationship built on expanded 
areas of cooperation.104 
 From 1997 to 2000, the Sino-American relationship underwent some policy 
adjustments as the Clinton Administration came to regard China as a strategic 
partner. After 1989, China and the US did not hold a summit until October 1997, 
when President Jiang and President Clinton issued a joint statement committing both 
nations to establish a constructive strategic partnership in the 21st century.105 The 
China-US Joint Statement clearly states: 
The two Presidents agree that a sound and stable relationship between China an the 
United States serves the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and the American 
peoples and is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to work for peace 
and prosperity in the 21st century.106 
This move marked a crucial landmark in Sino-American relations in the 
second half of the Clinton Administration. From a Chinese perspective, the Clinton 
visit was a symbolic achievement as he was the first US President to visit China in 
the nine years since the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, indicating a full diplomatic “re-
normalization” between the two countries.107 Until then, the US was considered a 
                                                 
104 Khan, R.M. ‘Sino-U.S. Rivalry in Southeast Asia’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 11(3), Fall 2012, pp. 
95-104 at 97-100 
105 Yan, X.T., ‘The Instability of China-US Relations’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 
3(3), 2010, pp. 263-292 at 267. 
106 China-U.S. Join Statement, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zysj/jzxfm/t36249.htm (Date 
of visit 26 July 2015) 
107 Lu, Y.C., ‘From Confrontation to Accommodation: China’s Policy toward the US in the Post-Cold 
War Era’, PhD Thesis, George Washington University, 2009, pp. 1-229 at 100. 
 
162 
 
political and security threat to China’s stability and development because of the crisis 
in the Taiwan Straits. However, there was a positive result from the second summit 
as the US reiterated the “three noes” policy to China: no support to Taiwanese 
independence, no support for “two Chinas” and no support for Taiwan’s membership 
in an international organization requiring that states only are members.108 
 The Sino-American relationship went through a period of relative friction 
during the 2000 US election, when the US considered China a competitor more than 
partner. Presidential candidate George W. Bush initially defined China as a “strategic 
partner” during his campaign, but still insisted on protecting American firms’ 
interests over disagreements with China. The discord between the two powers 
remained during Bush’s presidency, due mainly to his support for a pro-separatist 
Taiwan, religious freedom and the provocative national missile defence system.109 
Phạm Cao Cường argues that unlike the previous US administrations, George W. 
Bush took a hard line in foreign policy and adopted unilateral approaches in dealing 
with international relations. As a result, the US under the Bush Administration 
regarded China a “potential competitor” rather than a “potential partner.”110 
The Sino-American relationship from 1989 to 2000 went through periods of 
cooperation and discord. This characteristic has significant impacts for Southeast 
Asian nations. Despite the initial neglect, the US is still the dominant superpower in 
the region. China has not become the most influential regional power and Southeast 
Asia has enjoyed stability and peace. Goh has claimed that East Asia has remained 
stable since 1990 largely due to the US being able to maintain its alliances by 
maintain a deep economic and strategic involvement in the region. Major conflicts 
were avoided partly because China chose not to aggressively challenge the status 
quo.111  
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4.3.2 Sino-American Interactions in Southeast Asia (2001-2008) 
Despite tough competition at the beginning of the Bush Administration when 
the US considered China a strategic competitor, Sino-American ties went through a 
dramatic transition when both powers chose to cooperate from 2001 to 2008. Both 
powers had to deal with global issues that became prominent after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the US. Hribernik argues that the 9/11 attacks influenced and improved the 
relationship between China and the US. Criticism of China within the US subsided 
and Beijing began to support Washington more strongly in the war on terror. Both 
China and the US recognized the benefits of cooperation in security as each side 
ensured non-interference or even outright cooperation.112 Although China was the 
fourth largest trading partner of the US, the new Bush Administration took a hard 
line against China in early 2001 over the collision between a Chinese F-8 fighter and 
an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft. The Chinese had demanded an official 
apology for the death of the Chinese pilot but the American refusal to do so led to 
more tensions in Sino-American ties. 113 American policy towards China, however, 
changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and resulted in a more stable Sino-American 
relationship between 2001 and 2008.  
The reason for this relative cooperation between China and America in the 
aftermath of 9/11 attacks comes from the changing situation. Lu concluded that the 
September 11 incidents provided another point of cooperation for the two nations. In 
the aftermath of September 11, President Bush’s visit to Shanghai for the APEC 
Summit Meeting in October 2011 marked a milestone in bilateral relations for the 
two powers. The US had committed its willingness to develop constructive and 
cooperative relations with China, a positive response to China’s support for the 
American anti-terrorism campaign.114  
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When cooperation can bring about benefits, China and the US will cooperate. 
In this regard, China’s cooperation is crucial due to China’s position as a major 
power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The US also needs 
China’s cooperation in dealing with global issues, such as proliferation of weapons, 
transnational crime, and human and drug trafficking.115  However, the temporary 
cooperation between China and the US from 2001 to 2008 did not mean the end of 
uncertainty and instability in the relationship.  
Hribernik recognized that the age of uncertainty in bilateral relations between 
China and the US continues presently. The US had expressed its concern over the 
actual extent of China’s commitment to the struggle against terrorism given the 
appearance of Chinese weapons in Afghanistan. 116  There have also emerged a 
number of other problems, such as US trade sanctions, criticism of China’s internet 
restrictions and its continued human rights abuses, controversy over US arms sale to 
Taiwan or President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, as well as America’s 
pivot to Asia-Pacific with the rotational presence of US troops in Australia.117  
The Sino-American relationship, like any other international relationship, is 
carried out on the basis of national interest. In Southeast Asia, the improvement in 
Sino-American relations stemming from 9/11 was not strong enough to overcome 
differences between the two powers. For much of East and Southeast Asia, the US 
focus on terrorism and related international security issues contrasted sharply and 
unfavourably with Beijing’s emphasis on economic matters. While the US focussed 
on issues that regional governments considered as secondary to growth and 
development, China engaged them directly on economic interests. When Washington 
pressed cooperation in the war on terror, and sometimes criticised its counterparts for 
lacking skills or techniques, Beijing pursued a free trade area with ASEAN states, or 
it made efforts to ensure that China’s economic ascension was more of an 
opportunity than a threat. As a result, Chinese success in economic development and 
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social stability was talked about as the “China Model.” US anti-terrorism strategies 
have been perceived as anti-Islamic, which furthered tarnished US soft power.118  
Jia Qingguo has argued that cooperation between China and the US does not 
mean their differences will disappear. They will continue to differ, as there are 
unresolved issues, such as human rights, the pace of modernization, the meaning of 
free and fair trade, the role of international organizations and the Taiwan issue. 
However, sharing the same global problems, such as terrorism, increasing the level 
of bilateral cooperation and assuming a greater role in world affairs will make both 
powers find more constructive methods to deal with these problems.119 
4.3.3 The Sino-American Relations in Southeast Asia since 2008 upwards 
By 2008 the Sino-American relationship had reached a pivotal point. China’s 
ascension has been recognised globally after the global financial crisis, and this 
coincided with China’s ambition to use Southeast Asia as the buffer zone for its 
global strategy of international engagement. The US also launched a strategy of 
rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. Conflicting interests have drawn China and the 
US into strategic competition in Southeast Asia in spite of the level of cooperation 
outside the region. China’s rise could be seen as a challenge to the status quo of the 
US as a superpower. Sino-American competition could be a threat to Southeast Asia 
in territorial disputes and an opportunity for regional economic development.120  
Southeast Asia has been squeezed between a rock and a hard place. While 
China’s economic rise is the main reason to shift US power to Asia, it was the Asian 
financial crisis that served as a turning point for China’s rise, as Southeast Asian 
states began to develop a more favourable perception of Beijing. China’s growing 
relationship with the region directly affects American interests there because China’s 
rise means the US is no longer the sole protector or lender.  
Utilising realism’s power transition theory, the international system is most 
unstable when the distribution of power changes. Thus, future Chinese growth 
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remains a concern for regional stability. Southeast Asia, therefore, serves as a testing 
ground for China’s increasing influence and an early warning on how US foreign 
policy will respond.121 Southeast Asia has grown in importance for both China and 
the US, especially after 9/11. The two powers have attempted to cooperate actively 
with the region in their competition for influence in Southeast Asia. After 2009, the 
US adopted a regional approach and institutionalised its cooperation with ASEAN 
once again. The 2009 ASEAN-US Summit laid the foundation for a renewed 
relationship. The US also strengthened its relationship with ASEAN and East Asian 
countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.  
Recently, Vietnam and Indonesia have also developed stronger defence ties 
with the US but the depth of these defence ties varies greatly between Indonesia 
(which is a major step up in relations following the end of the Suharto era) and 
Vietnam (where the defence ties are nascent).122 The adjusted US strategy to bring 
Southeast Asia back onto its radar is aimed at controlling the rise of China. With 
China’s growing influence, the US has begun to pay more attention to Southeast 
Asia, and China’s ascension has caused Washington to initiate a set of strategies 
focused on Beijing’s potential challenge to its strategic interests in Asia.123 The re-
engagement of the US with ASEAN is regarded as a response to a rising China, 
whose influence is increasingly felt beyond its borders, particularly in Southeast 
Asia.124 
 In general, Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia include both 
cooperation and competition. Jian and Rouben note a report in China’s influential 
Liaowang Weekly that China expects that Chinese and American interests will 
become increasingly intertwined and that the cooperation between the two countries 
will continue to develop. At the same time, it is imperative for the two sides to face 
their disagreements and conflicts. Occasional frictions and tensions do occur in the 
development of bilateral relations but war would be detrimental to both parties. 
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Consequently, cooperation and friction will continue to characterise the most 
important bilateral relationship in the globe today.125 
4.4 Implications for Southeast Asia 
4.4.1 Impacts 
There are pros and cons in the post-Cold War Sino-American relations for 
Southeast Asia. The positive effects can be achieved only when China and America 
cooperate well with each other in Southeast Asian affairs. On the contrary, if the 
Beijing-Washington relationship suffers from a strategic rivalry, then there will be 
negative impacts. In terms of advantageous impacts, this relationship has created 
economic dynamism for the regional situation. This dynamic development is an 
essential essence for a regional mechanism like ASEAN to grow and mature. This 
will be a considerable achievement given the turbulence that was once present at the 
birth of the ASEAN community.  
After more than forty years, ASEAN has become a successful example of 
regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Jetschke argues that since its establishment 
in 1967, “ASEAN is the most successful regional organisation among development 
countries.” 126  Through a number of multilateral security forums and regional 
cooperation mechanisms, ASEAN has succeeded in enlarging and consolidating the 
relationship between itself and outside dialogue partners, including major powers. 
The ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) was established in the 1990s for 
ASEAN to conduct dialogues with outside partners. ASEAN’s dialogue partners 
have been expanded to include China, South Korea, India and Russia, in addition to 
its partners in the early post-Cold War period, such as the US, the EU, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand.  
The next step was the foundation of ARF in 1994, which quickly became an 
effective consultative forum in the Asia-Pacific to enlarge dialogues on regional 
political and security issues. Another regional achievement followed with the 
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establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. In 1997, ASEAN 
proposed to hold the ASEAN +3, which included all ASEAN state members, plus 
Japan, South Korea and China. Since its institutionalisation at Singapore in 2000, 
ASEAN+3 has started to develop East Asia integration, and it paved the way to 
officially start an East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005. Later, in response to the U.S. 
strategy of rebalancing to Southeast Asia, and amid a rising and assertive China with 
efforts to resolve the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN successfully 
held the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in Hanoi in 2010. 
The meeting was a remarkable example of ASEAN’s balance of power strategy, with 
the attendance of Ministers of Defence from ASEAN states, the US, Russia, China, 
Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, to discuss Southeast Asian 
security issues.127  
The other positive impact from Chinese and American interactions in 
Southeast Asia is to bring about a higher international profile for ASEAN as a 
regional cooperation mechanism, and to position Southeast Asia as an important sub-
region of the Asia-Pacific. When ASEAN becomes the focus of the world’s leading 
powers, there will emerge conditions conducive for ASEAN to enhance bilateral 
relations with China and the US. In this way, ASEAN has created its own regional 
reputation in the globalised world as a positive destination for investment, tourism, 
education and other socio-economic developments. Finally, the Sino-American 
interactions in Southeast Asia are likely to bring about stability and security to the 
region. China’s amazing economic development can lead to greater political 
influence and military enhancement. This trend has, however, concerned ASEAN 
states and as a result, ASEAN had to enhance its bilateral relations with the US to 
counter the influence of China. As a result, China’s greater influence in the region 
creates greater influence for the US in Southeast Asia. This development is in line 
with ASEAN’s long-term strategy and policy to invite all great powers to play roles 
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in the region. In ASEAN’s perception, the more powers appear in the region, the less 
possibility exists for one dominant power to overwhelm other regional powers.128 
In terms of disadvantages, there are a number of worries for regional 
instability and insecurity if China and the US confront each other in the regional 
arena of Southeast Asia. Firstly, ASEAN’s centrality will be affected, as member 
states are likely to be polarized because of different national interests. Some 
countries are very close to China because of their economic dependence. Others are 
already very clearly in the camp of American allies: the Philippines, Thailand and 
Singapore. Then there are countries that choose to adopt a neutral stand, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. In that situation, ASEAN will be less effective. If 
ASEAN can no longer maintain its strategic centrality then ASEAN will become less 
relevant as the different alignments could split the organisation. Southeast Asia risks 
becoming polarised and this will undermine ASEAN unity and centrality. These are 
the possibilities and challenges of growing Sino-American rivalry on ASEAN.129 The 
China-US rivalry is also likely to affect ASEAN’s unity if this region becomes an 
object of major power competition. America’s “pivot to Asia” and deployment of 
naval power back to the Asia-Pacific has resulted in an escalating rivalry with China. 
Being closer to either side is considered harmful to ASEAN’s unity and centrality. 
Any change in the balance of power in ASEAN will have adverse consequences, 
including the threat of an end to ASEAN solidarity since its establishment in 1967.130  
4.4.2 Recommendations 
In the short term, ASEAN should continue its efforts towards a skilful 
balancing of the influence of China and the US. ASEAN should attempt to ensure 
that major powers will neither fight nor confront each other in the region. ASEAN 
should at least adjust its own policies so as not to make them adopt rival positions. 
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This approach can be achieved either through unilateral or multilateral, individual or 
collective cooperation together within the ASEAN framework.131 
In the long term, preserving ASEAN’s integrity, centrality and unity is the 
key for the region in international relations. Southeast Asia will be strong and 
confident in its relations with great powers only when the regional states act more 
cohesively together. Unity and centrality have led to success and increased strength 
for ASEAN throughout its development. The ASEAN Charter states that ASEAN’s 
purpose is “to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary 
driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional 
architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.” 132  This guideline is also a 
practical recommendation for the relationship between ASEAN with China and the 
US. ASEAN enthusiasts would prefer to safeguard “ASEAN centrality” in order to 
balance itself between China and the US. ASEAN knows that being too close to 
China or the US will be harmful to its unity, but it can maintain its centrality by 
using the “ASEAN way” of consultation and consensus to accommodate all the 
voices and needs of its members. The fear of domination by major powers may 
prompt ASEAN to strengthen itself and maintain unity, safeguard the consensus 
principle and engage more carefully with regional powers. Through the “ASEAN 
way,” the association can take into account the interests of all parties.133  
The next chapter investigates the characteristics of the triangular relationship 
between Vietnam, China and the US. It explores the basis and context of the 
relationship, with an analysis of Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the US 
from 1991 to 2001. Chapter 6 will explore the same relationship, but from 2001 to 
2015. Both chapters will illustrate Vietnam’s dilemma of being caught in between 
China and the US in the post-Cold War period. 
                                                 
131 Interview Rizal Sukma, 12 June 2012. 
132 ASEAN Charter, chapter 1 “Purposes and Principles”, Article 1.15, p. 5 
133 Sarith, ‘ASEAN: between China and America’. 
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CHAPTER 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRIANGULAR VIETNAM, 
CHINA, AND THE US RELATIONSHIP 
  
 
This chapter will question the view that Vietnam is getting closer to the US 
rather than China after normalizing bilateral ties with both countries. Vietnam’s 
objective in its relationship with China is to seek friendship and friendly 
neighbourliness. It aims to move in the direction of bilateral cooperation for the 
mutual benefit of the two nations. The Vietnamese attach great importance to the 
comprehensive partnership with the US in the spirit of putting the past behind, 
overcoming differences, promoting common interests and looking towards the future. 
For both Vietnam and the US, the aim is for peace, stability, cooperation and 
prosperity in Southeast Asia. The main argument of this chapter is that Vietnam 
suffers from a geopolitical dilemma between China and the US. It will be better for 
Vietnam to keep both China and the US engaged in Southeast Asia. Vietnam also 
welcomes a good relationship between China and the US for peace, stability and 
development in the region. 
5.1 Basis of the Triangular Vietnam, China and the US Relationship 
5.1.1. Theoretical Basis of the Triangular Relations 
Vietnam’s dilemma of having to play off China and the U.S. mostly comes 
from an assessment shaped by ideology that both China and the US have their own 
strategic concerns when entering into bilateral relations with Vietnam. Vietnam 
shares a similar political system with China. According to Luong Ngoc Thanh, the 
similarity in Marxist-Leninist doctrine and a one-party state has made Vietnam and 
China become interdependent with each other.1 However, Vietnam also sees China in 
a realist perspective. Its strategies of independence and freedom have accidentally 
made Vietnam an obstacle for Chinese regional ambitions, resulting in a fluctuating 
relationship between Vietnam and China. The issue for Vietnam is overcoming 
differences while maintaining a friendly relationship with China in order to create 
                                                 
1 Luong Ngoc Thanh, ‘Vietnam in the Post-Cold War Era: New Foreign Policy Directions’, Journal of 
International Development and Cooperation, 18(3), 2012, pp. 31-52 at 34. 
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favourable conditions for national development. 2  This matter has become more 
urgent as the post-Cold War situation has made the context complicated for Vietnam, 
with China’s increased diplomatic influence and trade expansion in mainland 
Southeast Asia. Every diplomatic movement of Hanoi towards other powers, 
especially the US, must be considered in the context of Beijing’s possible reaction.  
While Vietnam’s national development strategy is different from that of the 
US, there is a growing convergence of interests to underpin bilateral relations. 
Vietnam faces painful memories of high tensions in the previous war with the US, 
and current difficulties with respect to issues of democracy and human rights. Some 
problems in the post-Vietnam War remained to influence bilateral relations between 
Vietnam and the US. The issue of POW/MIA is one factor. Another is the presence 
in the US of a Vietnamese-American community, now in its second generation. Most 
of these people are young, born with American English as their native mother 
tongue, raised and educated in the US and feel American. This community is two 
million strong and has become increasingly prosperous. They are now playing a 
significant role in the bilateral relationship.3 Brown notes that officially, remittances 
to Vietnam total over US$2 billion per year but in reality, due to informal sources, it 
is likely to be two to three times that amount.  
Another legacy is the impact of the defoliant Agent Orange used during the 
Vietnam War. Progressive American and Vietnamese scientific and humanitarian 
groups have come together to exercise pressure on Washington to make amends and 
take remedial actions to clean up this dangerous chemical.4 Vietnam and the US are 
currently implementing significant progress in their bilateral relations. As 
Vietnamese CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong stated: 
What is of utmost importance is that we have been transformed from former enemies to 
become friends, partners and comprehensive partners. And I’m convinced that our 
relationship will continue to grow in the future. We have been able to rise above the 
past to overcome differences, to promote our shared interests, and look towards a 
future in order to build the comprehensive partnership that we have today. The past 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Brown, F.Z. ‘Vietnam and America: Parameters of the Possible’, Current History, 2010, 109(726), 
pp. 162-169 at 166. 
4 Brown, ‘Vietnam and America: Parameters of the Possible’, p. 166. 
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cannot be changed, but the future depends on our actions, and it is our responsibility to 
ensure a bright future.5 
The US has the best opportunity to build a positive, durable relationship 
between the Vietnamese and the American peoples through education. 6  The 
Fulbright program, the Vietnam Education Foundation and other private 
organisations, such as Ford, Luce and Gates, along with a host of individual 
universities, are working to train thousands of Vietnamese students in the US or in 
Vietnam. More than 13,000 Vietnamese are now studying in American universities. 
5.1.2 Practical Basis of the Triangular Relations 
Firstly, the linkage of traditional relations and shared culture has formed the 
basis of the triangular relationship between Vietnam, China and the US. Vietnam’s 
2000-year history is marked by the struggle for independence and freedom against 
foreign invasions. China’s proximity played a special role in this narrative with its 
constant threat functioning as a catalyst for Vietnamese identity formation. The giant 
neighbour also facilitated the diffusion of Confucian teachings during the fifteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, which transformed Vietnam’s cultural environment.7 
Vietnam is composed of 54 different ethnic groups. Some 85% of its citizens 
are Vietnamese (Kinh) with significant historical and cultural influence from China. 
Vietnam and China share aspects of identity, such as Confucianism and Buddhism, 
as well as communist ideology and the one-party state development model. There are 
some parallels with Korean culture. In both Korea and Vietnam, Confucian traditions 
and legacies are infused in national identity. With this comes a historical 
consciousness that Korea and Vietnam were members of an ancient Chinese-centred 
regional order. Korean and Vietnamese identities are largely involved in resisting 
                                                 
5 Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong of Vietnam, 
Oval Office, 7 July 2015. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/07/07/remarks-president-obama-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trozng-vietnam, (Date 
of visit 2 August 2015) 
6 The following discussion is drawn from Brown, ‘Vietnam and America: Parameters of the Possible’, 
p. 169. 
7 Welle-Strand, A., Vlaicu, M. and Tjeldvoll, A. ‘Vietnam-A New Economic Dragon in Southeast 
Asia?’, Journal of Developing Societies,  29(2), 2013 pp. 155-187 at 158. 
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outside pressure and influence.8 External threats can help create a national identity, 
which is a key component for national survival. Vietnamese national identity was 
forged over centuries in opposition to Chinese hegemony. Its quest for survival 
means that Vietnam remained outside the Chinese Empire for generations.9  
In addition to Chinese support for Vietnam’s wars of resistance against 
France and the US, the historical connection shows Chinese long-term interest in 
Vietnam. Vietnam has to deal with China for the sake of its independence and 
freedom. The least expected and most dramatic development in Southeast Asia 
following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 was the abrupt and rapid deterioration 
of relations between China and Vietnam, two former allies that had experienced 30 
years of unity in the Indochina wars. A cooling of ties began in 1975, but the schism 
widened in early 1978 into open accusation and counteraccusation, which led to a 
massive exodus of Chinese residents from Vietnam.10   
In early 1979, the two nations went to war to resolve their disputes. Hopes for 
bilateral normalization of diplomatic relations faded. There were three causes that led 
the two one-time comrades-in-arms to be combatants in such a short period: 
territorial disputes, the departures of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China, and the 
entry of Vietnam into Cambodia. The territorial disputes had historical antecedents.11 
Chang argues that, ever since the Vietnamese nation state emerged as an independent 
entity in the first millennium, it has had to contend with the “tyranny of 
geography,”12 as Vietnam has to share a border with its giant neighbour to the north. 
With a population of eighty-eight million, Vietnam would rank as a medium-sized 
Chinese province. Thus, the bilateral relationship between Vietnam and China has, 
                                                 
8 Easley, L.E., ‘Middle-Power National Identity? South Korea and Vietnam in US-China Geopolitics’, 
Pacific Focus, 27(3), 2012, pp. 421-442 at 425-433. 
9 The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Easley, L.E., ‘Middle-Power National Identity? 
South Korea and Vietnam in US-China Geopolitics’, pp. 425-433 
10 This paragraph draws on the source from Chang, P.O., The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 
Praeger, New York, 1986, pp. 1-10 
11 Chang, P.O., The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, Praeger, New York, 1986, pp. 1-10. 
12 This expression is in Prof. Carlyle Thayer’s words, it means that Vietnam has no choice but to learn 
to share its destiny with neighboring China through every twist and turn in history. This is also the 
similar case of Cuba to the United States or Georgia to Russia. The source of this information is from 
Le Hong  Hiep, ‘Vietnam’s Tyranny of Geography’, The Diplomat, July 22, 2011. Available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/vietnams-tyranny-of-geography/ (Date of visit 30 July 2015) 
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throughout history, been embedded within a structure of persistent asymmetry.13 
According to Womack, in three thousand years of interaction, China and Vietnam 
have experienced the full spectrum of the relationship, from intimate friendship to 
negative hostility.14 
Although located thousands of miles apart, the US and Vietnam were Cold 
War antagonists in the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the two poles for 
Vietnam were the USSR and China, and for much of that period, Vietnam’s 
trajectory was to move closer to Moscow.15 In the post-Cold War period, with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the current poles for Vietnam are both the US and 
China. In general, middle powers in Asia are thought to be “squeezed” between the 
US and China or between the forces of globalization and nationalism.16  
Ang argues there are two approaches that can help in analysing the dynamism 
of Vietnam-China relations.17 On the one hand, historical memories have arguably 
conditioned and shaped the relationship. For some ten centuries (from 3 B.C. to A.D. 
1000), the Vietnamese were under the direct rule of the Chinese. During this long 
period, Vietnam assimilated much of Chinese culture, although the Vietnamese 
remained intensely nationalistic.18  Thus, for Vietnamese people, the years under 
Chinese rule and domination is a reminder of its huge neighbour. On the other hand, 
external forces and geopolitical connections have to be taken into consideration when 
examining the relationship between China and Vietnam. Vietnam-China ties are 
crucially shaped by the conjunction of relations of geographical proximity, changing 
ideological configurations and the evolving nature of relations among China and the 
                                                 
13 Thayer, C.A. “Vietnam and Rising China: The Structure Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry”, 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 2010, pp. 392-409 at 392. 
14 Womack, B., ‘China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry’, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
p.77 
15 Easley, ‘Middle-Power National Identity? South Korea and Vietnam in US-China Geopolitics’, pp. 
433-434. 
16 Ibid 
17 Ang, C.G., ‘Vietnam-China Relations since the End of the Cold War’, Asian Survey, 38(12), 1998, 
pp. 1122-1141 at 1122. 
18 Ibid 
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US. The likelihood is that the relationship will be either constructive or destructive, 
depending on the method of relationship management chosen by the two nations.19 
5.1.3 The Position of Vietnam in the Triangular Relations 
According to Luong Van Ke from the University of Social Sciences and 
Humanities, Vietnam National University, Vietnam connects with other Southeast 
Asian states to form a united bloc. Its central geo-strategic role in Southeast Asia will 
make any power want Vietnam to be its ally. Whether it is China, the US, Russia or 
India, it will have similar strategic interests in Vietnam. This finding is based on 
geopolitical research on the geographical characteristics of Southeast Asian states. 
Ke claimed that a medium-range ballistic missile (with a range of between 1,000 and 
3,000 km) placed in Vietnam could threaten all of maritime Southeast Asia, the 
middle of China to the Yangtze River in the north, or the furthest islands of 
Indonesia and Malaysia in the south. Vietnam is easily accessible due to its seaports 
and airports along the coastline.20 
 As a result, any power that can dominate or control Vietnam can earn crucial 
strategic preponderance in maximising national interests in Southeast Asia, which is 
the gateway to the Pacific. It plays a role for a relations in Northeast Asia because 
Southeast Asia faces the East Sea (for the Vietnamese) or the West Sea (for 
Filipinos) or the South China Sea (to the Chinese), as well as controlling the vital sea 
lanes to major powers including China, South Korea and Japan, and part of Russia in 
this century of globalisation and commercial development.21 Huỳnh argues that since 
normalisation of ties, Vietnam’s geo-political location in Southeast Asia has played a 
key role in American policy decisions concerning Vietnam.22 Although American 
relations with China have progressed, the US has enhanced its close relationship with 
                                                 
19 The information from this paragraph is drawn from Ang, C.G., ‘Vietnam-China Relations since the 
End of the Cold War’, p. 1122. 
20 Interview Luong Van Ke, Hanoi, Vietnam, 24 January 2013 
21 Interview Luong Van Ke , 24 January 2013 
22 Huynh Phan, ‘Vietnam voi nuoc lon hay chuyen long tin va loi ich’[Trans: Vietnam with major 
powers or belief and benefits]’, TuanVietnam.net, 7 December 2011, 
http://tuanvietnam.vietnamnet.vn/2011-12-06-viet-nam-voi-nuoc-lon-hay-chuyen-long-tin-va-loi-ich 
(Date of visit 9 December 2013) 
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Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam through diplomacy, commerce, education, 
security and defence.23 
Vietnam has to deal with China and the US, representatives of two conflicting 
ideological systems. While China represents the socialist world as the largest 
communist state left on Earth, the US is the symbol of the capitalist world as it has 
the largest free market economy; China represents the East while America represents 
the West. In the perception of the US, it is aware of Vietnam’s important role in the 
struggle against China’s strategy to expand its influence over Southeast Asia. No 
country in Southeast Asia has more experience than Vietnam in responding to the 
Chinese threat due to the long historical connections and cultural harmonization.24 
Vietnam has experienced both positive and negative historical relations with China.25  
Brown shares this viewpoint, showing that Vietnam has had 2,000 years of 
experience in dealing with China and is a master of the “politics of the asymmetry.”26 
Womack also makes the essential point that although China is much more powerful 
than Vietnam, China cannot easily force Vietnam to do what it wants, as Vietnam’s 
motive for survival will surely be stronger than China’s motive for domination.27    
Consequently, if only Vietnam could become the strategic partner of the US, 
then Washington could be convinced about a front line, where it could exert more 
leverage in its relations with China. Simultaneously, the US expects to see Vietnam’s 
positive reaction to the opportunity of becoming an American security partner, as the 
relationship is equal and less burdensome than tributary ties with China. 
Furthermore, American ambition in Vietnam is more about promoting discourses of 
human rights and democracy than seeking control or power over Vietnamese national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is different from the Chinese assertive 
actions in territorial disputes with Vietnam.28  
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Interview Luong Van Ke , 24 January 2013. 
25 Interview Hoang Anh Tuan, 13 February 2012. 
26 Brown, ‘Vietnam and America: Parameters of the Possible’, p. 166. 
27 Womack, B., ‘China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry’, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
p. 79 
28 Interview Luong Van Ke, 24 February 2013 
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Vietnam is now well on the way to nation-building and development. While 
taking a glance at outside powers’ development, Vietnam looks to both China and 
the US. Womack explained that ‘China will always be more important to Vietnam 
than the US, and China will always be more important to the US than Vietnam.’29 
The Vietnamese mind-set, however, is to trust the Americans more than the 
Chinese.30 American values of democracy and freedom were acknowledged by Ho 
Chi Minh in the Declaration of Independence in 1945 and enshrined in the country’s 
first constitution of 1946 
"Hỡi đồng bào cả nước, 
Tất cả mọi người đều sinh ra có quyền bình đẳng. tạo hóa cho họ những quyền không 
ai có thể xâm phạm được; trong những quyền ấy, có quyền được sống, quyền tự do và 
quyền mưu cầu hạnh phúc…!". 31 [Trans: Dear martyrs compatriots, all men are born 
equal: the Creator has given us inviolable rights, life, liberty and happiness…!] 
 Such rights of to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were acknowledged 
in the US 1776 Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.32 
Thus, the Vietnamese view Chinese ambition of dominating Vietnam as 
stronger than that of the Americans, due to historical tributary relations, traditional 
connections and cultural exchanges between the two countries over a thousand years. 
The Vietnamese are suspicious of Chinese leaders’ long term and unchangeable wish 
to exercise a controlling influential power over Vietnam, since it means the control 
of land and natural resources. Vietnam is located in the path of Chinese leaders who 
want to go further into Southeast Asia, a zone rich in natural resources and an 
                                                 
29 Brown, ‘Vietnam and America: Parameters of the Possible’, p. 168 
30 Interview Luong Van Ke, 24 February 2013 
31 Ho Chi Minh’s Declaration of Independence, Hanoi 2 September 2015, announcing to the 
Vietnamese People and to the world the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Availbale at 
‘Tuyen ngon doc lap nuoc Vietnam Dan chu Cong Hoa’, 31 August 2007, http://tuoitre.vn/tin/theo-
guong-bac/20070831/tuyen-ngon-doc-lap-nuoc-viet-nam-dan-chu-cong-hoa/217980.html (Date of 
visit 26 August 2015) 
32 Quoted in ‘The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription’. Available at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (Date of visit 25 August 2015) 
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abundant labour force beneficial to the development of China.33 Consequently, the 
author shares Ke’s analysis, indicating that the Vietnamese see Americans as less 
threatening than the Chinese. The US has an advantage over China because the 
former needs Vietnam in its struggle to counterbalance the Chinese.  
5.1.4 The Effects of Sitting between a Regional Power and a Global Superpower  
On the one hand, when the two major powers cooperate, then Southeast Asia, 
and especially Vietnam, will enjoy a peaceful and friendly atmosphere where all can 
collaborate and develop together. From talking with scholars in this field, the author 
learns that there are many cooperation mechanisms between these two countries in 
the economic, political and security sectors. According to Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan, 
Director General of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Vietnam 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were at least 70 mechanisms of cooperation 
between China and the US leading up to 2012. Some of these mechanisms have not 
been very useful, but there are others that presently remain useful.34 According to a 
report from Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Vietnam National Assembly in receiving the delegation from the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), there have been more than 90 
cooperation mechanisms between the US and China as of 2015.35 China and America 
are separated geographically by the Pacific and do not have territorial claims on each 
other, nor is there any acute military threat towards each other. Most importantly, the 
American and Chinese economies complement each other. China urgently needs to 
get access to US technology and industrial goods while the US can find no wider 
market than in Mainland China.36 As a result, cooperative Sino-American relations 
can be beneficial as a win-win solution, not a zero sum game for the two sides.37 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Interview Hoang Anh Tuan, 13 February 2012. 
35 Government Report to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Vietnam National Assembly in receiving the 
USCC delegations to Vietnam from 24-28/7/2015 
36 Thee. M. ‘US-Chinese Rapprochement and Vietnam’, Journal of Peace Research, 9(1), 1972, pp. 
63-67 at 63. 
37 Interview Pitono Purnomo, 11 June 2012. 
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On the other hand, when the two major powers compete, they need other 
countries to be on their side, so as to gain more leverage. This situation places 
Vietnam in a difficult situation: if both major powers try to enhance bilateral 
relations with it, then it has to decide which to align itself more closely with. At 
present, US strategy includes military commitments to its allies, such as Japan and 
South Korea, as well as a more strategic ambiguity to deter Beijing from using force 
against Taiwan. Obviously, this commitment does not mean a security guarantee for 
Vietnam, but the US hegemonic role in the region is indeed helpful to enhance 
strategic stability to balance rising Chinese power. This strategy has also provided a 
beneficial context for the gradual normalization of relations with the US, including 
Vietnam’s access to the American market, technology transfer, foreign investment 
and other benefits for Vietnamese economic modernization.38  
Above all, in the current situation, both major powers are experiencing 
cooperation and competition in a dynamic world. If US engagement in Southeast 
Asia plays the role of strategic balancer against a rising China, Vietnam can face the 
disadvantage from developing a dependency on the US to maintain stability in this 
area. This will make it vulnerable to American major policy shifts in the region. If 
the US carried out a policy of offshore balancing, such as the conclusion of its 
security alliance in the region and with the withdrawal of 100,000 military personnel, 
and no longer commits itself as a hegemonic stabilizer in East Asia, this would be 
devastating for Vietnam. A small country like Vietnam will become more vulnerable 
than before and subject to greater regional instability. Under offshore balancing, 
Vietnam will have to rely on Japan to help balance China, or to accept a position 
relative to China’s emerging power. The US will presumably make the effort to limit 
China’s power by playing off Tokyo against Beijing, but this design will be of little 
help for Hanoi to deter China. In this situation, the best alternative for Vietnam and 
the region will be co-operative security to retain the existing US-dominated 
hegemonic regime in place, as it has been for the last twenty-five years. This co-
operative mechanism will still allow countries involved to remain independent on US 
hegemonic regional stability. Cooperation is likely to enhance ASEAN’s security 
                                                 
38 Van Ness, P., ‘Alternative US Strategies with Respect to China and the Implications for Vietnam’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20(2), 1998, pp.154-170 at 165-166. 
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arrangement. At this point, East Asian nations, including Vietnam, will enjoy more 
strategic autonomy and grasp the chance to work together to shape their own regional 
security model.39 
In sum, to address the full impact of sitting between a global superpower and a 
regional power, Vietnam attaches great importance to its neighbours. According to 
Pham Binh Minh, ASEAN is of strategic significance to Vietnam, as Vietnam’s 
security and development environment is connected directly with Southeast Asia. 
Thus, cooperation with ASEAN states both bilaterally and multilaterally has been 
identified as a priority in Vietnam’s foreign policy.40 Le Dinh Tinh and Hoang Hai 
Long argue that Vietnam has recognized that working with ASEAN can be more 
effective in dealing with regional and global issues, rather than by acting alone. 
Thus, ASEAN is considered as Vietnam’s bridge to the wider world and a safety net 
amid regional or international problems. ASEAN helps Vietnam integrate politically 
into the larger Asia-Pacific region.41 
5.2 Context of the Triangular Vietnam, China and the US Relationship 
5.2.1 International Situation  
In the international situation where the US is the global superpower and 
China is the emerging challenger, any nation will find it difficult to choose either 
China or the US exclusively. Most countries will seek to pursue a relationship with 
both powers. Vietnam is not an exception. Thus, it is essential to understand the 
international situation that led to Vietnam being involved in a complex triangle with 
China and the US in the first decade of the post-Cold War era.  
After the Cold War, the world experienced major changes in a restructured 
global economy – a fundamental transition in state economies, readjusted national 
strategies and re-organised international relations. Regional organizations flourished 
                                                 
39 Van Ness, ‘Alternative US Strategies with Respect to China and the Implications for Vietnam’, pp. 
166-167. 
40 Pham Binh Minh, ‘Việt Nam tiếp tục đồng hành và phát triển cùng ASEAN vì mục tiêu xây dụng 
một Cộng đồng ASEAN gắn kết’, Trans: Vietnam continues to acompany and develop with ASEA for 
a unified ASEAN Community] 28 July 2015. Available at http://www.mod.gov.vn/ (Date of visit 2 
August 2015) 
41 Le Dinh Tinh and Hoang Hai Long, ‘Vietnam in ASEAN and ASEAN in Vietnam’, Asia Pacific 
Bulletin, 242, 21 November 2013 
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as states attempted to grapple with emerging trans-national problems, such as crime, 
pandemics, natural disasters and climate change. The realignment of power from US-
Soviet relations to Sino-American relations in world politics marked a shift of the 
centre of the world from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, necessitating strategies for 
readjustments by Southeast Asian states. In the face of these challenges, nations 
including great powers had to readjust development objectives and external relations 
strategies.42  
For many countries, adjustments and changes of national strategy became 
indispensable tools in the attempt to create or at least to try to achieve favourable 
conditions in the new world order. Such adjustments have a great impact on small 
and medium countries, the pieces on the world’s grand political chessboard played 
by the leading powers. In the process of adjusting diplomatic strategies, all major 
countries focused on strengthening and expanding foreign relations to maximize their 
full influence, to gain benefits in all aspects and to set up the most advantageous 
position in the new world order. Being influenced by these characteristics, large 
powers adjusted their foreign policies to simultaneously serve national interests and 
enhance their already powerful positions in the world. Consequently, medium and 
smaller states had to adjust their foreign policies to cope with the new environment 
in order to enhance their role in the international and regional arena.43    
Kao has examined Deng’s idea of modernization in China. He argues that 
China in the post-Cold War era wanted to develop its backward economy and so 
understood the need to maintain peaceful and stable relations with major powers and 
neighbouring countries. Beijing consistently followed Deng’s view of de-escalating 
tension with its neighbours, such as the former Soviet Union, Vietnam or India, as 
well as establishing diplomatic relations with the US in 1979. Thus, Chinese foreign 
policy during its process of modernization was not to expand influence abroad but to 
create an environment conducive to domestic economic development. In this case, 
                                                 
42 Vu Khoan, ‘Current international status-quo and challenges to Vietnam’, Tap chi Cong san [The 
Communist Review], 30 June 2013, http://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/The-World-Issues-and-
Events/2013/362/Current-international-statusquo-and-challenges-to-Viet-Nam.aspx (Date of visit 30 
October  2014). 
43 Luong Ngoc Thanh, ‘Vietnam in the Post-Cold War Era: New Foreign Policy Directions’, Journal 
of International Development and Cooperation, 18(3), 2012, pp. 31-52 at 31-38. 
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Beijing hoped that the peaceful and stable environment surrounding China could be 
maintained without any disturbance.44  
Zhao has argued that China by the mid-1990s came to be regarded as a 
regional power. It no doubt remained a major player in East and Southeast Asian 
regional affairs. He also argued that China has reassessed the political, military and 
economic importance of Southeast Asia in its foreign policy. Since the death of Mao, 
China has adopted a practical approach to relations with the region. To that end, it 
has boosted bilateral ties between China and Southeast Asia through normalization of 
bilateral relations – with Jakarta (August 1990), Singapore (October 1990) and Hanoi 
(1991), and through active involvement in UN peacekeeping forces in Cambodia 
from 1992.45  
Zhao also argues that the US has consistently recognized the importance of 
Beijing’s cooperation on East and Southeast Asian affairs, especially over issues 
such as Korean unification and the Cambodian peace settlement, although the 
international competition for the Chinese market is also a major consideration for US 
foreign policy toward China.46 From a global political perspective, the American and 
Chinese national interests are not fundamentally in conflict. With the end of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping issued a 
sixteen-character instruction to guide China’s policy towards the US: 
Zengjia xinren  (增加信任):  to increase mutual trust 
Jianshao mafan (减少麻烦): to reduce trouble 
Zengjia hezuo (增加合作): to enhance cooperation 
Bugao duikang (不搞对抗):  not to seek confrontation. 47 
Specifically, in terms of the bilateral relationships with Vietnam, an 
important factor in the development of good relations between the US and Vietnam 
was the pragmatic approach taken by both countries well before the normalization of 
                                                 
44 Lang, K., ‘Did China’s Foreign Policy Really Change in the Post-Cold War Era?’, Taiwan Journal 
of Political Science, 21, 2009. 
45 Zhao, Q.S., ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, World Affairs, 159(3), 1997, pp. 
114-129 at 115-122. 
46 Zhao, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, pp. 115-126 
47 Ibid. 
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relations in 1995. This resulted in a focus on present and future benefits rather than 
dwelling on past disagreements, such as the effects of the Vietnam War.  
From the early 1990s, the bilateral normalisation process commenced with a 
number of steady but cautious steps set up by single-interest groups, such as the 
League of Families of Prisoners of War and Missing in Action who were searching 
for their loved ones, war veterans looking for reconciliation, Vietnamese refugees 
wanting reunification with family members, humanitarian and educational institutes, 
and American businesses seeking to export and invest in Vietnam. Vietnam was 
motivated primarily by its desire for access to the US market and by the prospect of 
US support for admission to the world’s leading international organizations, such as 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Vietnam also succeeded in pressing the US to address some longstanding 
legacies of the war, including funding assistance for dioxin removal from Agent 
Orange hot spots like the Da Nang air base. With strengthened bilateral ties with the 
US in the 1990s, both sides could work on enhancing economic cooperation. This 
served as the foundation for future economic cooperation between the two nations, 
for example, in the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) of December 2001, followed 
by textile, civil aviation, maritime and nuclear energy cooperation agreements. Later, 
Vietnam joined the WTO in January 2007 after tough negotiations on accession 
agreements with its major trading partners, including the US.48 
Normalisation of ties with China did not occur until November 1991 and only 
then when Vietnam agreed to China’s demand for a comprehensive political 
settlement in Cambodia. Since then, the two nations have exchanged high-level party 
and state delegations. Major areas of cooperation and expectations for future 
cooperation were set out in agreements, such as joint communiqués issued in 1992, 
1994 and 1995. Contentious border issues were assigned to specialist groups for 
negotiation, and military-to-military contact was resumed. The general period from 
1990 to 1999 can be seen as a transition stage from “hostile asymmetry” to “normal 
asymmetry.”49 
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Hanoi used the 1990s to improve its relationship significantly with China, 
Japan, the US, ASEAN and the EU. Vietnam and Malaysia agreed to establish a joint 
development zone in the Gulf of Thailand.50 Vietnam also signed and ratified a treaty 
on maritime delimitation with Thailand. In the last half of the 1990s there were a 
number of incidents between the Philippines and China, Malaysia and even Vietnam. 
However, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship continued to improve despite the 
disputes in the South China Sea. This situation placed Vietnam in a new and 
challenging position between China and the rest of ASEAN, a position that could 
give Vietnam a key role in developing a multilateral approach to managing the 
maritime and territorial disputes. It required Vietnam to stay on good terms with both 
China and Southeast Asian states. With its location bordering China, and sharing 
many cultural features, Vietnam might promote diplomatic efforts as a connecting 
bridge between Southeast and Northeast Asia.51 
5.2.2 Domestic Situation of Vietnam in the early Post-Cold War Era  
Politically, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is one-party state with 
four formal structures making up the regime: the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV), the People’s Armed Forces, the State Bureaucracy (Central and Local 
Government) and Vietnam Fatherland Front (a group of mass organizations). The 
one-party state has been in transition from a “hard authoritarian” to a “soft 
authoritarian” nation since 1986. This was a crucial year for Vietnam, which 
launched doi moi (renovation/reform), as an open-door policy to the international 
community. This new strategy presented Vietnam with new political decisions as its 
economy became increasingly integrated into the global economy.52 These policies 
have led to an enhanced economic position, and as a domestic strategy doi moi has 
helped Vietnam recover from the aftermath of the war in an effort to keep pace with 
surrounding nations and powers. Welle-Strand, Vlaicu and Tjeldvoll argue that since 
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1986, Vietnam has opened up to the outside world through trade, investment and 
official development assistance (ODA). Consequently, from a country devastated by 
war and domestic division, Vietnam has moved from one of the poorest countries in 
the world to a middle-income nation, from a distant player to an active member in 
the regional and international arenas.53 
After the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the CPV leaders 
sought an ideological alliance with China, hoping China would take up leadership of 
the world’s socialist forces. This Vietnamese approach was carried out when 
Vietnam still faced regional and global isolation after the counterweight of the Soviet 
Union was no longer available. As a result, in order to prevent Chinese aggression 
when faced with a disproportionately powerful neighbour, Hanoi had to pay 
deference to Beijing. Accordingly, Hanoi was rewarded with the normalization of 
bilateral relations with Beijing in November 1991 under the form of “comrades but 
not allies.” 54  Without an anti-Western alliance, the integration agenda regained 
momentum in Vietnamese policy with ASEAN members. It led to the opening of a 
new and friendly chapter in Vietnam’s relations with neighbouring countries. This 
was a geopolitical turning point in Vietnam’s foreign policy when top priorities were 
set for both regional cooperation and better relations with the great powers and other 
worldwide economic centres.55 
Many outside observers have concluded that Vietnam had by 2000 recovered 
from the worst effects of economic blockade from the early 1980s.56  By 1989, 
Vietnam also began to recover from its domestic economic crisis caused by 
bureaucratic mismanagement, soaring inflation rates and rising debt problems. For 
the first time, agricultural production was on target at 19 million tonnes. Industrial 
output was up 9% and for the first time, the consumption of output was in line with 
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government priorities, with consumer goods and exports leading the industrial sector. 
By 1989, inflation had fallen to a rate of 10% per month or lower. Vietnam’s foreign 
trade grew by a massive 21% in 1988. Ho Chi Minh City began to see increasing 
numbers of Japanese, Thai and other foreign businessmen. By April 1989, an 
agreement for some US$450 million worth of western capital as Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) had been signed, mostly for offshore oil and gas exploration and 
food processing for export. Vietnam has surprised many by emerging as a major rice 
exporter in 1989, with rice sales to Africa, India, the Philippines and even China.  
In the late 1970s, China and the US both expected that Vietnam’s economic 
isolation would “break” Hanoi. However, by the late 1980s, China had to accept that 
Vietnam was not broken, even though it had suffered from the economic isolation.57 
Since the normalization of bilateral relations with China, senior Vietnamese and 
Chinese leaders have met at least once annually since November 1991 to both review 
and advance the bilateral relationship, with discussions broaching all aspects of Sino-
Vietnamese relations. During President Le Duc Anh’s visit to China in November 
1993, the first visit by a Vietnamese President since 1955, his counterpart Jiang 
Zemin observed that economic and trade relations had been rapidly restored and 
developed since normalization. 58  However, Jiang also noted the relationship’s 
potential could be deepened.  
Between 1991 and 1997, CPV Secretary-General Do Muoi visited Beijing 
three times to discuss ways of strengthening economic, trade, science and 
technological cooperation.59 A number of economic agreements were signed at that 
time. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited Hanoi in November 1992 and again in 
June 1996, while President Jiang also stopped off in the Vietnamese capital in 
November 1994 as part of a four-nation tour around Southeast Asia. So despite the 
existence of the maritime disputes between China and Vietnam, the Sino-Vietnamese 
bilateral relationship remains very broad-based. Apart from reciprocal high-ranking 
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visits of leaders, there have been numerous exchanges between governmental 
(military and non-military) and non-governmental officials on an almost daily basis. 
By the late 1980s, the Reagan Administration feared that a Sino-Soviet 
détente would exclude US influence from mainland Southeast Asia, so it began 
cautiously to distance itself from Chinese policy while at the same time making 
efforts to counter Soviet influence. This led to a decision to move quietly towards 
normalising relations with Hanoi, which was enthusiastically welcomed by Vietnam. 
Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hanoi government radio stated that 
“The USA plays an important part in bringing about peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia. The Vietnamese people are prepared to turn to a new chapter of history and to 
facilitate the development of relations of friendship and cooperation between the two 
peoples.”60                                                                                                                                              
5.2.3 Vietnam’s China Policy 1991-2001 
 Vietnam and its giant northern neighbour improved their bilateral relations 
following the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1991. Sloreby argues that the 
cause of this improvement of bilateral relations between Vietnam and China was due 
more to internal reasons rather than the external environment. After losing support 
from its main Cold War ally, the Soviet Union, Vietnam was left isolated and 
vulnerable. Meanwhile, Vietnam could develop rapprochement with China because 
both countries have an identical political system and similar economic strategies.61 
Amer also noted that between 1991 and 2001, both neighbours expanded bilateral 
cooperation in many sectors and agreed on methods of negotiations. It helped 
manage any tension that existed between Hanoi and Beijing. This rapprochement 
brought about the settlements of the land border on 30 December 1999, the Gulf of 
Tonkin on 25 December 2000 and the South China Sea territorial disputes.62 
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Vietnam’s policy towards China in the first decade after the Cold War was to 
pro-actively enhance bilateral ties between the two neighbours. Nguyen Thi Phuong 
Hoa examined the positive solidarity of Vietnam’s China policy in this period.63 
After the normalization of bilateral relations in 1991, the leaders of both Vietnam 
and China stated in the 1991 Joint Declaration to “develop the relationship of 
friendship and friendly neighbourliness.”64 In another Joint Declaration in 1994, the 
two leaders re-affirmed to “consolidate and enhance the friendly neighbourliness and 
bilateral cooperation for the mutual benefits of the two nations, to nurture the 
relationship to be stable and long-lasting.”65  
Furthermore, Vietnam carried out the guidelines of the 1991 and 1995 Joint 
Declarations to “commit to improve the bilateral cooperation with China in the fields 
of economics, commerce, sciences, technology and culture on the basis of equality, 
mutual benefits and mutual development” to achieve the goal of “boosting the 
economic and commercial ties between Vietnam and China for constant development 
on the basis of long-term stability.”66 On the basis of complying with the guidelines 
in these joint declarations and the mutual understanding of leaders from the two 
communist parties, the two nations have raised the level of bilateral ties to “friendly 
neighbourliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-lasting stability, looking forward 
to the future” in the Joint Declaration of 2002. Vietnam is also committed to 
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“enhance the friendship exchange between youths of the two nations, adding to the 
comprehensive cooperation between China and Vietnam, transferring to future 
generations.”67 
In addressing the existing problems between Vietnam and China, Vietnam 
was aware of the importance of gradually resolving territorial disputes with China, 
but this should not come at the expense of general bilateral cooperation. Vietnam and 
China affirmed in the 1991 Joint Declaration “to preserve peace and security and 
encourage two-way travel of peoples at the border areas in order to build the 
Vietnam-China border into a border of peace and friendship.”68 Vietnam also agreed 
with China in the 1994 Joint Declaration to “reaffirm high-level agreements since 
1991 to continue to look for solutions for the two countries’ territorial and border 
disputes and the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.”69 The efforts and cooperation 
displayed by both sides resulted in the China-Vietnam land border delimitation treaty 
signed in Hanoi on 30 December 1999. It marked an encouraging start to Sino-
Vietnamese bilateral relations in the new millennium.  
5.2.4 Vietnam’s US Policy 1991-2001  
Vietnam employed a new approach in its relations with the US from the late 
1980s. The new strategy was the result of Renovation (doi moi) and reassessment of 
US-Vietnam ties by the CPV during its Sixth National Party Congress in December 
1986. The CPV 13th Resolution clearly stated to “issue a newly comprehensive 
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strategy towards the US to seek support from the American people and the world, as 
a convenient condition to maintain national peace and economic development.”70  
This improvement led to the normalization of bilateral relations between the 
two nations on 12 July 1995. However, there were still two sides to the 
rapprochement between Vietnam and the US. The cooperation came from mutual 
benefits that the two countries could gain from each other. The most successful 
feature of Vietnamese-American cooperation could be seen in the economic sector. 
Vietnam stressed the importance of trading and commercial ties. The US, with its 
practical mind-set, found in Vietnam a potential market for American goods due to 
Vietnam’s huge population, cheap labour force and geographical location. The US 
also found that improvement in bilateral relations with Vietnam could help it to 
escape from “the Vietnam Syndrome” that split American society after the Vietnam 
War.71 
However, competition still existed due to the antagonistic national strategies 
between Vietnam and the US. Vietnam’s national objective was to establish a 
successful socialist state while the US favours encouraging other states to join the 
American orbit and respect American values of democracy and capitalism.72 Thus, 
Washington and Hanoi were still suspicious of each other’s long-term strategic 
intentions. While the US wanted greater access to Vietnamese ports for its warships, 
Vietnam wanted the US to remove its restrictions on arms sales. The Vietnamese 
government welcomed the presence of the US Military Sea Lift ships at the 
commercial facilities in Cam Ranh Bay only for minor repairs at competitive prices, 
but these ships have to have civilian crews. Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan 
Dung invited all countries in the world to avail themselves of the commercial repair 
facilities in Cam Ranh. Meanwhile, the US was still considering lifting restrictions 
on the sale of lethal materials that could have helped Vietnam modernize its 
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military.73  Indeed, contemporary news reports indicate that Minister of National 
Defence General Phung Quang Thanh addressed the lifting of restrictions on arms 
sales during his trip to Washington, D.C. in late 2009. He later raised it with 
Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta when Panetta visited Hanoi in 2012. 
5.3 Characteristics of the Triangular Vietnam, China and America Relationship  
5.3.1 Security Characteristics  
The interaction of the two major powers in Southeast Asia means that there 
are pros and cons for Vietnam in its defence and security policy to preserve its 
national sovereignty. In its relations with China, Vietnam experienced a long history 
of conflict and cooperation. Regarding conflicts, the two sides fought a border war in 
1979 and there were two skirmishes over disputes in the South China Sea, one in 
1974 and the other in 1988. The first resulted in China taking possession of part of 
the Paracels, which were then under the control of the Republic of Vietnam (South 
Vietnam). Ravindran even argued that Vietnam would not hesitate to go to war with 
China over the disputes in the South China Sea, in spite of the overwhelming 
superiority of the Chinese military.74  
China and Vietnam have conflicting interests not only in the South China 
Sea, but also in other areas, such as China’s dam building in the Upper Mekong 
River and the widening trade deficit. Thus, according to the conflict-expectation 
model, Vietnam’s expectations of a future conflict with China are high.75 These 
arguments present one side of the problem only. For the Vietnamese, as Ho Chi 
Minh has stated, “nothing is more precious than freedom and independence”76 and 
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Vietnam has struggled bravely throughout its history for national integrity. Blazevic 
argues that for Vietnam, the sea carries great geostrategic significance. Vietnamese 
authorities do fear that China’s intentions are to enforce its claim by force if 
necessary, which threatens Vietnam’s claims, freedom of navigation and trade. 
Specifically, they perceive that China’s strategy is not defensive, but rather meant to 
alter the status quo and reorder the balance of power in the immediate region and 
beyond. They perceive threats not only to the national security of Vietnam but also 
regional and global security. According to Nguyen Duc Hung from the Southeast 
Asian Research Foundation, “China’s claim in the South China Sea is comparable to 
a claim by one person to all the oxygen in the air that South East Asia can be 
dominated, and nations that need to traverse through the South China Sea can be 
choked.”77  
However, Vietnam will not go to war with any power if its national integrity 
is threatened. According to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Lieutenant 
General Nguyễn Chí Vịnh, Vietnam is now at peace, so Vietnam needs to do its 
utmost to maintain a peaceful relationship and friendship with neighbouring 
countries. 78  Peace must be associated with independence and self-reliance. The 
Vietnamese people will never accept an unequal and dependant peace that results in 
the loss of Vietnam’s independence and the violation of its national sovereignty. As a 
result, the concept of peace as a Vietnamese motivation is related to national 
survival.79 Consequently, although the likelihood of conflict between Vietnam and 
China is probably high, it is not Vietnam’s desire or in its interests to go to war to 
resolve the matter. Moreover, there is cooperation between the two neighbours.  
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On the political level, relations between the two countries have been good 
since the normalization of bilateral ties in 1991, and sharing the same communist 
ideology has contributed to this rapport. The two nations also achieved a land 
boundary settlement agreement in 1999 and a maritime settlement in the Gulf of 
Tonkin in 2000. 80  In addition, Sino-ASEAN relations have, in general, steadily 
improved and the relationship between China and Vietnam has remained consistently 
cordial. In November 2009, Beijing and Hanoi signed an agreement concluding three 
decades of border negotiations.  
The triangular relationship between Vietnam, China and the US since the 
9/11 attacks in 2001 could be a stable security triangle if the two great powers 
developed a more positively cooperative relationship. As US President Barack 
Obama stated, the US can no longer dominate the globe unilaterally, and China will 
be a factor: 
We can’t predict with certainty what the future will bring, but we can be certain about 
the issues that will define our times. And we also know this: The relationship between 
the United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as 
any bilateral relationship in the world.81 
The US recognition that it can no longer shape the world solely in its image 
means it will have to consider China as a partner in setting an agenda for global 
security in the new century.82 As a result, China and the US will cooperate more with 
each other in security matters. Christensen argues that the US continues to compete 
with China directly and through its alliances, as well as with its security partnerships 
such as the US-Japan alliance, but this is only one part of the whole picture. The 
September 11 attacks and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have revealed important 
common interests between China and the US, but there remain tensions and there 
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must be room for discussion on how to pursue a resolution to the shared problems.83 
Consequently, both powers need a security environment of peace and stability and 
this is the condition that Vietnam needs for its nation’s establishment and 
development. A Vietnamese American Studies specialist argues that there is a 
mutuality of interests between China and the United States: for the US, there is the 
benefit in maintaining Southeast Asia as a peaceful and stable region in America’s 
orbit, and it is in Vietnam’s interest that this status quo continues.84 
China’s fast political, economic and military ascent has caused Southeast 
Asian nations to look for a counter-balance. Apart from its ties with the US, Vietnam 
has looked to Russia, Japan, India, and Australia. However, Vietnam’s strategic 
collaborations with the US must be low-key so that it can be seen to be acting 
independently, while keeping its options open with China. Carl Thayer has noted that 
it is better to have both the US and China keep each other at bay rather than have a 
situation where one is dominant. 85  Although the US now has given priority to 
Southeast Asia in its strategic pivot, and the Vietnamese-American rapprochement 
has led to better relations, this progress does not mean a neglect of Vietnam’s giant 
northern neighbour China. The US and Vietnam conducted joint field activities to 
locate the remains of both Vietnamese and American soldiers who were listed as 
MIA in the Vietnam War. There were also other on-going efforts to deal with the 
effects of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Thayer argued that Vietnam and the US have 
only a “comprehensive partnership,” while Vietnam has a “strategic partnership” 
with China.86 
If Vietnam goes with one power and neglects the other, a security challenge 
can grow into threat. Le argues that a stronger US-Vietnam relationship will likely 
put unwanted strain on Vietnam’s relations with China, especially when Sino-
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American relations worsen due to strategic competition. It is not in Vietnam’s 
interest to experience again the painful time of the 1970s and 1980s. 87  While 
Vietnam and the US may be moving closer to one another for economic reasons, 
Vietnam will be eager to avoid the perception that it intends to use the US as a 
counterweight to China in the region.88 Although Vietnam and the US have gotten 
closer as a result of recent diplomatic exchanges and military cooperation, this 
rapprochement is only on the surface, and is so far without a firm foundation. During 
the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, the two countries have drawn 
closer together. Since 2010 the two sides have initiated naval exchange activities 
(now renamed naval engagement activities). These are held in conjunction with the 
annual US Navy visit to Tien Sa port at Da Nang. In Hanoi on 29 October 2010, US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned the possibility of establishing bilateral 
contacts in the military sphere. The visit of US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta to 
Vietnam in early June 2012 has put this issue on a practical plane. Although there 
will be neither the possibility of Vietnam and the US signing a formal treaty alliance, 
nor the US leasing bases in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s three no’s policy, they do plan 
to cooperate on arms supplies issues.89 The US has lifted restrictions on the sale of 
lethal weapons on a case-by-case basis. 
However, despite the diplomatic progress, bilateral relations between 
Vietnam and the US still encounter obstacles. The continuing International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions has been an irritant in bilateral relations until 
they were partially lifted in 2014. The Vietnamese-American relationship has not yet 
seen any further detailed practical military cooperation. All Vietnam needs from the 
US is an American presence in the region for a more influential voice to counter-
balance China’s aggressive behaviour in the territorial dispute in the South China 
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Sea. This does not, however, mean that Vietnam wants an alliance with the US, as 
such an alliance can lead to retribution from China.90   
A US-Vietnam alliance may just create difficulties for Hanoi. First and 
foremost, Vietnam will face Chinese resistance. For the past 20 years, Beijing has 
avoided sharp moves towards its southern neighbours, but visits by US Navy 
warships to the deep water harbour of Cam Ranh Bay (or the appearance of US 
military instructors in Vietnam) would likely create a perception of threats to China’s 
southern borders, which China definitely would not leave unanswered. Secondly, 
China and other Southeast Asian states see Vietnam as a country with an independent 
foreign policy, but if Vietnam were to become a US ally (like the Philippines or 
Thailand) then Hanoi’s ability to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy will be 
questioned, which would affect Vietnam’s status in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, a 
Vietnam-US alliance would affect the content of the Bangkok declaration, which 
promotes peace and stability in the region by following the UN Charter. Although 
the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia was a 
non-binding political declaration, it highlighted ASEAN’s commitment to neutrality. 
The Manila Declaration also urged all conflicting parties to settle the dispute in the 
South China Sea exclusively by peaceful means. Thus, if Vietnam became a military 
ally of the US, Hanoi could become involved with outside powers in inter-regional 
conflicts.91 To become an American ally is therefore not in the Vietnamese national 
interest, however Vietnam should consider alternative options, such as becoming a 
strategic partner or security partner of the US. 
5.3.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics  
The socio-economic strategies of the two major powers towards Southeast 
Asia have created both advantages and disadvantages for Vietnam. According to 
Ravindran, the bilateral economic relations between Vietnam and China have grown 
tremendously since the normalization of relations in 1991. China is Vietnam’s largest 
trading partner, with bilateral trade amounting to US$30.094 billion in 2010, up from 
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US$32.23 million in 1991.92 Trade with China amounted to 36.3% of Vietnam’s 
GDP in 2011. 93  China has become the largest export destination for Vietnam’s 
primary commodities, with 71.78% of Vietnam’s total exports going to China.94 
From an energy perspective, approximately 4.65 billion kWh of power was imported 
from China in 2012.95 As a result, any disruption of this supply could cause serious 
harm to the Vietnamese economy. Above all, China’s economic hold over Vietnam 
is so strong that it can inflict heavy damage to Vietnam’s economy through trade 
sanctions. Though China has to consider how sanctions would affect its investment 
in this nation, this does not remove the high degree of vulnerability that Vietnam is 
exposed to.96  
Vietnam’s economic relationship with China is also under severe stress due to 
problems of a huge trade imbalance, the smuggling of goods and services as well as 
controversial Chinese investment projects. These disadvantages have made trade 
with China appear to be a threat. Vietnam’s receipt of Chinese FDI does not fare any 
better, especially from the perspective of ordinary Vietnamese. As of June 2009, 
according to official statistics, China is ranked 15th in terms of source of FDI in 
Vietnam, with an accumulated total of 640 projects, amounting to more than US$2.5 
billion. This was relatively small in comparison to the US$17.6 billion (ranked 3rd) 
and US$8.6 billion (ranked 7th) from Japan and the US, respectively.97  
Meanwhile, there was economic improvement between Vietnam and the US 
after the latter lifted the embargo in 1994 and the two countries officially established 
diplomatic relations in 1995.98 Since then, bilateral relations have advanced into 
many areas, facilitating the increasing closeness of the two former adversaries. 
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Vietnam has clearly gained significant benefits from its economic relations with the 
US. In 2000, the two nations reached a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement 
(BTA), which allowed Vietnamese goods to enter the huge American market with a 
crucial reduction in tariff rates. In exchange for this convenience, the Vietnamese 
Government made a series of commitments to give American businessmen and 
investors a level playing field. Vietnamese implementation of these commitments is 
to move its economy to be close to a rule-based, free market one.  Since 2001, the 
United States Agency for International Development, through its Support for Trade 
Accelerations Project (STAR), has provided Vietnam with technical assistance in 
realizing BTA commitments. STAR has assisted Vietnam by providing advice and 
training sessions for various government agencies, from national to local, in an effort 
to help Vietnam revise and adopt a number of new laws in accordance with BTA’s 
requirements. This assistance has resulted in remarkable improvements in Vietnam’s 
legal administrative systems, which increasingly made Vietnam an attractive 
destination for foreign investors in general. At the same time, Vietnamese goods 
have continued to flow into American markets with increasing quantities. The US 
has become Vietnam’s largest export market with major products, such as garments, 
footwear, wood products and seafood. These calls are for labour-intensive production 
and Vietnam clearly has a comparative advantage. Increasing exports to the US has 
helped Vietnam significantly in providing more jobs for its labour force.  
Vietnam can achieve better socio-economic stability and development if it 
can maintain the influence of both China and the US in the region since China’s rise 
strengthens the American economy and future prosperity. China is the largest growth 
market in the world for American goods and services. Trading with China, which is 
the third largest export market for the US and the leading market for US agricultural 
products, has helped the US recover from the Global Financial Crisis.99 At the same 
time, the richer China becomes, the greater will be its stake in the security of sea-
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lanes, the stability of the world’s trade and financial regimes. China will not get 
ahead if its rivals do not prosper.100  
Chinese influence in the region, and in Vietnam, has a long history and this 
has grown with trade and investment. Most of the major projects in Southeast Asia 
are currently financed by China. However, Vietnam needs both China and the US to 
remain engaged. This is a reciprocal benefit as Vietnam can use both sources, the one 
to its north and the offshore superpower. China and the US both need Vietnam too as 
it moves towards becoming an important economy in ASEAN. Vietnam is in a 
significant strategic location as an economic corridor from India to the South China 
Sea with major important harbours, such as Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau. 
With this geo-strategic position, Vietnam connects China and India with the rest of 
the Pacific.  
China seeks to invest in the international market due to the expansion of the 
size of its domestic economy. Bordering southern nations, such as Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia, are attractive targets for investment. However, among these countries, 
only Vietnam is ready to adapt to Chinese FDI, because of its infrastructure and 
economic conditions. In seeking to set foot in Asia Pacific, Vietnam is among the 
few countries that has caught the attention of the US. If the US can establish a 
stronger base in Vietnam, it can expand into the rest of the continent. Vietnam’s role 
of “connectivity” links it with Myanmar and to China’s engine growth provinces of 
Yunnan and Guangdong, or the FDI hub of Nanning province, which is also close to 
Hanoi. Thus, Hanoi is the gateway of ASEAN northwards towards Korea and 
Japan.101 With Singapore as the entrepot of Southeast Asia and Myanmar as the 
access for India to mainland Southeast Asia, Vietnam can play an important role for 
China to extend its influence southwards. China is financing numerous infrastructure 
projects to link its southern provinces to mainland Southeast Asia in which Kunming 
in Yunnan province plays a key role as a transport hub. 
If the China-US relationship moves into rivalry, it may cause social 
instability and economic challenges. Each power will try to gain allies and ASEAN 
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will be polarised due to different national interests. Countries such as Laos and 
Cambodia are likely to support China because of their economic dependence. Other 
countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore are already clear American 
allies. Some countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia will choose to remain neutral. 
Vietnam is considered to be among the non-aligned group. According to a leading 
Indonesian analyst, Vietnam is not likely to become an American ally unless it is 
invaded or attacked by China, which would make it rethink its strategy.102 
Increased regional tensions involving China can have dire consequences, 
such as military conflict over Taiwan’s political status, or between China and Japan 
over sovereignty over a group of uninhabitable islands and offshore energy sources 
in the East China Sea, or over the ownership of islands and energy resources in the 
South China Sea. In the worst scenario, those conflicts can escalate, accidentally or 
unintentionally, into a nuclear exchange.103 
5.3.3 Human Rights and Democracy  
Vietnam faces more difficulty in its relationship with the US than with China 
over questions of human rights, democracy and media freedom.104 While Vietnam 
shares a similar political ideology (the one party state) with China, ideological and 
political differences with the US can lead to tensions in bilateral relations. Such 
issues are considered as American values that the US often pressures other nations to 
implement. Vietnam regards cooperation in other sectors as the first priority, while 
human rights and democracy come later.105 While welcoming the improvement of 
bilateral relations with America, the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton affirmed 
that the issues of human rights and democracy need to be addressed in the US-
Vietnam bilateral relationship: 
And we prepared to take the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to the next level of 
engagement, cooperation, friendship and partnership. It is true that profound 
differences exist, particularly over the question of political freedoms. And the United 
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States will continue to urge Vietnam to strengthen its commitment to human rights, and 
give its people even greater say over the direction of their own lives.106 
 President Barack Obama also reiterated the issue of human rights and 
freedom of religion in the US-Vietnam relationship: 
There remain to be - there remain differences in the bilateral relationship, and we 
discussed candidly some of our differences around issues of human rights, for example, 
and freedom of religion.107 
Interviews for this thesis with a Vietnamese scholar of American studies 
suggest that Vietnam’s position between China and the US looks like a boat between 
two banks: if China is too aggressive for Vietnam’s liking in territorial disputes, 
threatening Vietnam’s national independence and territorial integrity, then the boat 
will be driven onto the American side. Meanwhile if the US uses human rights or 
democracy to change the political system of Vietnam, then the boat will be driven 
back to China’s side.108 The issues about human rights refer to point 9 in the July 
2013 US-Vietnam Agreement of Comprehensive Partnership. The US called for 
Vietnam to make “further progress on human rights, including the freedom of 
association and of expression.”109 This is the condition for the US before bilateral 
relationships can advance. Yet the US announced a year later it was lifting the sale of 
lethal weapons to Vietnam on a case-by-case basis. In other words, there is some 
give and take in the US position towards Vietnam.  
However, in spite of the difficulties in US-Vietnam relations regarding 
human rights and democracy, there is a difference between the activities of the US 
Government and those of the anti-Communist overseas Vietnamese living in the US. 
According to Professor Nguyen Manh Hung, there are misperceptions of American 
intentions in Vietnam, which has caused suspicion among Vietnamese leaders who 
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believe that the US aims to overthrow the communist regime through “peaceful 
evolution.” In fact, while the U.S. desires to see a more liberal and democratic 
Vietnam, it has no plans to overthrow the government. The U.S. wants a strong, 
stable and independent Vietnam and so a sudden change of Vietnamese governments 
does not serve American strategic interests. 110  US President Bush reiterated his 
government’s support for Vietnam’s national sovereignty, security and territorial 
integrity. 111  President Obama has also “affirmed the United States’ support for 
Vietnam’s independence, sovereignty, prosperity and integration into the 
international community.”112 
5.4 Vietnam between the US and China over the South China Sea Territorial 
Disputes from 1991 to 2001 
 
The South China Sea is contested by rival sovereignty claims to the Paracel 
Islands (east of Vietnam and southeast of Hainan) and to the many islets, reefs and 
atolls spreading over a large area called “Spratly Archipelago” between southern 
Vietnam, east Malaysia, Brunei, and Palawan island in the Philippines. “Spratly” in 
English was the name of one island only, located in the western part of the area and 
called “Trường Sa” in Vietnamese. Vietnam, Taiwan, China, the Philippines and 
Malaysia keep garrisons on some of the isles in the larger Spratly area. The Paracel 
Islands, to which the Vietnamese claimed sovereignty, have been fully occupied by 
China since 1974.113 
The South China Sea territorial disputes have become the “testing ground” 
for China’s “peaceful rise” strategy and the American dominant position in the 
region, as well as ASEAN’s unity. The disputes over the South China Sea are unique 
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because of the sheer number of parties involved and the importance of sea-lanes. To 
some extent, this dispute has turned into a power struggle between China and the US, 
with Southeast Asia caught in the middle.114 China is making efforts to enhance its 
influence in Asia, and in Southeast Asia in particular, on the way to become a global 
power. In this process, the South China Sea or East Sea is regarded as an effective 
backyard115 to protect Mainland China against maritime threats. On land, China can 
only create strategic influence over three neighbouring countries, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam, but on the sea, especially with control of the South China Sea, China is 
likely to gain controlling influence over all of Southeast Asia. As a result, this 
maritime zone is used as a springboard for China to advance its interests beyond the 
region. 
The US wants to protect its direct interests in the South China Sea. It will be 
difficult for the US to compromise with China over this dispute because American 
interests are related to the leadership position that Washington wishes to maintain in 
the current global system.116 From Vietnam’s perspective, what China and America 
do in the South China Sea territorial disputes demonstrates the two major powers’ 
attitude towards Southeast Asia, and especially Vietnam. With 70% of its imported 
oil transported via the South China Sea, China sees this sea area as its lifeline. For 
many years, China has staked its claims in this zone. As early as 1909, it began to 
occupy the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Archipelago.117 In 1974, China used force to take 
over the entire Paracel group, which at that time was under the administration of the 
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), killing at least 53 South Vietnamese sailors. 
In 1988, China took procession of the Johnson Reef in the Spratlys from the 
Vietnamese. Chinese gunboats sank Vietnamese transport ships supporting a landing 
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party of Vietnamese soldiers, killing 64 Vietnamese soldiers and injuring many 
others. However, these actions have become less frequent and during the latter half 
of the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, China was still biding its time under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping to carry out “charm offensives” in Southeast Asia and 
the world. 118  
Blazevic has argued that competition and conflict in the South China Sea 
involves many nations due to its resources, vital sea-lanes and the ability to serve as 
a security barrier.119 Of the involved parties, China increasingly serves as a “common 
denominator” by intensifying anxiety for its South China Sea maritime neighbours. 
China has been perceived by those states as the most assertive actor due to the 
“aggressive scope” of its claims in the sea with “increasingly belligerent actions” and 
“growing military capacity.” Among those states, Vietnam is most affected, as it is 
first line in the path of Chinese ambitions. The majority of China’s disputes in the 
sea, which are with Vietnam, certainly reveal Vietnam’s vulnerability in the region. 
For Vietnam, things are more complicated, as it must balance claims with China’s 
position as its major source of finance, investment and trade. For China, there is not 
only the fear over any threats to the sea-lanes but also the concern over seabed 
resource control, due to their increasing need for energy.120  
The next chapter examines the development of the Vietnam-China-US 
relationship from the 9/11 attacks in the US to 2015. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE VIETNAM-CHINA-US RELATIONSHIP SINCE 2001 
 
This chapter will continue to examine Vietnam’s position in the triangular 
relationship with China and the US since 2001. It will assess Vietnam’s foreign 
policy with respect to these two powers amid the changed global situation and the 
triangular relations of the 21st century. It will focus on the pros and cons of Vietnam 
in its relationship with China and the US in the situation after the 9/11 attacks in 
New York. From the advantages and disadvantages of Vietnam’s alignment with the 
US, the main argument of the chapter is that if Vietnam uses the rapprochement with 
the US to counter balance Chinese power on its way of development, then the costs 
outweigh the benefits. Rather, Vietnam needs to be very skilful in the triangular 
relations with China and the US. 
6.1 Background to Triangular Relations in the 21st century 
6.1.1 The New Global and Regional Situation after 9/11 
 Prior to 9/11, many American security analysts lamented that the US had 
neglected Southeast Asia in its strategic agenda, describing relations between the US 
and the region as “a policy without a strategy” or “a policy backwater in 
Washington.”1 Some American officials and strategists even placed Southeast Asia 
as “marginal to security in Asia”2 paying more attention to threats in the Taiwan 
Strait and the Korean Peninsula. For most Americans, the region remained “obscure 
and poorly understood.”3  
Since 9/11 however, the US has reversed that policy and placed Southeast 
Asia back on its strategic radar, declaring it the second front in the war on terror. 
Vaughn and Morrison also noted that for the global superpower the region went from 
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one of relatively low priority to one with renewed US attention.4 Since 9/11, there 
has been a shift in the international focus on security and Southeast Asia has gained 
strategic significance for the US.5  
Rabasa has argued that, with large population and vast natural resources, 
Southeast Asia is an area of enormous strategic significance that has not always 
received the level of attention it deserves.6  Southeast Asia is a region with one of the 
largest concentrations of Muslims in the world. Indonesia alone has over 200 million 
Muslims. Muslims are also a majority in Malaysia and constitute significant 
minorities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. This is an important 
feature in regional security because many militant groups are associated with radical 
Islamist ideologies. While these represent a small minority of Muslims, they have the 
potential to influence a larger substratum of the Muslim population. Moreover, the 
deterioration of economic and social conditions after the economic crisis in Southeast 
Asia and the associated political upheaval in Indonesia has produced an environment 
favourable to the activists of terrorists, radical groups and separatist movements. 
Such groups are a direct threat to the United States, operating in a political 
environment that has been profoundly affected by the 9/11 attacks, and by the US 
response.  
As a result, there is a changed calculus of US security interests in the region. 
Rabasa claims that the US is concerned that its war on terrorism not be viewed as an 
anti-Islamic crusade, and so the support of moderate Muslim-majority countries, 
such as Indonesia, is of crucial importance. Therefore, US actions should be framed 
by a strategy of strengthening security structures in the region and promoting 
stability and democracy in states facing internal dissent. In this line, economic 
reconstruction is critical to political stability. The US and other allied countries can 
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help rebuild ASEAN economies by encouraging trade, investment and economic 
reform.7  
As US global and regional interests are linked in Southeast Asia, the primary 
concern for regional stability and security, and to US interests in the region, is 
China’s emergence as a major regional power. It is linked to China’s maritime and 
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Much of this concern reflects an 
underlying, sometimes unspoken fear that China’s assertiveness will increase as its 
power grows. As a result, many Southeast Asian nations rely on the US to guarantee 
regional stability with a view to balance the rise of China.8 In this situation, the 
bilateral relationship between China and the US is an important factor in regional 
stability and development. Vaughn and Morrison have argued that the most 
important bilateral relationship of the 21st century is likely to be that between China 
and the US, and that likelihood of conflict and economic trauma will be great if it is 
poorly managed. However, the benefits, in terms of economic prosperity and world 
peace, will be great if it is handled well.9 
Furthermore, Southeast Asia’s rising importance in the international order has 
been achieved through its regional cooperation mechanism in the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The region has become the driving force for 
regionalization in East Asia with multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the 
“ASEAN plus three” (ASEAN+3, linking the ten states of ASEAN, China, Japan and 
South Korea), “ten plus one” (ASEAN+1), and the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN (CAFTA).10  
In addition to its growing significance, Southeast Asia after 9/11 has also 
posed a strategic dilemma with respect to the interactions of great powers in the 
region. Banlaoi argues that what worries Southeast Asia is the negative reaction of 
major powers to the rise of China and the impact of 9/11 on major powers’ rivalries 
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in the region. The 9/11 attacks have not altered the security fundamentals in 
Southeast Asia. Regional security problems in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean 
Peninsula and the South China Sea persist. These problems continue to encumber 
Southeast Asia with security concerns, making the region highly vulnerable to major 
power politics. Southeast Asia has often been a factor in the politics of large powers 
and the emerging landscape of 9/11 has intensified the situation.  
Banlaoi argues that major powers are now using the war on terror in the 
region as an excuse for active military engagements in Southeast Asia, in preparation 
for any contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula and the South China 
Sea. Thus, in this rivalry, Southeast Asian nations are placed in a strategic dilemma 
in how they manage their relations with the major powers.11 Banlaoi states that the 
reinvigorated American presence in Southeast Asia aims both at waging a war on 
terror and hedging against a rising China, which has given China an impression that 
the US wants to encircle China. Like the US, China also wants to maintain its 
presence in Southeast Asia, which China considers as vital for its own growth and 
prosperity.12  
Eight years later after Banlaoi’s claims in 2003, the US engagement with 
Southeast Asia has become a strategy. According to Thayer, President Obama 
launched the multidimensional policy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific 
(including Southeast Asia) in November 2011.13 Instead of curbing the rise of China, 
the Obama Administration seeks engagement and cooperation with China and 
encourages China to support a rule-based international system. 14  As a result, 
Southeast Asian states are in a bind when both China and the US now express their 
strategic interests in the region and plan to assert their influence.  
6.1.2 Domestic Situation of Vietnam in the New Century 
Vietnam’s foreign strategy of “multi-lateralism and diversification” of its 
international relations has helped it to integrate with the world and the regional 
                                                 
11 Banlaoi, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11’, p. 102. 
12 Banlaoi, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11’, p. 103. 
13 The following discussion is drawn from Thayer, C.A., ‘Background Brief, United States: President 
Obama to Visit Southeast Asia’, Thayer Consultancy, 30 September 2013, pp. 1-4 at 1-3. 
14 Ibid, pp.2-3 
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economy. Its foreign policy of openness is to be a friend and to cooperate with all 
countries in the world on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. To date, Vietnam 
has established comprehensive/strategic partnerships with all UN Security Council 
permanent members. 15  Vietnam has also established strategic partnerships with 
Southeast Asian nations. According to Thayer, Vietnam elevated its bilateral 
relations with Thailand as a strategic partnership in June 2013, which marked 
Vietnam’s first strategic partnership with an ASEAN member. Vietnam also raised 
bilateral relations with Indonesia to a strategic partnership that same month. In 
September 2013, Vietnam signed a strategic partnership agreement with Singapore in 
Hanoi.16 Vietnam upgraded its comprehensive partnership with Malaysia to strategic 
partnership in August 2015.17. The country has been granted MFN status by more 
than 70 countries and territories, including countries and regions with large capital 
resources, high technology and vast markets, such as the US, Japan, EU and newly 
industrialized countries in East Asia.18 
Vietnam is actively integrating into the global economy: its economic ties 
with other countries and international organizations have expanded. Vietnam is now 
a key state in ASEAN and an active member in APEC, ASEM and other 
international economic organizations.19 Vietnam is also committed to the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area. Economic cooperation with major economies, such as the US, EU, 
Japan, Russia, China and India have been broadened. Vietnam signed a bilateral 
trade agreement and is negotiating an investment agreement with the US. Vietnam is 
also negotiating a Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the 
                                                 
15 http://www.vietnambotschaft.org/vietnams-diplomacy-reaches-new-heights-2 (Date of visit 25 May 
2015) 
16 Thayer, C.A., ‘The Present Role and Position of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the 
International System, 1976-2015’, Presentation to International Conference on Vietnam: 40 Years of 
National Reunification with the Cause of Reform (Doi Moi), Development and International 
Integration, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam, 27 April, 2015, pp. 1-23 at 16-17 
17 ‘Vietnam, Malaysia lift relations to strategic partnership’, http://en.nhandan.org.vn/politics/external-
relations/item/3537602-vietnam-malaysia-lift-relations-to-strategic-partnership.html (Date of visit 8 
August 2015) 
18 General information about Vietnam’s economy, 8 September 2012, 
http://lemc4.molisa.gov.vn/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=129 (Date of visit 7 January 2014) 
19 The following discussion is drawn from http://vietnamconsulateinhouston.org/en/economy-and-
tourism/economy (Date of visit 7 January 2014) 
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EU and an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. In January 2007, Vietnam 
joined the WTO, marking its full integration into the global economy.  
These achievements demonstrate Vietnam’s active efforts in enhancing 
economic cooperation with major powers, including its former enemy the US, for 
advantageous national development. In the post-Cold War period, countries that have 
sought to deepen their integration in the world economy have had to engage in 
economic, social and political negotiations with the US. Vietnam, having once been 
at war with the US, proceeded to set the past aside in favour of negotiating trade 
terms with Washington as a path towards its entry into the WTO.20  
Since the policy of Doi moi (renovation), Vietnam’s foreign trade has 
increased by 20% annually. Starting from approximately US$0.5 million before doi 
moi, total exports reached US$48.4 billion in 2007, US$62.7 billion in 2008 and 
US$56.6 billion in 2009. Imports also headed in the right direction, falling from 
US$80.4 billion in 2008 to US$68.8 billion in 2009.21 The 1987 Foreign Direct 
Investment Law of Viet Nam has been amended and supplemented many times, 
notably in 1996 and 2002, which created a more open and attractive environment to 
draw foreign investors into crucial industries, such as export-oriented processing and 
manufacturing. Moreover, the 2005 Investment Law and Enterprise Law have served 
to create an attractive investment environment for Vietnam’s development.  
In sum, there has been positive economic development in Vietnam in the new 
century. Thayer argues that Vietnam’s international role has been improved by its 
successful hosting of APEC and ASEAN summit meetings and as a non-permanent 
member in the UN Security Council. Vietnamese foreign policy to maintain 
independence and economic development has promoted regional security and 
contributed positively to global security. 22  These achievements were due to 
Vietnam’s efforts to enhance its relations with major powers and neighbouring 
                                                 
20 Tay, S.S.C., ‘Asia and the United States after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific’ The 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 28(1), 2004, pp. 113-132 at124. 
21  http://vietnamconsulateinhouston.org/en/economy-and-tourism/economy (Date of visit 7 January 
2014) 
22 Thayer, C.A., ‘The Present Role and Position of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the 
International System, 1976-2015’, p. 20 
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countries, including ASEAN states, in a proactive agenda for international 
integration. 
6.2 Development of the Triangular Vietnam, China and the US Relationship  
6.2.1 Fluctuations in Sino-Vietnamese Relations 
Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations in the new century continued to improve 
despite the occasional tensions with persisting territorial disputes over the South 
China Sea. Amer claims that positive development can be seen in the political and 
economic cooperation between Vietnam and China up to 2000. The exchange of 
visits between the CPV and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enhanced overall 
relations and resulted in the ratification of the Land Border Treaty in 2000, the 
Tonkin Gulf Agreement in 2004 and the completion of the demarcation process of 
the land border in 2008.  However, there have been tensions over the South China 
Sea between 2009 and 2011.23 
This is because Vietnam is a security-conscious state with an acute sense of 
vulnerability due to its long coast, the difficulty of keeping the north and the south 
together, a history of national independence struggles against foreign invasion, and 
the lack of a hinterland. Meanwhile, China, in spite of its huge hinterland, also has a 
sense of vulnerability to foreign threats and encroachments.  The Chinese are envious 
of Vietnam for its long coast, with the feeling they are being unjustly deprived of 
“maritime territory” by the presence of foreign states in Chinese maritime spaces: 
Korea and Japan with the Ryukyus, the Philippines islands and Vietnam. 24  In 
addition, some islands off the coast of China are not under Beijing’s control, but are 
under the jurisdiction of Taiwan. For instance, Quemoy, an island just 2 km off the 
coast of Xiamen, is under Taiwanese control. 
                                                 
23 Amer, R., ‘Vietnam’s Relations with China-A Multifaceted Partnership’, China Policy Institute 
Blog, 17 March 2014, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/03/17/vietnams-
relations-with-china-a-multifaceted-partnership/ (Date of visit 3 January 2015). 
24 Tonnesson, S. ‘Vietnam’s objective in the South China Sea: National or Regional Security?’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2000, 22(1), 2000, pp. 199-220 at 202. 
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6.2.2 Vietnam’s China Foreign Policy in the New Century 
First and foremost, Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China from 2001 to 
2015 is the continuance of the implementation of a policy of multi-lateralisation and 
diversification by Hanoi at a time of regional and international integration. At the 9th 
CPV National Congress in 2001, this desire was then supplemented with a 
declaration that Vietnam is ready to be a friend, reliable partner and responsible 
member of the international community. Progress in this strategy was reported and 
the declaration further reaffirmed at the 10th CPV National Congress in 2006. The 
long transition from Vietnam’s “wish to become a friend” to “ready to be a friend” to 
“is a friend” and finally to “is a friend and reliable partner as well as a responsible 
member” has shown a crucial change in Vietnam’s foreign policy. This is because 
“friend” aims only at the meaning of friendship relations, while “partner” shows the 
cooperation in a number of sectors, through politics, economics, education, and 
security and defence coordination.25  
Consequently, amid the situation of fluctuating relations with China and the 
perception of it as a current threat to Vietnam, the latter still seeks to carry out a 
strategy of cooperation and struggle with its northern neighbour. Le Hong Hiep 
argued that the “hop tac versus dau tranh” [cooperation versus struggle] approach 
has served as the primary tactic of Vietnam’s China policy in the new century.26 
Lemon argues that while enhancing cooperation with China, Vietnam has also 
balanced China’s position through multilateral forums, such as ASEAN. Those who 
adhere to the “balancing camp” believe Hanoi uses ASEAN to “partly transform 
bilateral Sino-Vietnamese disputes into multilateral agenda involving Beijing and 
ASEAN as a group.”27  
                                                 
25 Pham Gia Khiem, ‘Trien khai Chien luoc Ngoai giao toan dien thuc hien thang loi Duong loi doi 
ngoai Dai hoi XI’ [Deployment of the Comprehensive Foreign Strategy in successful Implementation 
of the 9th CPV National Congress Foreign Policy’ in ‘Duong loi Chinh sach Doi ngoai Vietnam trong 
giai doan moi [Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in the New Situation]’, National Political Publisher, Hanoi, 
2011 pp. 7-59 at  27. 
26 Le Hong Hiep, ‘Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization’, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 35(3), 2013, pp. 333-368 at 343. 
27 Lemon, D.W., ‘Vietnam’s Foreign Policy toward China since the 1970s’, MA Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007, pp. 1-87 at 65. 
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Lemon argues that Vietnam found itself concerned about China’s actions, but 
also without an ally to balance against China. 28  As a result, Hanoi tried quiet 
diplomacy with China while it slowly engaged ASEAN to counter China. This is the 
reason why Vietnam stepped up efforts to enmesh itself in regional fora and the 
international community. Vietnam’s ASEAN membership aims to counter the China 
threat in the South China Sea because several ASEAN states share Vietnam’s 
concerns about China’s activities in this territorial dispute. ASEAN membership also 
serves as a strategic safety net that Vietnam could leverage to mitigate direct 
confrontation with China over disputes. 
Moreover, Vietnam has given few hints at possible security cooperation with 
the US in the region to balance China’s influence. Vietnam’s leaders privately view 
the US as a stabilising and balancing force in Southeast Asia.29 Le argues that along 
with growing economic ties, political development is also expanding in the bilateral 
relations between Vietnam and the US, which serves as a big surprise for a number 
of international observers. Over the past decade, many high-ranking visits have been 
exchanged between the two states. Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 
visited Washington in 2005. President George W. Bush paid a reciprocal visit to 
Hanoi in 2006. There were later visits to Washington by Vietnamese President 
Nguyen Minh Triet in 2007 and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2008. China’s 
rise and its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea territorial disputes are 
undoubtedly major factors behind Vietnam’s efforts to forge a closer relationship 
with the US, which is a task that seems to have been facilitated by the US strategic 
‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.30  
Le analysed that with China’s rise and aggression in the South China Sea, 
Vietnam wants to be closer to the US in an attempt to bargain with China in this 
territorial dispute. This argument is not, however, supported by the views of 
Vietnam’s strategists interviewed during fieldwork for this thesis who say Vietnam is 
doing a balancing act between the powers. In addition to military cooperation with 
                                                 
28 The following discussion is drawn from Lemon, D.W., ‘Vietnam’s Foreign Policy toward China 
since the 1970s’, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007, pp. 1-87 at 65 
29 Lemon, ‘Vietnam’s Foreign Policy toward China since the 1970s’, Master Thesis, p. 6. 
30 Le, ‘Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External Engagement’, p. 7. 
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the US, Vietnam also has defence cooperation with China. Interestingly, there have 
been more high-ranking exchange visits of political officials between Vietnam and 
China than between Vietnam and the US from 2008 to 2013.31  Thus, the evidence 
does not support the view that Vietnam has enhanced its relations with America as a 
response to China. China itself has boosted its bilateral relations with the US through 
a number of bilateral cooperation mechanisms, but scholars do not believe that this is 
a reaction to American domination. The matter of one nation moving to strengthen 
its relations with another country derives from its own national requirements and 
interests. Furthermore, the US strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific (including 
Southeast Asia) comes after the US had made its own calculations over the benefits 
of reappearing in the region with the presence of a rising China.  
Vietnam’s military enhancement is also a recent issue after it found it has not 
put enough attention into defence recently32. Thus, escalating tensions in the South 
China Sea disputes have caused Vietnam to strengthen its defence capacity to ensure 
safety, security and territorial integrity. Another reason for Vietnam’s military 
enhancement is to create more strength in discussion with great powers because once 
Vietnam possesses a stronger military capability, major powers have to factor its 
role, position or even reactions in their strategic calculations. 33  This strategic 
calculation has resulted in the concept of “strategic trust,” which was mentioned in 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore 
in 2013: 
We all understand that if this region falls into instability and especially, armed 
conflicts, there will be neither winners nor losers. Rather, all will lose. Suffice it to say, 
therefore, that working together to build and reinforce strategic trust for peace, 
cooperation and prosperity in the region is in the shared interest of us all. For Vietnam, 
strategic trust is perceived, above all, as honesty and sincerity. To build strategic trust, 
we ourselves need to abide by international law, to uphold the responsibilities of 
nations, especially of major powers, and work to improve the efficiency of multilateral 
security cooperation mechanisms. Countries, both big and small, must build their 
                                                 
31 Interview 2, Southeast Asian official, February 2013. 
32 The following discussion is drawn from the interview with Hoang Anh Tuan, February 2012. 
33 Interview Hoang Anh Tuan, February 2012. 
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relations on the basis of equality and mutual respect and, at a higher level, on mutual 
strategic trust.34 
Vietnam clearly wishes to send this message to great powers. Given the 
power shifts in the Asia-Pacific, Vietnam needs to address the triangular relations 
using all its diplomatic skill and innovation. Indeed, Vietnam President Truong Tan 
Sang made official visits to China and the US in June and July 2013 respectively. 
These visits aimed to enhance bilateral relations between Vietnam with these two 
major powers to build up “strategic trust” between all parties.  In addition to China 
and the US, Vietnam also attempted to boost relations with other regional powers 
through high-ranking meetings with Russia, Japan and India, with a focus on 
economic issues with Japan and greater cooperation in defence and energy with 
Russia and India.35 Technology and military issues are recorded as the main features 
of cooperation between Vietnam and Russia, with the first Russian submarine 
handed over to Vietnam on 7 November 2013. The Vietnamese government, 
however, insists that the presence of the submarine is not a threat to any other 
nation.36 
6.2.3 The Vietnam - US Rapprochement  
According to a number of international observers, Vietnam is seeking to get 
closer to the US in an attempt to counter balance the tensions with China.37 Zhao 
suggests Vietnam regards the US as an important counter-weight to China. The 
                                                 
34 Shangri-La Dialogue 2013 Keynote Address, Nguyen Tan Dung, Prime Minister, Vietnam, 
‘Building Strategic Trust for Peace, Cooperation and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region’, 1 June 
2012. Available at https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-
dialogue-2013-c890/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-2f46/keynote-address-d176 (Date of visit 
8 August 2015) 
35 Thuan Phuong, ‘Long tin Chien luoc va Ngoai giao nuoc lon [Trans: Strategic Trust and Diplomatic 
Relations with Major Powers]’, Vietnamnet, 27 December 2013. Available at 
http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/tuanvietnam/155403/-long-tin-chien-luoc--va-ngoai-giao-nuoc-lon.html 
,(Date of visit 8 January 2014 
36 ‘Hop tac Quan su Viet-Nga Khong Nham Chong lai Nuoc Thu Ba [Trans: The Russian-Vietnamese 
Military Cooperation Not Threaten the Third Nation]’, 26 December 2013, http://laodong.com.vn/doi-
ngoai/hop-tac-quan-su-viet-nga-khong-nham-chong-lai-nuoc-thu-ba-169613.bld (Date of visit 8 
January 2014) 
37 Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Dispute and China-ASEAN Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1), 2013, 
pp. 27-43 at 35. 
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Vietnam-US relationship cannot go beyond the constraints imposed by both states, as 
the Vietnamese have concerns over the Chinese reaction, and to the US congress, 
which has hindered the US Government’s effort to build closer ties with Vietnam. 
Yet, a number of visits have been made. In August 2010, the aircraft carrier USS 
George Washington travelled along Vietnam’s coastline and received visits from 
high-ranking Vietnamese military officials.38 The US Navy has sought service and 
re-supply facilities for its vessels in Vietnam, with three vessels repaired there for the 
past three years. The last vessel was the USNS Richard E. Byrd, a civilian-crewed 
ship in the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command. This was a logistics ship and the 
status of Vietnam-US rapprochement made it easier to call on Cam Ranh Bay for 
minor repairs in August 2011. During that month, the two countries concluded their 
first military agreement since the end of the Vietnam War. 39  
More impressively, in a visit to Vietnam in June 2012, the US Defence 
Secretary Leon Panetta stressed the importance of extending defence relationship 
with partners like Vietnam as the US shifts its emphasis to the Asia-Pacific: 
It’s only natural that we look for future opportunities, for partnership with Southeast 
Asia nations such as Vietnam… We want to explore ways to expand that relationship, 
building on the comprehensive memorandum of understanding that was signed by our 
two nations last year, and that will extend our practical cooperation…In particular, we 
want to work with Vietnam on critical maritime issues including the code of conduct, 
focusing on the South China Sea, and also working to improve freedom of navigation 
in our oceans…We are rebalancing our forces to the Asia-Pacific region so that in the 
future, 60% of our forces will be located in this region. For that reason, it will be 
particularly important to be able to work with partners like Vietnam…We need to 
obviously build a stronger defence relationship with countries like Vietnam.40 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the time was ripe for a shift in bilateral 
relations between Vietnam and the US. The end of the Cold War shattered the status 
quo in Southeast Asia, leaving Hanoi to admit that improvement in the relationship 
                                                 
38 The above discussion is drawn from Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Dispute and China-ASEAN 
Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1), 2013, pp. 27-43 at 35 
39 Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Dispute and China-ASEAN Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1), 2013, 
pp. 27-43 at 35. 
40 News Transcript of Media Availability with Secretary Panetta in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 3 June 
2012. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5051(Date of visit 
9 August 2015) 
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with the US would serve Vietnam’s national interests, not only economically but also 
strategically, as China had always been Vietnam’s prime concern. 41  However, 
Vietnam should always bear in mind that for the US, the key to a strategic 
relationship should not cause China to believe that there was an American-
Vietnamese plot to threaten China’s national security. China will always be more 
important to Vietnam than the US, and China will always be more important to the 
US than Vietnam.42 
From a realist perspective, countries must rely on themselves and seek 
alliances against outside threats. Vietnam is a small country so it cannot always 
choose to use its military to protect itself. Historical lessons have shown there is a 
heavy price for Vietnam using the military approach. Unlike Japan, which has 
strategic relations with the US, Vietnam had no choice in terms of an alliance after 
Vietnamese-Chinese relations were broken and the Soviet Union collapsed. The 
differences in ideologies and obstacles from the past have prevented Vietnam from 
approaching the US as a “supporter” to fill in the “power vacuum” in Southeast Asia 
to counterbalance the rise of China.43 As Vietnamese Deputy Minister of National 
Defence, Lieutenant-General Nguyen Chi Vinh mentioned in an interview with a 
Vietnamese journalist: 
In bilateral relations, we plan to be independent and self-reliant in relations with each 
country. We do not engage in relations and issues of other countries, especially major 
ones, if they are not related to Vietnam’s interests or peace and stability in the region. 
We do not go with or agree with one country to be against another.44 
Thus, according to Deputy Minister Vinh, with its strategic geo-politic 
position, Vietnam is pushed into a situation where major powers seek to win it over 
to their side. In this case, the only choice for Vietnam is independence and self-
reliance: 
                                                 
41Brown, ‘Vietnam and America: Parameters of the Possible’, p. 63. 
42 Ibid, p. 66. 
43 Luong Ngoc Thanh, ‘Vietnam in the Post-Cold War Era: New Foreign Policy Directions’, Journal 
of International Development and Cooperation, 18(3), 2012, pp. 31-52 at 34.  
44 ‘Vietnam does not accept dependent peace, says General’, http://en.baomoi.com/Info/Vietnam-
does-not-accept-dependent-peace-says-General/3/104538.epi (Date of Visit 9 August 2015) 
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We should not let other countries compromise on our back…However, I want to stress 
the fact that may be hard to accept: that respect, solidarity and friendship can only be 
gained and be practical when Vietnam is strong, independent, self-reliant and capable 
of protecting itself.45 
As a small country, Vietnam may face huge challenges in its bilateral relations 
with major powers, especially over territorial disputes. The solution is to seek 
support by using multilateral mechanisms and institutions. Lieutenant General Vinh 
stated: 
The factor is to open and make transparent all the issues for the world to know what is 
right and wrong. Openness and transparency are weapons for minor country to protect 
itself, protecting the countries that are confident that they have the truth and we have 
the truth. Those countries do not want to be open and transparent in international 
relations when they do not have enough confidence in their rightness.46 
The approach of bringing the world’s attention to the territorial disputes 
between Vietnam and China would seem to international observers that Vietnam is 
internationalising the South China Sea issue. Those opinions, however, are a one-
sided view, and do not see the whole picture of Vietnam’s foreign policy, as they 
lack a systematic insight into Vietnamese international affairs strategies. According 
to Lieutenant General Vinh, openness and transparency do not mean 
internationalisation: 
If defining internationalisation is to attract a country that has no sovereignty interests to 
solve the issue, to be a referee or even depends on the strength of this country to gain 
advantages in negotiation and solving territorial disputes, Vietnam will never do that. 
However, when we are open and make transparent all the issues to the world and listen 
to the ideas from the international community in bilateral and multilateral fora, it 
cannot be considered internationalisation.47  
In this direction, the US-Vietnam rapprochement does not necessarily mean 
that Vietnam is luring a third party to act as a counterpoise in dealing with a rising 
China and Chinese aggressiveness in the South China Sea. This is clearly mentioned 
in the Deputy Minister Vinh’s address to the Tuoi Tre journal:  
                                                 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
47 ‘Vietnam does not accept dependent peace, says General’, http://en.baomoi.com/Info/Vietnam-
does-not-accept-dependent-peace-says-General/3/104538.epi (Date of Visit 9 August 2015) 
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We enhance relations with many different countries at the same time and it is natural 
that some of those countries have conflicting interests. But out of our independence in 
policy, Vietnam’s relationship with other countries does not depend on any other 
outside party and we don’t mind when one relationship affects another relationship. 
Why is it so? Because in all of our relationships, we have one common principle: 
relationship between Vietnam and another country does not harm the interest of a third 
country. So in dialogues with other countries, we never talk ill behind the back of 
another country.48 
6.2.4 Vietnam’s US Policy in the New Century 
Vietnam’s foreign policy toward the US follows the CPV’s resolution49 to 
carry out a strategy of self-reliance through multilateralism and diversification. 
Multilateralism means Vietnam wants to broaden its external relations with all 
foreign countries while diversification means this policy is implemented in every 
sector from economic, political, security and military areas, including cooperation 
between the CPV and other parties in the world. This successful approach may be 
considered Vietnam’s soft power, which has resulted in more leverage and strength 
in its bilateral relations with major powers. 
The bilateral trade agreement (BTA) between Hanoi and Washington signed 
in 2001 allowed Vietnam to further expand trade and cooperation with the US. The 
BTA was a major step toward fully normalizing US-Vietnam commercial relations, 
as it restored reciprocal most-favoured-nation (MFN) status. To achieve this deal, 
Vietnam has undertaken a wide range of market-oriented economic reforms, but for 
the US, extending MFN treatment to Vietnam meant significantly reducing US tariffs 
on most imports from Vietnam.50 Deepened economic and diplomatic ties with the 
US brought about multiple advantages for Vietnam and balanced China’s increased 
economic, political and cultural influence in Southeast Asia. Economically, the US is 
a vast market for Vietnam’s export-driven economy. Economic interdependence has 
had two-fold results. On the one hand, trade and investment from the US helped to 
                                                 
48 ‘Vietnam Seeks No Outside Help over China Issues’, 30 October 2011, 
http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/publications/vietnamese-publications/621-vietnam-seeks-no-
outside-help-over-china-issues (Date of visit 16 December 2013) 
49 Interview 3, February 2012. 
50 Manyin, M.E., ‘The Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement’ in V. Largo (ed.), Vietnam: Current 
Issues and Historical Background, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2002, pp.29-46 at 29.  
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develop Vietnam’s domestic economy, strengthen its financial position and allow it 
to modernize its military. On the other hand, Vietnam’s security is increased through 
interdependence with the US.51  
Vietnam sided with Japan that the US should be invited to the EAS in 
December 2005. China wanted to exclude the US. Vietnam lost this particular 
diplomatic point, but Lemon has argued Vietnamese leaders believed their national 
interests could be better secured in maintaining a tacit strategic relationship with the 
world’s leading power, rather than by succumbing to the aspiring hegemon next 
door.52 Yet as with Le, Lemon overstates the case53, as it is not a zero sum game but 
a question of balance. Vietnam believes that moving closer to the US will better 
serve its security than surrendering to the neighbouring giant China entirely. The 
question of whether to follow China or the US has occupied Vietnamese scholars for 
decades and it is always a hotly debated issue, even in modern times. After the Sino-
Soviet split during the Cold War, Vietnam had a hard time balancing its relations 
with the two antagonistic powers. This led to a downward spiral in Sino-Vietnamese 
relations in the 1970s, which reached a climax when China invaded Vietnam in early 
1979. According to Farley, China’s rationale for this invasion was to punish Hanoi 
for its action in Cambodia, and for its association with the Soviet Union.54 This is 
why, according to a Southeast Asia official55, it is never wise for Vietnam to align 
with one power while neglecting another. It is a matter of realist politics: the US is 
far away from Vietnam while China is so close. As a result, Vietnam needs to be 
very skilful in the triangular relations with China and the US. Vietnam has 
historically considered China as its most important friend, so Vietnam will not now 
shift to the US and leave China. Vietnam values its partnership with China over the 
US. 
                                                 
51 Lemon, ‘Vietnam’s Foreign Policy toward China since the 1970s’, p. 43. 
52 Lemon, ‘Vietnam’s Foreign Policy toward China since the 1970s’, p. 72. 
53 Le, ‘Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External Engagement’, p. 5. 
54 Farley, R., ‘If Vietnam and China Went to War: Five Weapons Beijing Should Fear’, The National 
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With other ASEAN states, Vietnam has welcomed US rebalancing to the 
region, viewing this as providing opportunities for the two countries to boost bilateral 
relations. 56 The US presence in Southeast Asia brings about both pros and cons to 
Vietnam. While Vietnam considers America’s return as a good opportunity for 
improvements in political, economic, security and military coordination, the 
American return can create challenges, such as competition with China, which puts 
ASEAN between a rock and a hard place. Vietnam sees these developments as more 
positive than negative because they create more possibilities for the country to 
enhance its relations with the world’s leading power. Vietnam’s general foreign 
policy favours multilateralism and requires Vietnam to position itself as a friend, a 
trusted partner and a responsible member of the international community. For this 
reason, it will not go with the US for fear of China. 
6.3 Vietnam between China and the US since 2001 to 2015 
6.3.1 Security Affairs 
The very first security dilemma that Vietnam faced in the triangular 
relationship with China and the US is the difficult situation of being squeezed 
between the two powers. Sutter argues that the security interests of each power in the 
South China Sea overlap. Through a long series of initiatives, culminating most 
recently in the Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, 
the US seeks to protect its allies and related interests. This is, however, occurring in 
the same areas where China is seeking to protect is coastal waters, with key security 
and sovereign interests in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and territorial claims in the 
Yellow, East China and South China Seas.57  
From Vietnam’s perspective, it is not desirable to have to choose between 
China and the US. China is economically necessary but politically feared, while the 
US is no longer the enemy and an indispensable partner. While the Asian giant 
guarantees development, the US guarantees security. These are different priorities 
compared to the past and Vietnam must adjust to these new realities. Strengthening 
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the state and developing a strong nation can only occur through complete economic 
robustness. 58  Ott argues that the ascendance of the US as the world’s “sole 
superpower,” and the rapid emergence of China as East Asia’s preeminent regional 
power, present Vietnam with a dilemma. The rise of China has posed a potential 
threat whereas the pivot of the US to Asia has offered a potential solution.59 This is 
why the relationship with both powers is equally important to Vietnam’s national 
stability and security. Following this perception and approach, party leaders and 
commentators in Hanoi pointed out that Vietnam has considerable experience in 
constructive engagement on bilateral issues, particularly with China and the US. 
However, it should resist the temptation to fuel US suspicion with regards to its 
relations with China, given that such efforts are likely to fail.60 
The South China Sea territorial disputes created a security dilemma for 
Vietnam. While Vietnam wishes to address the territorial dispute multilaterally, 
China wants to settle the problem bilaterally. Thus, US willingness in solving this 
dispute is regarded as threatening Beijing’s interests. In 2010, when US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton suggested that the US was interested in resolving the South 
China Sea disputes, Hanoi celebrated.61 Hanoi is a critical gauge of some of the most 
intractable problems facing Southeast Asia with regards to China. Among Southeast 
Asian nations, Vietnam arguably has the longest history and most extensive 
experience of dealing with China, and recently there have been close ties, but the 
Chinese decision to move to shows of force has been a sore point.  While China’s 
neighbours seek greater US economic, diplomatic and military involvement in the 
region to counter-balance Chinese growing power, every country in the region also 
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desires a close relationship with Beijing.62 In other words, the littoral states of the 
South China Sea are pursuing a two-pronged foreign policy: one is to induce the US 
that it should remain available to provide support, including military support, and the 
other is to keep their relations with the Chinese.  
Despite the difficulties in dealing with these two superpowers, Vietnam is not 
likely to opt for one power over another, and any argument claiming Vietnam will 
move closer to the US to counter-balance the rise of China is at variance with 
Vietnam’s stated policy. According to Ott, Vietnamese party leaders, through foreign 
affairs channels, inform Beijing frequently and explicitly that Vietnam can never 
accept China’s maritime claims. At the same time, Vietnamese leaders made efforts 
to cultivate and increase a closer relationship with the US.63  
Starting with the cautious cooperation in resolving POW/MIA cases in the 
1980s, actual U.S.-Vietnam military-to-military contacts began in the mid-1990s. 
These have blossomed into regular annual US naval visits to Vietnamese ports, a 
structure of “strategic dialogue” between the two countries and regular references by 
senior Vietnamese officials to a “strategic partnership” with the US.64 From 2005 to 
2010, the US-Vietnam defence relationship had strategic implications, touching upon 
core issues of military-to-military relationship with a comprehensive expansion of 
cooperation and strategic dialogue. 65 In 2011 and 2012, American and Vietnamese 
defence cooperation was aimed at deepening strategic-level dialogues, with a focus 
on the capacity of building efforts and opportunities for service-specific activities. 
                                                 
62 This source quoted Glaser (2012b) from Muhammad, A.K., ‘South China Sea Security Dilemma’, 
17 May 2013. Available at 
http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=98:south-china-sea-security-
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63 Ott, M., ‘Vietnam’s China Dilemma: Steering in New Strategic Environment’, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 3 April 2012, 
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64 Prior to 2013 the U.S. and Vietnam held diplomatic discussions about raising bilateral relations to a 
strategic partnership along the lines of other strategic partnership agreement negotiated by Vietnam. In 
the end both sides pulled back and agreed on a comprehensive partnership instead. 
65 The following discussion is drawn from Jordan, C.W., Stern, L.M and Lohman, W., ‘U.S.-Vietnam 
Defense Relations: Investing in Strategic Alignment’, 18 July 2012. Available at 
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The annual US-Vietnam Political, Security and Defence Dialogue and the US-
Vietnam Defence Policy Dialogue gradually expanded the way the military forces of 
both countries meet new security challenges, further strengthening bilateral 
cooperation in defence and other security issues. 
According to Ott, the largely unspoken and unmistaken driver for this close 
relationship is a shared concern about China. Hanoi’s growing rapprochement with 
the US, is the most significant manifestation of Vietnam’s ability to steer a middle 
course between the US and China and reconcile its strategic dilemma.66 Vietnam-US 
relations are more nuanced and influenced by Vietnamese domestic concerns as well 
as the legacy of the past. Indeed, in the US rebalance to Asia strategy, ASEAN is 
considered as the leading priority in an E3 (Expanded Economic Engagement), as 
well as in other regional cooperative forums proposed by ASEAN. In all of these, 
Vietnam is an active member. Meanwhile, ASEAN has been China’s comprehensive 
strategic partner for ten years with a number of bilateral commercial cooperation 
programs.67 
 In the specific case of Vietnam, Hanoi’s relationship with Washington has 
improved, but it does not have a mutual defence treaty to fall back on, unlike the 
Philippines. With the US refusal to sell arms to Vietnam prior to October 2014,68 and 
then the US lift of the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam on a case-by-case basis, 
there is no guarantee that the US would rush to Vietnam’s defence, especially in the 
event of a war against China. Moreover, due to the geographical location, China is 
the neighbour, so moderation and steady diplomacy are essential for Vietnam to 
move forward by strengthening the relationship with the US while maintaining an air 
                                                 
66 Ott, M., ‘Vietnam’s China Dilemma: Steering in New Strategic Environment’, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 3 April 2012, 
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67 Interview 4, 6 May 2013. 
68 The so-called arms embargo was imposed in the mid-1980s when the International Trafficking in 
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of polite opposition to China. 69  Jordan, Stern and Lohman also argue that the 
Vietnamese have realized that engaging more with the US does not necessarily mean 
engaging less with China. 70  Vietnam continues to acknowledge the critical 
importance of an effective and friendly relationship with China. This means that the 
Vietnamese will not risk damage to their relationship with China in order to 
strengthen their relationship with the U.S.71 
6.3.2 Socio-economic Affairs 
Regarding the socio-economic dilemma that Vietnam faced in its interactions 
with China and the US in Southeast Asia, the first question is how can Vietnam be 
skilful enough to avoid being caught up in the strategic rivalry between two major 
powers at the expense of national security. As Chinese economic growth expands, it 
is embracing the whole of Southeast Asia, particularly those nations along the sub-
Mekong River Delta nations (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand) as 
a springboard to go further to the outside world. Vietnam needs to continue to affirm 
its stable and sustainable development in the bilateral relationship with China, a 
matter of crucial significance to the two countries and the region. During the GFC 
the world’s leading developed economies suffered from financial crisis, but China 
continued to import goods at a growing rate. China now contributes to 10% of the 
world’s GDP, equivalent to that of the whole EU.72  
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China’s economic expansion over the past few decades has created a new 
middle class dedicated to consumption, thus boosting Chinese domestic demand. In 
addition to that, the higher value of Chinese currency has also paved the way for 
more convenient conditions for other foreign countries to export to China. Under the 
slogan of “preserve internal resources, increase exploiting and using external 
sources,” 73 China is also relocating the abundant energy, ingredients and labour 
sectors, which contribute to pollution in less-developed neighbours in the region, 
especially in the sub-Mekong River Delta. China’s huge demand for energy and 
ingredients can be considered a possible threat to other nations, especially to 
neighbouring countries. In comparison with the US, Vietnam is more dependent on 
China in terms of its economic development. Although the US has become Vietnam's 
biggest export market, China remains Vietnam’s largest import market, and without 
China, Vietnam’s economy may suffer major blows.74  
US economic assistance for countries in Southeast Asia is also something that 
Vietnam should take into consideration. As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated 
during his trip to Vietnam: 
On December 16, Secretary of State John Kerry announced an initial commitment of 
US$ 32.5 million in new regional and bilateral assistance to advance maritime capacity 
building in Southeast Asia. Including this new funding, our planned region-wide 
funding support for maritime capacity building exceeds US$ 156 million for the next 
two years.75 
According to Tiezzi, this funding was seen as a response to China’s growing 
assertiveness in the regional territorial disputes. Vietnam has become a new recipient 
of US maritime security assistance in its strategy to rebalance Asia. The US wants to 
extend its ties beyond its long-term allies of Japan, South Korea and the 
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Philippines.76 Vietnam would receive US$ 18 million from the United States as 
commitment from Secretary of State John Kerry: 
As an example of our commitment to strengthen maritime securities in Southeast Asia, 
the United States intends to provide up to US$ 18 million in a new assistance to 
Vietnam to enhance the capacity of coastal patrol units to deploy rapidly for search and 
rescue, disaster response, and other activities, including through provisions of five fast 
patrol vessels in 2014 to the Vietnamese Coast Guard.77 
This is where an economic dilemma for may turn out to be a security 
dilemma, as China views the American economic assistance for Vietnam’s defence 
as part of a larger containment strategy towards China through a closer relationship 
with Vietnam. The Global Times reveals how China perceived the US security 
assistance to Vietnam: 
First of all, provocations from the Philippines and Vietnam, with the support of U.S. 
troops, make the possibility of Sino-U.S. military conflict larger than in the past…A 
U.S. military aircraft or warship may use an “accident” to provoke war.78 
Yuen claims that the U.S. commitment to assist Vietnam with US$18 billion 
for buying patrol boats to improve its maritime capabilities may provoke more 
conflict in the South China Sea.79 Zhu Feng, a professor of international security at 
Nanjing University, was quoted as saying that: 
The US is trying to expand its political and maritime security influence in the South 
China Sea by providing financial support to Southeast Asian countries, so that it can 
confront China’s power in the region.80 
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Another Chinese analyst, Xue Li, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science, stated that: 
The more the U.S. involves itself in the South China Sea issue, the more China will do 
to counter the situation, which will eventually lead to more conflict and harm relations 
between China and Southeast Asian countries.81 
6.3.3 Cultural Affairs 
The dilemma of Vietnam choosing between China and the US in the cultural 
sector can be seen in the political system and ideology. Vietnam has the same 
political structure as China in the single-party state mechanism and shares similar 
cultural values. A closer US-Vietnam relationship requires change from within 
Vietnam’s political system, including giving ground on human rights and democracy. 
These two issues are a barrier between the ruling CPV and Washington. Although 
the US is a realist power taking action on the basis of its national interests, it never 
loses its enthusiasm for promoting Western values, such as democracy, freedom and 
human rights. Liberalisation could jeopardise the legitimacy of the Vietnam’s ruling 
party. This dilemma between Hanoi and Washington will probably turn into a long 
term issue, as Vietnam’s ruling party will retain its leading position while it 
continues to demonstrate success in national development, although issues of human 
rights or democracy will not disappear from Washington’s diplomatic program.82  
Vietnam is still a single-party state under the rule of the CPV. With its poor 
record on human rights and democracy, American human rights activists and 
politicians are questioning Washington’s increasing business cooperation with 
Hanoi. They believe that increased trade should be accompanied by civil and 
political reforms. As Vu argues, if Hanoi wants the US to be a true friend, it may 
have to change itself first.83 If Vietnam has to choose at the end of the day, China is 
in many ways a more difficult problem to address than the US. While the US 
demands human rights and democracy for Vietnam, this threat is only for political 
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reform. It does not touch on national independence or freedom. If Vietnam has to 
choose between the two powers, the choice will be between party interest and 
national interest. In theory these should be the same, and the answer for Vietnam at 
the present time is how to be a friend of all major powers, including both the US and 
China.  
Another concern is that Vietnam may suffer in the triangular relationship 
between Beijing and Washington and become a “two-faced” nation. Vietnam will 
neither pledge an alliance to Washington, nor will it constantly maintain a 
brotherhood with China.84 In fact, Vietnam has adopted the diplomatic strategy of 
engagement and “not choosing” between China and the US. Hanoi has displayed 
some solidarity with Beijing since diplomatic normalisation in 1991, with robust 
mechanisms for managing the relationship, such as 100 delegations exchanged 
annually. China has become Vietnam’s largest trading partner. Vietnam and China 
also have joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, reciprocal naval port visits by Chinese 
and Vietnamese naval visits, and exchange visits by the two Defence Ministers.  
Vietnam, however, has also sought to repair its bilateral relations with the US 
as a strategic insurance against China by providing permission for US naval ships to 
visit its ports or hosting the US Defence Secretary’s visit to the country. These 
signals have proved that the bilateral relationship has reached a new level. Owing to 
its engagement of both major powers, Vietnam may either be regarded with 
suspicion by both powers, or its dual strategies of engagement and enmeshment 
could be recognised as dividends.85  
6.4 Vietnam in the South China Sea Territorial Disputes 2001-2015 
Contrary to the charm offensive with “soft power” strategy towards Southeast 
Asian nations, China has currently demonstrated its aggressiveness in the territorial 
disputes by declaring the South China Sea as its “core interest.” Beijing will not 
allow any discussion or questions about their policies and it will probably engage the 
military presence of any power. China has even recently warned US oil companies 
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not to take part in any joint exploration agreement in the South China Sea with 
Vietnam.86  
China has undertaken a number of assertive actions in this sea area, such as 
clarifying the U-shaped claim, increasing military and paramilitary as well as civilian 
activities in the area to achieve a de facto control over the zone set by the line. 
China’s military build-up, especially naval modernization and the construction of a 
naval base in Sanya, could serve as a gateway to the South China Sea. China has also 
deployed systematically patrol vessels and boats from various Chinese maritime law 
enforcement agencies to the South China Sea. During the time of the unilaterally 
declared fishing ban between May and August 1999, which has since been imposed 
annually, Chinese maritime security forces have repeatedly detained Vietnamese 
fishermen, confiscated fishing boats and charged fines ranging from US$8,000 to 
US$10,000 for their release. Since the summer of 2007, China has threatened a 
variety of oil and gas companies to stop joint offshore exploration operations with 
Vietnam or face the consequences when dealing business with Chinese 
counterparts.87  
Consequently, as Tonesson argues, the assertive actions of China could be a 
threat to the Vietnamese’s territorial integrity. They provide Vietnam with a choice 
between two main strategies: either defend its claims to the Spratlys (Truong Sa) and 
insist that China return the Paracels (Hoang Sa), or define the main aim of keeping 
and promoting regional peace to enhance human security.88 In the first scenario, 
Vietnam requires a military build-up, nationalist mobilization and renewed attempts 
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to find allies abroad to present a counter-balance to China. In the second, Vietnam 
needs to increase regional and international trade to engage China. It is pointed out 
that there are two basic problems with the first choice when Vietnam is still a poor 
country and can hardly afford to build naval and air forces that can match Chinese 
naval power, despite Vietnamese strength and determination to maintain a minor 
deterrent role with modern Russian-built fighter aircraft and warships. Moreover, 
Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN does not represent a counter-balance with China, 
because the only power that can counter-balance China is the US. As a result, the 
only situation to make the first choice available is to radically improve its 
relationship with the US, while Sino-American relations deteriorate. In this case, 
success gained with the US means a serious damage to Vietnam’s relations with 
China. Tonnesson supposed that it seemed logical for Vietnam to either apply a 
passive, reactive foreign policy or choose the second strategy to actively engage the 
region in the new global situation. 
The argument of this thesis is that Vietnam is not using enhanced relations 
with the U.S. in an attempt to counter balance its relationship with China. Vietnam 
uses balancing strategy with both China and the US and does not play one power off 
the other. It seeks to be friends with both powers while keeping an eye on both of 
them. Vietnam is practical and careful not to annoy the US and China in a system of 
global interdependence. Vietnam’s priority is to protect its territorial integrity against 
China’s assertive claim over the South China Sea. Vietnam need not have to 
cooperate with the US and downgrade relations with China. It has many diplomatic 
channels of cooperation. Vietnamese foreign policy since the time of Renovation 
(doi moi) has been multi-lateral and diverse and this has been reiterated since the 6th 
Congress of the CPV in 1986.  
For the last 60 years, Vietnam has had both positive and negative relations 
with China. Today, Vietnam has affirmed its friendship and cooperation with China. 
This type of relationship plays an important role in the development of each nation, 
along with peace, stability and security in the region. However, both nations face 
unsolved matters of history. These problems include the territorial disputes over the 
South China Sea. For the US, with its “back to Southeast Asia strategy” in the “Asia-
Pacific Century,” Vietnam views U.S. policy of rebalancing to the region as a chance 
to create more opportunities for countries in the region to boost their bilateral 
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relationships with the US. However, Vietnam is also aware of the fact that the 
American return to Southeast Asia can create challenges. In the multilateral 
perspective, US rebalancing to the region amid the rise of China can put ASEAN 
countries, including Vietnam, in the difficult situation of a possible competition 
between these two powers.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese are concerned about whether Vietnam will lean 
towards the US as a hedge against China. This is the situation that Vietnam has 
faced. Vietnam always considers China as its most important friend. Vietnam has 
never considered the US ‘back to Southeast Asia’ policy as a method to reject China. 
Vietnam’s foreign policy acts under the Party’s resolution to carry out the strategy of 
independence and self-reliance. This tactic can be seen as a Vietnamese exercise of 
“soft power,” which has brought about more leverage and strength for Vietnam in the 
relations with outside partners.89  
The next chapter explores the implications of the Sino-American interactions 
for Southeast Asia and Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM 
  
This chapter will focus on exploring the possible impacts of Sino-American 
interactions in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. This is followed 
by an assessment of implications on how to maximise regional and state advantages 
while minimising possible disadvantages. 
7.1 Implications for Southeast Asia 
7.1.1 Advantages and Disadvantages 
Whether Sino-American interactions can bring about an opportunity or a 
threat to Southeast Asia is a matter of debate among international relations scholars. 
As Zhu has argued, China’s ascent has aroused boundless discussion about its 
implications on international politics and global security. The most common 
discussion centres on theoretical and policy debates about whether a rising China 
constitutes a threat or an opportunity, whether it is a conservative status quo power to 
be engaged with or a rising revisionist state to be contained.1 Cha reiterated the 
prediction of popular American international relations scholars since 1993 that Asia 
would be “ripe for rivalry”2 due to a combination of nationalism, power rivalries, 
historical animosity, arms build-ups and energy needs. Aaron Friedberg, an 
international relations scholar at Princeton, predicted the term “ripe for rivalry” in 
Asia in 1993: 
While civil wars and ethnic strife will continue for some time to smoulder along 
Europe’s peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely to be the 
cockpit of great power conflict.3 
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However, other observers argued that China’s style of diplomacy, together 
with political culture and its domestic socio-economic structure, suggests that it will 
not necessarily threaten its neighbours, and that it may even make a positive 
contribution as the “balance of influence” in Asia.4 In summary, this relationship is 
likely to result in both pros and cons.  
Advantages may be seen when harmonization is maintained, and when 
cooperation is carried out in the interactions between China and the US in Southeast 
Asia. This means when China is more “peaceful rise” than “China threat,” Southeast 
Asia is likely to enjoy the positive impacts from the Sino-American relations in the 
region. Van der Putten envisaged a positive scenario where the US and China could 
accept each other’s status as great powers, before taking on a five-power approach to 
regional security with Japan, India and Indonesia. These five countries would then 
work with other countries in South, East and Southeast Asia in regional fora, such as 
ASEAN and EAS.5  
Shirk claims Southeast Asian countries do not want to have to choose 
between the US and China as they grow closer to China. They hedge their bets by 
trying to keep the US engaged in the region. Shirk also argues that China’s success 
depends on cooperation with the US.6 If the US declared China the enemy in a new 
Cold War and tried to tie an economic noose around it, China’s economic growth and 
job creation would be slowed, and domestic problems would increase even if few 
American allies joined US efforts to contain China. A hostile US military posture 
would drive the Chinese military, and the public, to demand the Chinese government 
put more resources into building the military, thus increasing the risk of a war. Citing 
an example, with respect to conflict with Great Britain in the nineteenth century, one 
Chinese specialist explained the experiences and lessons of history prove that a late 
power can only rise with the cooperation of the dominant power in the international 
                                                 
4 Zhu, F. ‘China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: How Uni-polarity Matters ’ in Ross, R.S & Zhu, F. ,China’s 
Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London, 2008, p. 34 
5 Van der Putten, F.P., ‘China’s Regional Security Relations and Interactions with the US: Trends, 
Challenges and Possible Scenarios’, NOREF Report, 2012, p. 5 
6 The following discussion is drawn from Shirk, S.L., China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford and New York, 2007, pp. 115-219 
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system. The best way for China to rise peacefully is to behave like a responsible 
power and to accommodate the current global superpower.7  
China’s peaceful rise can help forge a good impression on neighbouring 
Southeast Asian states, creating reciprocal advantages and benefits. According to a 
source from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, one of 
China’s central objectives is to secure and ensure access to resources in Southeast 
Asia for continued Chinese economic development. China wants to maintain a secure 
buffer zone around it.8 When China was under Mao, Southeast Asian governments in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines had distanced 
themselves from it, fearing that China would export revolution to them. However, 
within less than a decade after the establishment of diplomatic relations with all ten 
Southeast Asian states by 1991, China’s skilful diplomacy has made regional states 
view China as a partner and a market opportunity, rather than as a potential threat. 
Public opinion polls in Southeast Asia9 show China is viewed positively; one poll 
found that 76% of Thais believed China was Thailand’s closest friend, while only 
9% of Thais chose the United States. 
Disadvantages will emerge when China and the US engage in strategic 
rivalry, and when China is more “China threat” than “peaceful rise.” 10  K. 
Shanmugam, the Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the wary view of 
Southeast Asian people about the Sino-American competition for regional power and 
influence: 
The relative weight of China is growing. I’m not one of those who believe that the US 
is in permanent decline. But nevertheless, the respective levels of influence, there will 
be a relative shift. And Singapore’s position has consistently been to be good friends of 
both. …Would that be a challenge-free approach? It really depends on how the state of 
relationship between the US and China develops. It could develop in a way that makes 
                                                 
7 Shirk, S.L., China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2007, pp. 
115-219 
8 2014 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
Washington, November 2014, p. 427 
9 Cited in Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, pp. 112-113. 
10 The following discussion is based on Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, p.4 
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it challenging for all of us who are friends with both countries and we will just have to 
adapt to that.11 
Problems will arise if the US mishandles the economic rise of China. Even if 
the two sides manage to avoid military conflicts, a Cold War with China would 
wreak havoc in the US and the entire world. The US is China’s largest export market 
(buying approximately 20% of its total exports) and China loans most of the dollars 
it earns from trade to the US Government, which uses the money to pay off its large 
budget deficits. Thus, if Washington imposed economic sanctions on China and 
China retaliated by selling off some of the billions of dollars of American 
government debt it owns, American interest rates could shoot up and a global 
recession could result.  
A hostile relationship with China would also make it impossible for both 
countries to work together to solve global issues, such as AIDS, the avian flu 
epidemic, global warming and terrorism.12 In sum, at the moment, it is not likely that 
China and the US will engage in devastating rivalry or potential war because neither 
side will benefit. There is evidence that some Chinese believe optimistically that 
future Sino-American ties will be as close as the Anglo-American alliance today. 
However, as both countries have different political systems of governance, it is hard 
to imagine a perfect harmony between the US and China.13 
7.1.2 Direct and Indirect Impacts 
The direct impact of Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia on regional 
nations will influence their economic dynamism, the spread of China’s ideological 
and cultural influence, and the return of American presence in the region. 
Suryadinata argues that China has rapidly become a major economic power, a 
“dynamo” of Asia or “world factory” for mass production, flooding the regional 
markets. This has resulted in a profound socio-political and economic change in 
                                                 
11 K.Shanmugam, “Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs K.Shanmugam’s reply to Parliamentary 
Questions and Supplementary Questions”, Singapore, 14 January 2013. Available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/tr/2013/January/transcript_20130114.ht
ml (Date of visit 15 August 2015) 
12 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, pp. 4-5 
13 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, pp. 261-269 
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Southeast Asia.14  China’s rapid rise directly impacts regional states and China’s 
economic growth augurs well for East Asia’s continued economic growth.15 China 
can harness the region’s vast trade and investment opportunities to stimulate its 
domestic economy. 
 Southeast Asia’s growth potential has benefited from China’s increasing 
integration with the region through the Southeast Asian Chinese. Enterprises 
managed by the ethnic Chinese have become increasingly dependent on China’s 
economy and this has forced them to be cautious in doing business in China. Anti-
Chinese riots had occurred in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the past, 
but strong resentment against any perceived economic and cultural invasion from 
China has surfaced in Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.16 
In relation to indirect impacts of Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia, 
China’s ambition is a spectre haunting Southeast Asian nations. In 1979, the 
Vietnamese government argued that Southeast Asia was a region where Chinese 
rulers felt they could widen their influence and use “their cash with no strings” aid as 
a trump card in gaining support across the world.17 Chinese policy towards Southeast 
Asia over the last three decades points to the extremely important position this region 
occupies in its global strategy, and also reveals their great power expansionist and 
regional hegemonic ambitions. The Chinese government has orchestrated an 
impressive campaign to reassure its Asian neighbours, the US and the rest of the 
world of its “peaceful rise” even when it grows stronger. In 2014, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi claimed Chinese leaders’ responsibility to uphold peace: 
Premier Li Keqiang spoke the mind of the Chinese people and showed that China 
shoulders the responsibility to uphold peace. We fully support his statement. …China 
is committed to the path of peaceful development, and we hope other countries will 
also take the path of peaceful development. The Chinese Dream belongs to the Chinese 
                                                 
14 Suryadinata, L. Southeast Asia’s Chinese Business in an Era of Globalization:  Coping with the 
Rise of China (ed), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore, Singapore, 2006, p. 1 
15 Wong, J., ‘China’s Economic Rise and Its Implications for Southeast Asia: The Big Picture’ in L. 
Suryadinata, Southeast Asia’s Chinese Business in an Era of Globalization:  Coping with the Rise of 
China (ed), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore, Singapore, 2006, p. 25. 
16 Xia, M., “China Threat” or a “Peaceful Rise of China”,  http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-
china-politics-007.html (Date of Visit 18 March 2014) 
17 Vietnam Courier (ed), Chinese Aggression Against Vietnam, Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, 1979, p. 10 
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people, and as it is closely connected to the dreams of other nations as our interests are 
well intertwined.18 
Chinese President Xi Jinping also reiterated China’s commitment for peace 
development in his keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 
2015: 
What China needs most is a harmonious and stable domestic environment and a 
peaceful and tranquil international environment. …The Chinese nation loves peace and 
has, since ancient times, held high such philosophies that “harmony is the most 
valuable”, “peace and harmony should prevail”, “all men under heaven are brothers”. 
…Close neighbours are better than distant relatives. This is a simple truth that the 
Chinese people got to know in ancient times. That explains China’s firm commitment 
to building friendship and partnership with its neighbours to foster an amicable, secure 
and prosperous neighbourhood.  
On the other hand, Kirshner doubted the success of China’s strategy of 
promoting its own “peaceful rise.” History has witnessed the rise of new great 
powers that tend to upset the international system. China’s rise is not guaranteed to 
be a peaceful one, as its interests could clash with those of other nations.19 There is a 
saying of Napoleon Bonaparte about China, which is to “let her sleep, for when she 
wakes, she will shake the world.”20  
There are some worrying aspects to Beijing’s international behaviour, which 
is a contradiction to its leaders’ repeated claims about China’s “peaceful rise.” 
Beijing’s defence budget has been increasing for almost two decades but its military 
intentions remain unclear. According to the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission (USCC) report21, China’s official projected defence budget 
                                                 
18 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press”, 8 March 2014. 
Available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1135385.shtml (Date of 
visit 15 August 2015) 
19 Kirshner, J., ‘The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations’ in Ross, R.S 
and Zhu, F. (ed), China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 2008, p. 238. 
20 Quoted in Watkins, T., ‘Sleeping Giant: China’s Peaceful Rise’, China-US Focus, 18 February 
2013. Available at http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/sleeping-giant-chinas-
peaceful-rise/ (Date of visit 15 August 2015) 
21 2014 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
Washington, November 2014, p. 287. 
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increased from 720 billion RMB (approximately US$119.5 billion) in 2013 to 808 
billion RMB (approximately US$131.6 billion) in 2014, a 12.2 % increase. With the 
exception of 2010, China’s official defence budget has increased in nominal terms by 
double-digits every year since 1989.  
The source from the 2014 USCC report to Congress22 revealed that China’s 
actual aggregate defence spending is higher than the officially announced budget due 
to Beijing’s omission of major defence-related expenditures, such as purchase of 
advanced weapons, research and development programs or local government support 
to the PLA. The estimation from the US Department of Defence (DoD) revealed 
China’s actual defence spending in 2013 exceeded US$145 billion, approximately 
21% higher than its announced defence budget. The evaluation from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute calculates that China’s actual defence 
spending in 2013 was US$188 billion, approximately 57% higher than its announced 
defence budget. 
Thus, China’s unclear purposes in military expansion and its assertiveness in 
regional territorial disputes might lead it to test the limits of American global 
dominance as it attempts to play its own role in world politics. This is not necessarily 
alarming, so long as China continues to seek common ground with the US. In the 
situation of a possible new Cold War and the very real possibility of a hot one, a 
good deal of patience and self-restraint will be required.23 
7.1.3 Short term and Long term Impacts 
ASEAN has to face the dilemma of maintaining their regional balance and 
centrality amid Sino-American interactions in the region. Owing to China’s recent 
aggressive manner with some Southeast Asian states in the territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea, there are suspicions about the peaceful rise of China. According to 
Shambaugh, despite Beijing’s efforts to assuage its neighbours, China’s “charm 
offensive”24 could not win the heart of every nation along its periphery. Concerns 
                                                 
22 Ibid, p. 288 
23 Baum, R., The Fall and Rise of China, The Teaching Company, Chantilly, VA, 2010, pp. 163-169. 
24 See Sato P. Limaye, ed., Asia’s China Debate: A Special Assessment, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies, 2003 
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about a looming “China Threat”25 still exists occasionally among security specialists 
in Hanoi, New Delhi, Singapore, Tokyo and certainly Taipei.  
These arguments fall into three categories. First, regarding ideological and 
cultural factors, the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration felt the fact that 
China was officially communist was an impediment that exacerbated a clash of 
civilizations. In this worldview, an unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian 
civilizations is the principal threat to the West. Accordingly, in this perspective this 
worry caused a sensible response from the US with short-term containment policy 
and long-term confrontation, bringing about the promotion of peaceful 
transformation within China. Secondly, from realists’ perspectives, China has to 
pursue equivalent respect and influence due to its position as a major power in size, 
territory, population and economy. That is why nationalism is likely to drive a rising 
China in the direction of a clash with the US, if the latter rejects a space for the 
former in the global leadership.26  
Thirdly, the possible collapse of China (if it were to suffer a Soviet-style 
sudden-death syndrome) could create even greater uncertainty and an even worse 
scenario. Chinese refugees from its 1.3 billion population, a failed state and/or 
presence of warlords, civil war, transnational crime, proliferation and nuclear 
weapons - all of these are possible outcomes for the world to deal with. Owing to 
these considerations, the US often tends to oscillate from “demonization to 
romanticization,” from containment to engagement with China in “the sweet and 
sour Sino-American relationship.” 27  Hernandez claims that should China’s rise 
continue without serious interruption, it could be a “towering giant” that will 
dominate not only the US, but also major regional powers, such as Japan and 
Russia.28 Should China’s rise be derailed, leading to an implosion, the fallout would 
                                                 
25 Shambaugh, D.L., ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security, 
29(3), Winter 2004/05, pp.64-69 at 67 
26 Xia, M., ‘China Threat” or a Peaceful Rise of China’, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-
china-politics-007.html (Date of Visit 18 March 2014) 
27 Xia, ‘China Threat” or a Peaceful Rise of China. 
28 Hernandez, C.G., ‘The Rise of China and Implications for Southeast Asia’ in H.H.M. Hsiao and 
C.Y. Lin (eds), Rise of China: Beijing’s strategies and implications for the Asia-Pacific, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2009, pp. 252-269 at 261. 
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affect Southeast Asia very negatively. The vision of Chinese migrants spilling out of 
the mainland to its immediate neighbours would be a nightmare for Southeast Asia. 
As for the long-term view, there are two scenarios about the impacts of the 
Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia that depend largely on continued Chinese 
economic development. First, China’s economic rise could slow, resulting in harmful 
long-term impacts not only for the Sino-American relations in general, but also for 
Southeast Asia. For the time being, there are two leading characteristics of the world 
economy, namely Chinese economic growth and American consumer markets. The 
former is a crucial component of the global economy due to its size and potential. 
However, in spite of its fast growth over a few decades, Kirshner doubts the 
continuance of Chinese ascension, as it was unusually high and vulnerable to internal 
and external factors that could result in disruptions. Consequently, if Chinese 
economic growth decreased, domestic political stability and foreign policy would be 
affected.29  
The 2014 USCC Report to the US Congress notes that China sustained 
economic growth at or near its official target rate of 7.5% through the first three 
quarters of 2014.30 Accordingly, China’s GDP growth has been under 8% for ten 
consecutive quarters, entering a “new normal” 31  period. China’s oversupply of 
property and industrial over-capacity in sectors such as steel and solar panels 
continues to put Chinese economic growth at risk. It could harm US manufacturing 
and exports by dumping excess supply into global markets. 
Next, if China’s economic rise continues at the same rapid pace as today, then 
Sino-American relations may enter into unavoidable engagement and friction, which 
is a long-term dilemma for Southeast Asia. It has been predicted by a number of 
scholars that China is likely to have on-going economic development. Lee and 
Nedilsky have examined the notion that China has claimed the twenty-first century 
as its own, and have projected that rising Chinese economic and political strength 
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will surpass that of the United States.32 The International Monetary Fund forecasted 
that by 2016 China would replace the US as the largest economy. With an average 
GDP growth rate of 9.7% per year in the last three decades, Chinese economic 
growth is remarkable. No other country has enjoyed this rate of economic growth 
recently.33  
Kirshner admits that if China continues its economic ascension, its expanding 
economy will create both challenges and frictions for the US. With greater Chinese 
economic strength comes an increase in its national prestige domestically, regionally 
and internationally. As China is a leading engine of the global economy, together 
with the US, Chinese economic and political creditability can challenge US 
hegemony and foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. China can cause more tension 
for regional and international economic conflicts, which may frustrate the US. 
However, Sino-American frictions will not result in a war because the issues are 
merely irritants to bilateral relations and strategic rivalry. 34  An armed conflict 
between the two major powers could be evidence of strategic competition, as China 
and America may not be able to avoid conflicts. However, the right policy choices by 
both powers can keep the two on the path of more cooperation than conflict, avoiding 
the “doom and gloom scenario” painted by a number of scholars.35   
7.1.4 Implications  
The most important way for Southeast Asia to maximise regional benefits is to 
maintain what the ASEAN Secretariat calls “ASEAN centrality,” and to maintain 
equilibrium between the current interactions of the US and China. ASEAN’s 
objective of maintaining its centrality in regional affairs has contributed to Southeast 
Asia’s stability and economic development, despite regional and global financial 
                                                 
32 The following discussion is drawn from Lee, J.T.H & Nedilsky, L.V., ‘Appeal and Discontent: The 
Yin and Yang of China’s Rise to Power’ in J.T.H. Lee, L.V. Nedilsky and S.K. Cheung (eds), China’s 
Rise to Power: Conception of State Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, pp. 1-29 at 3. 
33 Knight, J. and Ding, S., China’s Remarkable Economic Growth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012, p. 57 
34 Kirshner, ‘The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations’, p. 239 
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crises. ASEAN registered an economic growth of up to 6% in 2014, proving that 
regional integration since the ratification of the ASEAN Charter for “an ASEAN 
Community” has worked well for political, security, economic and socio-cultural 
cooperation. This achievement also makes ASEAN attractive to major powers.  
While the US has considered ASEAN as a leading priority in its pivot to the 
Asia-Pacific, China and ASEAN celebrated the 10th anniversary of their strategic 
partnership in 2013. While individual countries in Southeast Asia could enjoy good 
diplomatic ties with China and/or the US, it is crucial that these ties do not compete 
with the collective interests of ASEAN and that “ASEAN centrality” remains 
sacrosanct.36 ASEAN countries themselves depend on fostering good relations with 
both major powers, but also on good Sino-American relations. ASEAN serves as an 
influential platform due to its central position in regional initiatives.37 Solidarity 
through ASEAN centrality is smart power for the association, as the strategy assures 
both the US and China that ASEAN is not a pawn in their rivalry, but rather a 
regional mechanism for cooperation and development. ASEAN could make an effort 
in “dynamic balancing” between China and the US in order to ensure that any Sino-
American rivalry would not adversely affect the region. The response by ASEAN 
nations is to engage with the US and China together as a regional forum.38  
The region’s solidarity can work effectively on disputes in the South China 
Sea. Division and suspicion will arise through any interference by foreign powers in 
Southeast Asian internal affairs. ASEAN solidarity can help to resolve the 
differences between China and the US through multilateral dialogues or other 
“confidence building” strategies. These trust building measures, such as the ADMM 
Plus and the ARF, can be set up regularly to address regional territorial disputes. 
These regional fora can discuss Chinese military modernization objectives and 
China’s manner in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. In this light, procedures 
to upgrade the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) into a full Code of Conduct (COC) in 
                                                 
36 Interviewee 4, 6 May 2013. 
37  Egberink, F. and Van de Putten, F.P., ‘ASEAN and Strategic Rivalry among the Great Powers in 
Asia’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29(3), 2010, pp. 131-141 at 134. 
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the South China Sea territorial disputes should be addressed by ASEAN in its 
engagement with China.39 
Shirk believes that it would be in the interest of Southeast Asian nations if their 
navies could invite Chinese and American naval vessels for joint patrols of the Straits 
of Malacca and other sea-lanes that have been plagued by piracy and terrorism. The 
responsibility for the security of the Straits of Malacca, for instance, rests with the 
littoral states that have rejected the involvement of outside navies. Southeast Asian 
states, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, have organized 
combined naval and air patrols. There has also been a regional anti-piracy initiative 
promoted by Japan known as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).  
However, China could maintain a strong military presence in Southeast Asia 
without raising suspicion from the US.40 Once the US and China are assured of their 
mutual benefit (as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) in Southeast Asia, ASEAN 
nations also gain favourable conditions for regional security and development. The 
US has no territorial disputes in the region. It has been more broadly committed to 
free trade and to keeping its market open. Southeast Asia regards American 
leadership as a key to regional stability, and it will be a challenge to replace the 
American role in the region. The region’s future depends now on the US response to 
an increasingly assertive China.41 
7.2 Implications for Vietnam  
For thousands of years Vietnam has struggled against imperialism and foreign 
invasion. It is now faced with being caught in a dilemma of a great power rivalry. 
This section offers some approaches and proposals for the better national 
                                                 
39 Thayer, C.A., ‘Recent Development in the South China Sea: Implications for Peace, Stability and 
Cooperation in the region’, East Sea (South China Sea) Studies, 24 March 2011,  
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visit 2 April 2014) 
40 Shirk, S.L., China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2007, pp. 
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41  Yahuda, M., The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 3rd and revised edition, Routledge, 
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development of Vietnam. These are intended as positive strategies to assist 
Vietnamese policymakers. 
7.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages 
Vietnam can gain from Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam can seize this opportunity to promote its own economic development. The 
geographical position of Vietnam also makes it a potential buffer zone for Chinese 
ambitions to expand southwards. However, the US could use Vietnam to contain the 
rise of China. With an increasing presence of Chinese soft power, the US could 
promote its influence in Vietnam in order to create a critical distance between China 
and Southeast Asia. Moreover, improvement in US-Vietnam relations can be 
justified from any of the three American attitudes towards China. If China is a threat, 
Vietnam could help block China’s influence and contain China. If China is a 
challenge, part of an American response is to improve its own soft power in countries 
like Vietnam. If China is an opportunity, then Vietnam can be another smaller 
country with a similar opportunity.  
Accordingly, the rise of China is predicted to provide a positive influence on 
US-Vietnam relations, regardless of their direction in the future. However, if the 
relationship between Washington and Beijing worsens, then American interests in 
containing China could present Vietnam and countries in the region with a painful 
choice. A triangular asymmetric situation of Washington-Beijing-Hanoi adds new 
levels of complexity because there is a natural temptation for the strongest and the 
weakest state to ally against the middle. The middle is the greater potential threat to 
the strongest, and the weakest can hide behind the strongest. However, such an 
alliance puts the weakest in a precautious position.42  Most Southeast Asian nations 
are clearly hedging their bets with regards to China’s rise. While simultaneously 
advancing close economic and trade relations with a rapidly rising China, their 
exports also have to compete with those of China in the US market. Historical 
memories of Chinese power in the region, and the fear of Chinese military expansion 
have contributed to the regional countries’ desire to balance against China’s 
ascension. Accordingly, most ASEAN nations have sought to maintain or strengthen 
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their defence relationships with the US, and remain wary of any Chinese efforts to 
exclude America from emerging East Asian mechanisms.43 
In relation to the disadvantages caused to Vietnam by the interaction of China 
and US in Southeast Asia, the most difficult aspect for Vietnam is to avoid being 
squeezed between global superpowers and regional powers in their strategic rivalry. 
This dilemma poses the risk of forcing Vietnam to choose sides, which could 
threaten its stability and national security. As Hugh White has argued, the status-quo 
arrangement in the region reflects a balance of power system, in which the two 
strongest powers build alliances to balance each other and a structurally adversarial 
relationship emerges between them. In this case, regional countries will then be 
forced to choose which power to bandwagon with, causing a division within 
Southeast Asia.44  
With China, Vietnam risks territorial disputes that threaten its integrity. With 
the US, Vietnam risks interference in its current political system. Le Linh Lan argued 
that the US has come to recognize the importance of Vietnam in Southeast Asian 
security because Vietnam is a significant and integral part of the sub-region. 45 
Vietnam’s strategic location in the region means it is a crucial partner for the US. 
While Washington has important interests in seeing the vital sea-lane in Southeast 
Asia free for navigation and overflight, the increasing salience of the South China 
Sea disputes has also raised the significance of Vietnam in the years to come.  
Moreover, Vietnam’s active membership in ASEAN makes it an important 
player in regional affairs and the wider Asia Pacific region. Vietnam’s membership 
in ARF and its participation in APEC add more avenues for Vietnam-US 
cooperation, raising the US stake in seeing Vietnam become a stable and prosperous 
nation. Thus, the changing and complex configuration of power in Asia has 
undoubtedly stressed the importance of Vietnam as an independent actor in 
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America’s strategic calculations. One problem, however, is the US inclination to 
impose its values on other nations with different political systems. According to Le 
Linh Lan46, the US has never hidden its agenda in spreading democracy, human 
rights and American values to countries with different political systems, including 
Vietnam.  As President Clinton stated: 
I believe normalisation and increased contact between Americans and Vietnamese will 
advance the cause of freedom in Vietnam, just as it did in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. I strongly believe that engaging the Vietnamese on the broad 
economic front of economic reform and the broad front of democratic reform will help 
to honour the sacrifice of those who fought for freedom’s sake in Vietnam.47 
Such a position is obviously problematic for the Vietnamese government, as 
opening up the political system runs the risk of the CPV losing power. 
7.2.2 Short-term and Long-term Impacts 
The short-term impacts of the triangular relationship between Vietnam, China 
and the US can turn into long-term impacts if current tensions are not resolved. The 
most obvious risk for Vietnam is China’s encroachment in the South China Sea 
territorial disputes, as these actions threaten Vietnam’s territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty. China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea may be 
seen as a “soft invasion” occurring within its “peaceful rise.” Clearly, however, 
Vietnamese policymakers need to study these events carefully. China has opted for 
civilian forces like simple fishing boats, paramilitary forces, or business corporations 
like oil companies, rather than naval forces, to assert sovereignty over islands in the 
disputed areas. Moreover, the Chinese have established military bases, observation 
posts or oil drilling platforms to occupy the sea areas that are claimed by Vietnam, 
and this had caused difficulties in the supplying routes from the mainland to the 
islands. ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan expressed concern that the South 
China Sea could become Asia’s Palestine in his address to the Financial Times: 
                                                 
46 See Le for an analysis at Le Linh Lan, ‘The Changing Pattern of Interaction between Vietnam and 
the US: From Confrontation to Cooperation’, paper presented at the 42nd Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, and held in Chicago, 20-24 February 2001, pp. 1-14 at 10-11. 
47 William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations with Vietnam, 
11 July 1995. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51605 (Date of visit 15 August 
2015) 
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We have to be mindful of the fact that the South China Sea could evolve into another 
Palestine if countries do not try harder to defuse rather than inflame tensions.48 
According to Luong Van Ke, Chinese tactics are to “win without attack” to 
isolate the Spratlys to an unbearable limit, forcing Vietnam to leave the islands. This 
is a patient strategy. Despite being not overly hostile, it still carries a long-term risk 
to Vietnam national territorial integrity. Thus, the first dilemma is China forcing 
Vietnam to leave by itself.49 
Taking both positive and negative implications into consideration, Vietnam 
would prefer to see the positive scenario come into being to avoid suffering a loss in 
its bilateral relations with China. In order to influence the situation in a positive 
direction, Vietnam has adopted several short and long-term strategies. In the short 
term, regarding the South China Sea territorial dispute, Thayer recommends that 
Vietnam needs to monitor Chinese actions carefully using proper naval escorts to 
look after Vietnamese ships that enter the disputed waters around the Spratly islands. 
Vietnamese vessels should operate with Vietnamese Marine Police escorts. 50  In 
addressing sophisticated territorial disputes, the armed forces are required to firmly 
adhere to the policy of “‘3 Nos,” “4 Avoids” and the “6 Ks”51:  
“3 Nos”: Không liên minh quân sự với nước ngoài [Trans: no military alliance with 
foreign countries], Không cho nước ngoài đặt căn cứ quân sự ở Việt Nam [Trans: Do 
not allow foreign nations to place military bases in Vietnam] và Không cho bất kỳ một 
tổ chức chính trị, quân sự nào lợi dụng địa bàn lãnh thổ Việt Nam để chống lại nước 
khác [Trans: and Do not let any political or military organization take advantage of the 
Vietnamese territory against another country]; 
“4 Avoids”: Tránh xung đôt về quân sự [Trans: Avoid military conflict], Tránh đối đầu 
[Trans: Avoid confrontation], Tránh bị cô lập về chính trị [Trans: Avoid being drawn 
                                                 
48 Bland, B., ‘ASEAN Chief Warns on South China Sea Spats’, Jakarta, 28 November 2012. Available 
at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c025d896-386b-11e2-981c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3itUVJghV 
(Date of visit 15 August 2015) 
49 Interview Luong Van Ke, 24 January 2013. 
50 Thayer, C.A., ‘South China Sea: China’s Trifecta’, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, 5 
December 2012, http://scribd.com/doc/116955007/Thayer-South-China-Sea-China-s-Trifecta (Date of 
visit 30 October 2014) 
51 Ha Van Ngoan, ‘The Thematic Report on the South China Sea: Bilateral Relations between 
Vietnam and China and Maritime Security’, presentation at a meeting of the Central Propaganda 
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City, 2012. 
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into political isolation] and Tránh bị lệ thuộc chính trị với nước ngoài [Trans: Avoid 
political dependence on foreign countries] (this motto is to show the independence 
perspective of the Vietnamese); 
“6 Ks”: Kiên quyết đấu tranh bảo vệ chủ quyền lãnh thổ [Trans: Determined struggle 
to defend national territory], Kiên định độc lập dân tộc và giữ vững chủ quyền toàn 
vẹn lãnh thổ [Trans: Consistent manner in defending national independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity], Khôn khéo: vừa đấu tranh ngăn cản, vừa tránh va 
chạm và tuyên truyền đặc biệt [Trans: Skilful tactic of preventing military conflict and 
using special propaganda], Không khiêu khích: tạo cơ hội cho nước ngoài đánh chiếm, 
gây xung đột [Trans: No provocative manner which can create reasons for powers to 
cause conflict or invasion]; Không mắc mưu khiêu khích (rơi vào bẫy âm mưu của 
nước ngoài) [Trans: Not tricked by provocation, which can be drawn into the plot of 
powers]; Không gây bất ổn, giữ vững an ninh, chủ quyền quốc gia [Trans: Not cause 
instability, and maintain security and national sovereignty]. 
With reference to the long-term impacts to Vietnam from Chinese and 
American interaction in Southeast Asia, Vietnam believes that China’s leaders will 
attempt to control the region in an effort to progress towards world hegemony, and 
that the US is trying to contain the rise of China. As Mao Zedong stated in August 
1965 during a meeting of the Political Bureau:  
We are bound to recover Southeast Asia, which includes South Vietnam, Thailand, 
Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. Southeast Asia is very rich in minerals and to recover 
it is worth all the efforts we make. This region will be advantageous to China’s future 
industrial development, and will make up for all the losses. The east wind will prevail 
over the west wind when we have recovered Southeast Asia.52 
Indeed, Chinese rulers regard Southeast Asia as a natural region for Chinese 
expansion, for they consider all the land, sea and islands there as their territories. 
Southeast Asia has a fertile soil, a large population and it is rich in natural resources. 
Moreover, with a sea route going from east to west and linking the North and South 
Pacific Oceans and the Indian Ocean, it occupies a strategic position in Asia. Once 
this region is under Chinese control, the Chinese rulers will be able to increase their 
strength and assume hegemony in Asia, then in the world. Furthermore, Southeast 
Asia is considered as more vulnerable to Chinese expansion because it is comprised 
of small countries, and there is no great power like the Soviet Union, Japan, or India. 
                                                 
52 Quoted in Vietnam Courier (ed), Chinese Aggression Against Vietnam, p. 9. 
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China has two potential advantages in this region: the large overseas community of 
Chinese residents, and the so-called “revolutionary” Maoist organisations.  
By channelling Chinese aid into Southeast Asia, the Chinese use it as a their 
bargaining chip with the world powers, including the US and Japan.53 Thus, with 
Southeast Asia being the location of Chinese strategic region calculations, Vietnam 
is involved in Chinese plans for expansion to the south. This is the long-term impact 
that Vietnam risks. Meanwhile, in the American ‘pivot to Asia,’ Vietnam also figures 
in the calculations of the US to engage and counter balance China. In the long-term, 
Vietnam’s national stability and security is endangered if caught between the two 
giants. 
7.2.3 Direct and Indirect Impacts 
A more direct impact that Vietnam is likely to suffer from the triangular 
relationship with China and the US is a direct Chinese threat in the territorial 
disputes as a message to Vietnam communicating China’s strong disapproval of 
deeper US-Vietnam security ties. Since the normalisation of relationships with the 
US in 1995, Hanoi is still cautious about boosting its defence cooperation with 
Washington in order not to offend China. Thayer determined that there are two major 
obstacles holding back US-Vietnam cooperation. One is the fear held by 
conservatives in the CPV about any American support for peaceful evolution that 
could result in a change in its political system from a one-party state into a pluralist 
democracy. The other is Vietnamese leaders’ concern that “moving too close to the 
United States will incur costs in Vietnam’s relations with China.”54 
 Thus, Vietnam has to be very cautious in the triangular relationship with 
China and the US to be clear of the type of Chinese threat that is more direct and 
dangerous so that it may adopt suitable tactics. The territorial dispute with China in 
the South China Sea is currently Vietnam’s biggest diplomatic and security concern. 
Vietnamese overtures to Washington are the consequence of a lack of direct military 
threats from the US. 
                                                 
53 Vietnam Courier (ed), Chinese Aggression Against Vietnam, pp. 9-10. 
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The indirect impacts on Vietnam stem from Chinese and American 
interactions in Southeast Asia with the risk of economic downturn and social 
instability. Vietnam may suffer from environmental problems if China and the US 
could not agree on gas emission targets to mitigate the impact of climate change. 
New environmental worries arise over the impact of China’s efforts to supply its 
southern provinces with much needed power, often through dam construction on the 
Upper Mekong River that are felt downstream. China’s growing influence in 
ASEAN also affects US interests in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. With 
Southeast Asia containing some of the busiest sea-lanes in the world, it is an 
overstatement to claim that the US response to Chinese action will have an impact on 
global strategic and economic stability. Between 1999 and 2000, China has 
conducted a low-level, systematic campaign to restore ties and improve relations 
with each ASEAN nation individually. In every ASEAN country, Beijing forged 
agreements to strengthen cooperation over a broad range of areas, including trade, 
defence, culture and tourism. By the close of the 1990s, all ASEAN countries had 
deeper ties with China.55  
Moreover, in order to deal with a possibly aggressive northern neighbour 
while maintaining a relationship with its former adversary that is carrying out a 
policy of engaging and counter-balancing China, Vietnam is modernizing its military 
capacity for national defence. Thus, the Vietnamese budget for military and defence 
will be at the expense of other sectors, such as education and health care, adding 
more risks and difficulties for Vietnamese social stability. According to Hiebert and 
Phuong Nguyen56, between 2004 and 2013, Vietnam boosted its military spending by 
113%, which is the largest increase among Southeast Asian countries. Vietnamese 
total military expenditure was USS$3.3 billion in 2012 and US$3.4 billion in 2013. 
Hiebert and Phuong Nguyen notes that since 2011, Vietnamese defence spending has 
been enhanced after the CPV Central Committee issued a detailed 2011-2020 
                                                 
55 Dalpino, C. and Lin, J., ‘China and Southeast Asia: The Difference of a Decade’, Brookings 
Northeast Asia Survey, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2002, pp. 77-90 at 77-79.  
56 Hiebert, M. and Phuong Nguyen, ‘Vietnam Ramps Up Defense Spending, but Its Challenges 
Remain’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 18 March 2015. Available at 
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maritime strategy. 57  Consequently, the protection of Vietnamese maritime 
sovereignty and economy are key national security pillars. The Vietnamese 
government sees its largest threat from maritime security, as Vietnam has a long 
coastline of 3,260 kilometres facing the South China Sea and 50% of its population 
live along the coast. 
7.2.4 Implications 
What should Vietnam do to move forward while walking between two 
giants? Vietnam’s words and deeds will have practical effects for its national 
independence and freedom to protect national sovereignty, to preserve national 
security and to foster national development. Vietnam’s creative diplomatic activity 
will be a test of how well it serves the nation. 
Vietnam could project a better image of the country through a national 
reconciliation with the overseas Vietnamese communities. These communities were 
created after the fall of Saigon in 1975. South Vietnamese officials and military 
officers had fled abroad; others followed later as “boat people.” Overseas 
Vietnamese have been (and are being) welcomed back should they choose to return, 
especially if they bring skills and capital that can benefit the country. National 
reconciliation in this case also means the reconciliation of different voices, 
viewpoints and experiences. 
Last but not least, national reconciliation also means the reconciliation of 
internal economic conflicts, such as the issues of land ownership that are addressed 
through the constitution. Overall, national reconciliation covers the reunification of 
people at all levels, both domestic and overseas. All economic perspectives must 
ensure the sustainable development of the nation with a view to make Vietnam 
become the beloved homeland for all Vietnamese. In order to achieve this goal, 
Vietnam needs to follow the value system that all progressive peoples in this world 
are following: the value of liberalisation for social stability. This is the fundamental 
                                                 
57 The following discussion is drawn from Hiebert, M. and Phuong Nguyen, ‘Vietnam Ramps Up 
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basis to boost domestic strength, and it would give a solid impetus to conduct its 
external affairs.58  
The result of such integration will be 90 million united Vietnamese, from the 
officials to the people, from the central to the rural to create the overall consensus for 
national security, stability and development. Sharing this viewpoint, Deputy Foreign 
Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for Overseas Vietnamese, Nguyen 
Thanh Son, told Thanh Nien News in an interview that it is essential to unify 
Vietnamese people from all over the world, as overseas Vietnamese play an 
important part in the country’s development, and unification should include those 
who fled the country after the Vietnam War ended on 30 April 1975.59 The past 
feelings about the communist government must be put aside so as to build up the 
trust that “the overseas Vietnamese play a really important role in contributing to the 
protection and development of the country.”  
Indeed, annual remittances from overseas Vietnamese could be worth as 
much as US$20 billion annually, which is one-fifth of the country’s GDP or 
equivalent to the trade value between Vietnam and Europe. There are over 400,000 
people of Vietnamese descent working in leading agencies across the world in 
various sectors, such as space technology, economy, education and health.60 The 
remittances from the Vietnamese community living abroad (Viet Kieu), most of 
whom reside in North America, Australia, Europe, South Korea and Japan, fluctuates 
due to changing economic conditions over different time periods. Between 1975 and 
1990, the Viet Kieu sent back to Vietnam was at least between six and eight billion 
dollars. According to the World Bank, 2.2 million Viet Kieu generated more than 
US$42.8 billion in total remittance inflows between 2000 and 2010. However, the 
global economic crisis significantly affected remittances, recorded at US$6 billion in 
2009, down from US$6.8 billion in 2008. When the global economy recovered, 
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59 http://www.thanhniennews.com/special-report/unity-of-vietnamese-people-vital-for-national-
development-deputy-foreign-minister-2332.html (Date of visit 26 March 2014) 
60 Ibid 
 
255 
 
remittances bounced back to US$8.2 billion in 2010 and an estimated US$8.7 billion 
in 2011.61 
In terms of foreign affairs, Vietnam needs to place its national interests as the 
highest strategic objective of its foreign policy.62 Accordingly, Vietnam needs to be 
vigilant when the Chinese leadership, under the guise of communist ideology and 
socialist orientation, attempts to limit the capacity of Vietnamese leaders to respond 
to developing issues. Indeed, despite the depth of comprehensive strategic 
partnership between Vietnam and China, under the 16 golden words and four goods 
motto as discussed in earlier chapters, China’s aggressive actions towards Vietnam in 
the South China Sea as well as the unbalanced trade relations with Vietnam have 
revealed a changeable Chinese behaviour towards its southern neighbour.  
The Vietnamese people are fully aware of a difference in words and actions 
but feel China’s real ambition is to turn Vietnam into a satellite or quasi-satellite 
state. Both the Vietnamese people and their leaders are aware of this risk, but the 
similar political system and socialist model of development have affected how 
Vietnamese leaders respond. This is a worrisome point as it affects the unity and 
solidarity of the Vietnamese people under the leadership of the elite. Above all, 
Vietnam needs to be very cautious about the ideological dominance from China.63  
Meanwhile, in the rapprochement with the US in security affairs, Vietnam 
also needs to be alert to the inherent problems of engaging on democracy and human 
rights, as this may weaken its control of the state by allowing hostile forces to 
undermine the leadership of the CPV.64 As a result, Vietnam should strictly obey the 
guidelines in the Political Report adopted at the 11th National Congress of the CPV 
in 201165 that defined major defence and security objectives and tasks relating to 
these risks namely, (i) protecting national independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, (ii) protecting the Party, State, People and the Regime, ensuring political 
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stability, social order and security, as well as actively preventing and defeating any 
hostile attempts and activities to damage the state and (iii) readily responding to 
global non-traditional security challenges.66 In general, national interests and benefits 
are the most crucial goals that Vietnam needs for national establishment and 
development. 
Secondly, Vietnam needs to integrate fully into the regional and global 
community to create a smarter way of dealing with major powers. According to 
Pham Binh Minh, as Vietnam integrates into the international community, it must be 
aware of the need to satisfactorily settle relations between international integration 
and ensuring independence, self-reliance, a firm maintenance of national sovereignty 
and national strength.67 If China continues its assertive manner in the South China 
Sea territorial disputes, Vietnam may be forced into a security partnership or 
strategic partnership with the US. Such a security partnership between Vietnam and 
the US could also mean partnership with NATO. Vietnam will therefore not establish 
a security alliance with any power that opposes a third power. However, it is the 
legitimate right of Vietnam to seek partnership, not to oppose a third country, but to 
defend its national interest and benefits.68  
Thirdly, Vietnam needs to enhance its motto of being a friend and reliable 
partner to all foreign countries. According to Hoang Binh Quan, Head of the Party 
Central Committee’s External Relations Commission, Vietnam has now established 
diplomatic relations with more than 200 political parties in various countries, 
including over 100 communist and workers’ parties and nearly 80 others involved in 
national parliaments.69 As Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated: 
Vietnam consistently persists with a foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, 
multi-lateralisation and diversification of external relations, being a friend and reliable 
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partner to all nations, and a responsible member of the international community. 
Vietnam wishes, and has spared no efforts to build and deepen, strategic partnership 
and mutually beneficial cooperative partnership with other countries. It is also our 
desire to establish strategic partnerships with all the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council on the principles of independence, sovereignty, non-interference in 
internal affairs of each other, mutual respect, equal and mutual beneficial cooperation 
are committed to and seriously implemented.70 
Fourthly, Vietnam should continue the high value strategy of contributing to 
ASEAN as the principal regional multilateral organization. Accordingly, Vietnam 
needs to combine its national interests with regional interests. The interests of 
ASEAN are also Vietnam’s interests; any benefits to ASEAN will be benefits to 
Vietnam. This is a smart combination of national power and regional power. 
Vietnam should contribute effectively to multilateral fora and regional mechanisms, 
as when ASEAN has become an attractive partner of foreign major powers, then 
Vietnam, as an active member of the organisation, can profit from the general 
benefits of regional cooperation.71 Ha Hoang Hop claimed “a united and strong 
ASEAN is a top priority in Vietnam’s foreign policy.”72  
Indeed, in the modern time of globalization and international integration, 
Vietnam should take advantage of its positive relationship with other major partners 
to deal with China and the US. For this, an active role inside ASEAN is crucial. By 
going alone in the relations with the US and China, a smaller nation like Vietnam is 
likely to suffer from disadvantages, but within ASEAN it will be more protected. 
Indeed, the triangle of Vietnam, China and the US means the dilemma between the 
rock and a hard place is in three dimensions. First, Vietnam is being squeezed as a 
small nation between two major powers. Second, Vietnam has been suffering 
difficulties with China, with which it shares a similar political system but is facing 
territorial disputes. Vietnam has also been suffering grievances with the US, with 
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which it has the chance to upgrade its bilateral relationship but faces significant 
institutional differences. Third, Vietnam also suffers from the dilemma of the 
triangular relationship between ASEAN, China and the US.  
As a result, Vietnam has considered ASEAN as a crucial regional 
organization for the exercise of influence and has concentrated on building ASEAN’s 
role and position.73 This approach is in line with the speech of the CPV General 
Secretary at the 28th diplomatic conference in Hanoi on 16 December 2013: 
Viet Nam has played up its role as an active member of regional and global 
mechanisms. Our country has participated deeper and wider in Southeast Asia and 
Asia-Pacific linkages through such organizations and fora as ASEAN, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) and East Asia 
Summit (EAS). Viet Nam joins eight bilateral and regional free trade agreements and is 
negotiating six other agreements including two biggest ever agreements, which are the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). Viet Nam has together with other member countries 
made active contribution to the process of building the ASEAN community and 
enhanced its position and profile in the regional community. For the second time, Viet 
Nam has officially stood for non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 
the 2020 - 2021 term; is ready to host the 32nd International Parliamentary Union 
General Assembly in 2015 and the APEC Summit for the second time in 2017.74 
Vietnam needs to continue a smart balancing act in its relationship between 
China and the US. Vietnam should do its best to prevent the bilateral relationship 
between China and the US from becoming a rivalry. If there exists a strain in that 
relationship then Vietnam should act to ease the tension. This is because when the 
competition between China and the US becomes worse, it will create instability and 
insecurity in the region, meaning none can benefit from the situation. Vietnam 
should establish an equally close and equidistant relationship with both powers. 
Indeed, China is now the comprehensive strategic cooperative partner of Vietnam 
and this places China at the top of Vietnam’s hierarchy of strategic partners. The 
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bilateral relationship with the US has also improved through a number of cooperative 
mechanisms.  
Vietnam’s good relationship with China has created a favourable foundation 
to have better bilateral ties with the US. Similarly, Hanoi’s improved cooperation 
with Washington in economic, political, defence and security affairs has created a 
better stance for Vietnam to maintain its relationship with China. Above all, the 
relationship between Vietnam with both China and the US is a relation of 
complementary support. Vietnam should not choose between the US and China 
because it derives different types of benefits from both relationships. Vietnam should 
stick to its national interests and protect national benefits from boosting the bilateral 
ties with both China and the US.75 
Regarding the territorial disputes in the East Sea (South China Sea), Vietnam 
does need creative diplomacy when faced with direct pressure from China, and 
should take advantage of American support.76 This is because if the disputes escalate, 
Vietnam is in a situation where internally it has to introduce more effective measures 
to protect national territorial integrity, maritime interests and the welfare of its 
people, while externally it has to avoid making the situation worse. The difficulty 
also lies in how to demonstrate a firm position on national interests to its people 
while trying not to be seen as adopting a confrontational approach to other claimants. 
Vietnam faces the dilemma of national defence by investing more in military 
capabilities to effectively support its claim without losing track of the priority for 
national economic development and incur the risk of causing suspicion or military 
conflict with other claimants.  
Thus, Vietnam needs to show the world it is willing to resolve the territorial 
dispute in a positive manner. As Vietnam’s Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi 
Vinh affirmed: 
Vietnam is a party among others to the dispute in the South China Sea. The policy of 
the Vietnamese state and that of Vietnamese national defence is consistently trying to 
resolve the dispute through peaceful means while resolutely defending sovereignty and 
territorial integrity based on international laws and forging greater friendship and 
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understanding between Vietnam and neighbouring countries, including those 
concerned to the South China Sea.77  
Vietnam needs to carry out a skilful approach in dealing with China, 
especially with the US pivot to Asia placing a greater focus on Southeast Asia. The 
triangular relationship of China-ASEAN-US in the South China Sea is, for the time 
being, unbalanced, due to China’s aggressive activities in the territorial disputes area 
and its domination in regional forums.  
However, China’s assertiveness is more temporary than permanent because if 
China continues to be aggressive then it is likely to lose more than it will win. China 
is facing the biggest loss in regional trust and confidence. The Chairman’s Statement 
of the 26th ASEAN Summit clearly mentioned this: 
We, the Head of State/Government of ASEAN Member States, gathered in Kuala 
Lumpur and Langkawi, Malaysia for the 26th ASEAN Summit on 26-27 April 2015. 
…We share the serious concerns expressed by some leaders on the land reclamation 
being undertaken in the South China Sea, which has eroded trust and confidence and 
may undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea.78 
The other loss that China may suffer is the suspicion from the region’s people 
and the world community about China’s peaceful rise. It is clear that virtually all 
countries in the region and the major powers in the international community are 
looking at China’s behaviour in the South China Sea as a test for its “peaceful rise” – 
will it be a state that obeys international law, or a rogue state with an attitude that it 
can bend and break rules as it sees fit?  
According to Kemp79, the South China Sea territorial disputes are originally 
long-festering disputes over sovereignty among the littoral states (principally China, 
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Vietnam and the Philippines but also involving Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia) that 
have been transformed into a dangerous confrontation between major powers (China 
and the US). Kemp analysed that the South China Sea has become the most 
important testing ground for the Sino-American relationship as it raised a raw contest 
for power and influence between an incumbent superpower and an emerging one. 
This territorial dispute also raised the questions about whether states can be bound by 
the decision from international tribunals against their will. When the Philippines 
wanted China to go for the arbitration, China insisted it would not consent to the 
arbitrators’ authority. In the case of Vietnam, China allowed the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to announce that the company would open 
foreign bids for nine oil and gas blocs located deep within Vietnam’s continental 
shelf and overlap lots 128 to 132 and 145 to 156 where PetroVietnam has been 
operating for a long time.80 It shows Beijing’s disregard for international law.  
Creative diplomacy by Vietnam can help resolve its territorial disputes with 
China, with a view of winning support from regional states and the international 
community. Domestically, there has been growing discontent in Vietnam over 
Chinese intrusions into the South China Sea. However, the government’s prohibition 
of public demonstration on these matters and the arrest or jail sentences given to anti-
Chinese demonstrators or protestors have shown Vietnam’s intention to attempt a 
peaceful resolution to the territorial disputes that is based on international law, 
especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).81 
There have been constant diplomatic attempts by Vietnam to prove its legal and 
historical claims to the islands to the international community. Vietnam’s passing of 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/31/commentary/world-commentary/south-china-sea-
disputes-test-chinas-peaceful-rise/#.VdAnvF4xHFI (Date of Visit 16 August 2015) 
80 ‘Vietnam Lawyers Up in Arms at Chinese Bid Invitation’, VNA, 29 June 2012. Available at 
http://www.vnconsul-
osaka.gov.vn/en/news_object_view?newsPath=/vnemb.vn/tin_hddn/ns120629042810 (Date of Visit 
16 August 2015)  
81 Ha Hoang Hop,  More Changes Awaits Vietnam’s Political Economy, Trends in Southeast Asia No. 
4, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2013, pp. 1-41 at 25-26 
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the Sea Law to protect its sea and islands in Vietnam’s 13th National Assembly 
session is a step towards ensuring its sovereignty over the islands.82  
In dealing with the “soft invasion” of the Chinese in the South China Sea 
territorial disputes, Vietnam needs to learn from China on how to harness the 
patriotism of the people in protecting national territory. China did not use naval or 
military forces, so Vietnam cannot respond militarily. Vietnam needs to expend 
funds on maintaining patriotic citizens to live in the islands day and night to protect 
the territory. One official noted that this is with a historically proven strategy of 
leaning on the people and raising their patriotism, which can result in national 
solidarity to protect the motherland. 83  Thayer has argued regional states should 
undertake an initiative to hold Senior Official-level discussions on the UNCLOS so 
as to further clarify unclear or disputed problems, such as the claims to extended 
continental shelves and the presence of foreign military vessels in another country’s 
EEZ. He proposed the use of regional security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific or in 
East Asia.84 
Finally, more research is required on Vietnam’s international relations to 
develop thorough policy strategies and practical approaches in dealing with major 
powers. Vu Khoan argued that a deep and comprehensive assessment of the world 
situation is essential to map out a grand strategy and to reorganize a contingent of 
external relations researchers under unified leadership. In the common strategy, 
studies about great powers’ policies and Vietnam’s position in their calculations 
should be attempted, so as to deal with the question of which threat is the most direct 
and worrisome.85 Such research will create the foundation for appropriate countering 
                                                 
82 Interview Le Minh Thong, Vice Chairman of the National Assembly’s Committee for Legal Affairs, 
Hanoi, Vietnam, 25 September 2012. 
83 Interview Luong Van Ke, 24 January 2013. 
84 Thayer, C.A., ‘Recent Development in the South China Sea: Implications for Peace, Stability and 
Cooperation in the Region’, East Sea (South China Sea) Studies, 24 March 2011, 
http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/conferences-and-seminars-/510-recent-developments-in-the-south-
china-sea-implications-for-peace-stability-and-cooperation-in-the-region-by-carlyle-a-thayer (Date of 
visit 2 April 2014) 
85 Vu Khoan, ‘Current International Status-quo and Challenges to Vietnam’, Tap chi Cong san [The 
Communist Review], 30/6/2013, 
http://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/PrintStory.aspx?distribution=362&print=true (Date of visit 
31 March 2014)  
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measures to be identified to safeguard national interests. Accordingly, territorial 
sovereignty and integrity should be linked to peace, stability and external relations. 
On that basis, Vietnam needs to be persistent in its policy of independence and self-
reliance and to maintain a policy of multi-lateralisation and diversification to take 
advantage of the support and assistance of the broad international community. 
Vietnam is intrinsically connected with regional and global trade. An in-depth 
understanding of the world’s situation is an indispensable condition for defining 
national tasks.86 
The dissertation’s conclusions will recapitulate the main points: the 
recommendations of win-win approaches in foreign policy to manage the triangular 
relations of Vietnam between China and the US; the proposal to keep ASEAN 
centrality to retain balance of powers, and the smart balancing strategy of Vietnam to 
move forward. 
 
                                                 
86 Nguyen Duc Hung, ‘Vietnam’s options during international trend’, Communist Review, 14/11/2013, 
http://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/Vietnam-on-the-way-of-renovation/2013/389/Vietnams-
options-during-international-integration-trend.aspx (Date of visit 1 April 2014) 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
 Since 1991, Southeast Asia has risen in importance in the triangular 
relationship with China and the US. This dissertation has examined the position of 
the Southeast Asian region and especially Vietnam within this triangular relationship 
to propose policy responses to issues that have multilateral and bilateral implications. 
On that basis, the dissertation has argued that Vietnam has not adopted a strategy of 
aligning closer to the US to counter China, and that a win-win solution is the most 
beneficial approach for all parties in any interactions with China and the US in 
Southeast Asia during the Post-Cold War era. 
 In the world today, despite its hegemony, the US has to recognize its inability 
to resolve global affairs unilaterally. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, its hegemony was challenged by the combined efforts of China and, to a 
lesser extent, India, Brazil and a resurgent Russia. US global power has been 
negatively affected after its failure in 1994 to use trade as leverage in improving 
China’s human rights record, and two very costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
between 2002 and 2014. Despite American concerns, India, Pakistan, North Korea 
and Iran continue to develop nuclear weapons. The expenses of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan coupled with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) impacted globally, 
including Southeast Asia.1 
 Thus, in the atmosphere of a relatively declining US and a rising China, the 
position of the region in general, and Vietnam in particular, has been calculated 
against this great power rivalry and the two major powers’ strategic tactics. The 
Southeast Asian region has strategic importance as a bridge between the Indian and 
Pacific Ocean with vital sea-lanes that give China, Japan and the US access to the 
Middle East and the eastern coast of Africa. 2  In addition to its geographical 
significance, the main regional organisation of Southeast Asia, ASEAN, holds 
                                                 
1 Yahuda, M.B., The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Routledge, London and New York, 
2011, pp. 182-183. 
2 ‘Southeast Asia: Heartland of Our Times’, http://www.asean.org/news/item/southeast-asia-heartland-
of-our-times (Date of visit 15 April 2014) 
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importance for major powers. ASEAN has achieved significant success in creating 
regional unity and solidarity against interference from outside powers. ASEAN has 
managed to avoid military conflict among its member states, despite rivalries, inter-
ethnic tensions that cross national boundaries, and border disputes. It has also 
continued to be a successful diplomatic community acting as convenor, facilitator 
and regional architect for many regional groups involving the great powers, notably 
ARF, ASEAN+3, EAS, ADMM Plus and the EAMF (Enlarged ASEAN Maritime 
Forum).3 
In terms of trade, Southeast Asia is beneficial to the US economy. As the US 
deepens its engagement with Asia, the ten Southeast Asian nations of ASEAN are 
prominent on its policy horizon. With a dynamic economy and nearly 600 million 
people located at the crossroads of huge markets, it straddles critical shipping lanes 
and controls substantial agricultural, mineral and energy resources. As a region it is 
strategically and economically significant. ASEAN is an emerging economic 
powerhouse. Its GDP exceeds US$2 trillion (3% of world GDP) and is likely to grow 
at an average rate of 6% for the next two decades. After the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998 and the GFC from 2008 to 2009, FDI inflows rebounded to a record 
US$76 billion in 2010, exceeding flows into India and closing in on China. ASEAN 
is a major US trade partner in several important products. For example, the US 
exports 15% of its electrical equipment to Southeast Asia, especially the main 
markets of Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. ASEAN exports mainly rice, 
apparel, footwear and manufactured goods. Vietnam is the second largest supplier of 
footwear to the US behind China.4  
From China’s perspective, Southeast Asia is viewed as a region within its 
sphere of influence and a potential market for its goods. Since the end of the Cold 
War, Chinese interest in Southeast Asia can be seen in three distinct phases. It started 
with normalisation of ties with each Southeast Asian nation from 1990 to the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. This phase was followed by economic cooperation from 
1997 to 2009. Since 2009, China has deepened its strategic partnership with ASEAN. 
                                                 
3 Yahuda, M.B., The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Routledge, London and New York, 
2011, p.214 
4 Petri, P.A. and Plummer, M.G., ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN-US Economic Relationship, 
Policy Studies no. 69, East West Center, Honolulu, 2013, pp. 1-45 at 1-3. 
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China is now ASEAN’s largest trading partner and ASEAN is China’s fourth-largest 
trading partner.5 Among ASEAN members, Vietnam plays a crucial strategic role in 
the region amid Sino-American interactions in the region. Geographically, Vietnam’s 
S-shaped coastline provides an easy access linking maritime and continental 
Southeast Asia. This position has made Vietnam an attractive destination of both 
China and the US. Through its economic reforms, Vietnam can deal with ambitious 
global powers from a position of independence and relative strength.  
Continuing rivalry between China and the US offers both risks and rewards to 
the leaders in Hanoi, as the world’s two most powerful countries seek deeper 
strategic and economic influence in Southeast Asia. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 
visit to Hanoi highlighted the importance of the Vietnam-China bilateral relationship: 
China and Vietnam are linked by mountains and rivers, with cultural affinity, the same 
political system and in-depth development of exchanges and cooperation in all 
fields.…Both sides agreed, based on enhancing political mutual trust and consolidating 
traditional friendship, to properly manage and control differences, not to let the South 
China Sea issue interfere with the big picture of bilateral cooperation, to effectively 
implement the consensus reached between both sides and to push the working group 
for consultations on joint maritime development and other cooperation mechanisms to 
make substantive progress as soon as possible, so as to promote bilateral practical 
cooperation in all fields, to implement the spirit of ‘good neighbors, good friends, good 
comrades and good partners’ and to bring tangible benefits to the people of the two 
countries and of the region.6 
Meanwhile, Washington is also eager to bring Vietnam more firmly into its 
strategic Asian orbit. Despite the Vietnam War, Washington arguably has history on 
its side because for most of Vietnam’s history, neighbouring China has been its most 
fearsome enemy. Vietnam can utilize its geopolitical advantage in the rising 
                                                 
5 Cao, Y.H. and Chen, J.R., ‘Changing Southeast Asia: The Role of China, the United States, Japan 
and ASEAN’, Asia Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011, pp. 1-33 at 7-8. 
6 Premier Li Keqiang Meets with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong, Stressing to Consolidate China-Vietnam Traditional 
Friendship and to Push Forward Bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership to a New 
Height, 15 October 2013. Available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/lkqzlcxdyldrxlhy_665684/t1090184.shtml (Date of 
visit 16 August 2015) 
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competition for influence between China and the US.7 The Americans worry about 
Chinese expansion and from historical experiences, they know Vietnam has been the 
biggest barrier against Beijing’s southward drive.8 Indeed, Vietnam is considered as 
a testing ground for China’s ambitions to the south in its global strategy.  
Following modern economic reform in China and Doi moi (renovation) in 
Vietnam, both nations have continued their transitional path to a market-oriented 
economy putting industrialization and trade issues at the forefront, with territorial 
disputes generally left on the back burner. The year 2010 marked the 60th 
anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic ties with official 
normalization of relations being in place in the 1990s. China and Vietnam will 
remain intertwined because of geographic, economic and political realities.9 
The dissertation has asked whether Vietnam has responded to the rise of 
China and Chinese aggression in the South China Sea by aligning itself with the US. 
Based on interviews the author conducted with 28 Southeast Asian government 
officials, the conclusion is that Vietnam is engaged in a balancing act. It is not 
getting closer to the US or China.  
Although the US has security commitments to Asia and plays a role as a 
counterweight to China that is welcomed by ASEAN, ASEAN and China share 
important principles in their thinking about international relations, and China is both 
more active and more influential in the sphere of multilateral cooperation. ASEAN 
and the US have clashed on human rights issues on many occasions. Although 
ASEAN appreciates the US contribution to regional stability, the moral advice that it 
comes with is not appreciated.10 Vietnam is an active member of ASEAN, but an 
approach that favours either China or the US is not seen as a responsible regional 
foreign policy. Vietnam’s foreign direction has tended towards multilateralism and 
                                                 
7 O’Reilly, B., ‘China-Vietnam: more carrot, less stick’, Asia Times, October 22, 2013. Available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-221013.html (Date of Visit 23 April 2014) 
8 Chanda, N., ‘The Slow Rapprochement’, American Review. Available at 
http://americanreviewmag.com/stories/The-slow-rapprochement (Date of visit 24 April 2014) 
9 McCornac, D.C., ‘Vietnam’s Relations with China: A delicate Balancing Act’, China Research 
Center. Available at http://www.chinacenter.net/vietnams-relations-with-china-a-delicate-balancing-
act/ (Date of visit 25 April 2014) 
10 Egberink, F. & Putten, F.P.V.D, ‘ASEAN, China’s Rise and Geopolitical Stability in Asia’, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2011, pp. 1-64 at 31. 
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diversification. This means Vietnam wishes to cooperate with China, the US and 
other powers in defence and other sectors, while still retaining a sense of dynamic 
balancing: a maxim might be “ keep them all equally close and equally distant.” 
ASEAN states can achieve maximum benefit if China and the US interact with each 
other in a cooperative manner, rather than engage in rivalry.  
Any time China moves aggressively, Vietnam finds itself in a more 
precarious position. If the Vietnamese government is to continue to be successful in 
maintaining a balance, it must avoid close alignment with one country at the expense 
of ties with the other. This is a unique time in Vietnam’s history when it is unified 
with enough economic and political conditions to stand up to China in the region, 
though whether it will be successful in the long-term remains to be seen. Given the 
past history of both nations and in an effort to engage in global economic integration, 
Vietnam is pursuing a foreign policy of having “more friends, fewer enemies.” 
Stable, normalized economic and military relations with both China and the US are 
the current state of affairs. Vietnam has also placed an emphasis on general global 
integration, and this has resulted in political and economic engagement with a wider 
range of countries that is aimed at countering the influence of Beijing in the region.11 
This is the Vietnamese foreign policy of independence and self-resilience with 
multilateralism and diversification of diplomatic relations for national security and 
development amid the strategic calculation of major powers.  
As a result, the claim that Vietnam is getting closer to the US to counter 
balance China is not persuasive. It is more the case that Vietnam is engaging 
multilaterally with as many states as it can. China is a large market and it is a source 
of financial assistance and a model of development for Vietnam. 12  Only when 
Washington and Beijing achieve a bearable approach towards one another in both the 
cooperative and competitive dimensions can bilateral ties between them achieve a 
win-win solution for all parties, including Vietnam. A devastating war between the 
two great powers is not likely to happen; if it does it will be a worst case scenario, as 
it is a disaster for all concerned parties, and Vietnam is no exception. On the other 
                                                 
11 McCornac, D.C., ‘Vietnam’s Relations with China: A delicate Balancing Act’, China Research 
Center. Available at http://www.chinacenter.net/vietnams-relations-with-china-a-delicate-balancing-
act/ (Date of visit 25 April 2014) 
12 McCornac, ‘Vietnam’s Relations with China: A delicate Balancing Act’. 
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hand, if China and the US can handle the bilateral relationship in a cooperative 
manner, Vietnam in particular and Southeast Asia in general can gain more 
advantages and benefits.  
So far the main response of the Southeast Asian countries to China’s rise has 
been to encourage the US, Japan and India to remain involved in the region and to 
foster strong bilateral relations with China at the same time. The downside of this 
approach is that should China’s relations with one or more of the other powers 
deteriorate, then the neutrality and relative unity of Southeast Asia could be at risk. A 
conflict among the great powers would also affect the economic prosperity of 
Southeast Asian nations. Therefore, ASEAN’s direct interest to moderate relations 
between the region’s great powers will test its best abilities. 13  Balancing in a 
dynamic manner between China and the US is the best solution for regional nations, 
including Vietnam, amid the dilemma of sitting between the global power and the 
regional giant.  
On the basis of an empirical analysis presented on the importance of 
Southeast Asia and Vietnam from Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia in the 
post-Cold War era, the author proposes policies for the region and Vietnam as to how 
to maximise the regional and individual benefits while mitigating the risks of rivalry 
between the two major powers. Regionally, ASEAN centrality is the key to solving 
the dilemma of regional countries while sitting between a global superpower and a 
regional power. ASEAN members are now increasingly stable and politically 
confident with the enhancement of ASEAN centrality in regional and global 
decisions. This new centralised approach requires coordination of members to further 
common interests. It is often seen as a benchmark for the region’s external 
relationships, especially with partners like the US. Cooperation among ASEAN 
countries, following on the heels of serious conflicts among them, has already paid 
large dividends by generating political stability. In turn, stability has provided a 
platform for economic development and productive engagement with larger foreign 
powers. Consequently, ASEAN centrality can act in a positive manner for regional 
nations in dealing with the Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia. 
                                                 
13 Egberink, F. and Van der Putten, F.P., ‘ASEAN, China’s Rise and Geopolitical Stability in Asia’, 
Clingendael Paper No. 2, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2011, pp. 1-64 at 4. 
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Objectively, dynamic balancing is another solution for Southeast Asian states 
to get maximum advantages from both major powers. This is also the responsibility 
of regional nations to make efforts to nurture the relationship of China and America 
in the region so as not to be drawn into strategic rivalry. For Vietnam, the 
dissertation argues there are internal and external implications to avoid being 
squeezed between China and the US. Domestically, it is vital for Vietnam to 
consolidate its comprehensive strength that has derived from national independence 
and reconciliation. Externally, Vietnam needs to continue to stick to completing and 
developing the renewal direction approved during the 11th National Congress of the 
CPV with national interest as the highest priority. In order to maximise state benefits, 
Vietnam needs to fully integrate into the regional global economy, community and 
society under the motto of “being a friend and reliable partner of all foreign 
countries.” Simultaneously, Vietnam should contribute actively and pro-actively to 
the regional mechanism of ASEAN for regional strength against foreign invasion or 
interference.  
Finally, Southeast Asia (and especially Vietnam) is gathering both rewards 
and risks with pros and cons in the triangular relationship with China and America. 
The important feature is how Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states will deal with 
the dynamic situation to be well adapted and responsive in a practical and positive 
manner.  
This dissertation has covered the critical 24 years from 1991 to 2015 in the 
post-Cold War era to provide an analysis of the triangular relationship of Vietnam 
between China and the US in the context of Southeast Asia. During this timeframe, 
Vietnam normalised its diplomatic relationships with both major powers and then 
developed its separate bilateral relations with the two giants in a pro-active manner. 
Dynamic balancing kept both equally close and equally distant while maintaining a 
practical approach to enhance cooperation for national security and development. 
Smart and creative diplomacy in addressing issues in its foreign relations can 
enhance Vietnam’s future security. A sense of unity with other ASEAN states to 
build and strengthen ASEAN as the key regional mechanism will further boost 
Vietnam’s friendship and partnership to gain regional and international support for 
its claims in the South China Sea territorial disputes. A win-win solution can be 
achieved as long as the major powers of China and the US approach the relationship 
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in a measured and constructive manner. If they do, Vietnam and other regional states 
can benefit from a more stable regional environment as they continue to develop 
economically. This will lead to an enhanced security environment for Southeast Asia, 
which would be of benefit to all states and peoples. 
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